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Abstract

A fundamental transformation is taking place in the basic approach to regulating
network industries. Policy makers are in the process of abandoning their centuryold commitment to rate regulation in favor of a new regulatory approach known as
access regulation. Rather than controlling the price of outputs, the new approach
focuses on compelling access to and mandating the price of inputs. Unfortunately, this shift in regulatory policy has not been met with an accompanying shift
in the manner in which regulatory authorities regulate prices. Specifically, policy
makers have continued to base rates on either historical or replacement cost. We
argue that courts and policy makers have largely ignored the fact that this fundamental shift in regulatory approach demands an equally fundamental shift in
the approach to setting prices. Economic theory suggests that regulatory authorities should base access prices on market prices. In addition, because compelled
access to most telecommunications networks requires that competitors be permitted to place equipment on the network owner’s property, access requirements
constitute physical takings for which market-based compensation must be paid.
Although the unavailability of market-based determinants once justified basing
prices on some measure of cost, the shift in regulatory policy (especially when
combined with the emergence of direct, facilities-based competition made possible by technological convergence) has caused the justifications for refusing to set
rates on the basis of market prices to fall away. We then use these insights to analyze access pricing with respect to three emerging regulatory issues: (1) access to
unbundled network elements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
(2) the access to utility poles compelled by the 19996 amendments to the Pole
Attachments Act, and (3) open access to digital subscriber line (DSL) and cable
modem networks providing high-speed broadband services.

A fundamental transformation is taking place in the basic approach
to regulating network industries. Policy makers are in the process of
abandoning their century-old commitment to rate regulation in favor
of a new regulatory approach known as access regulation. Rather than
controlling the price of outputs, the new approach focuses on
compelling access to and mandating the price of inputs.
Unfortunately, this shift in regulatory policy has not been met with an
accompanying shift in the manner in which regulatory authorities
regulate prices. Specifically, policy makers have continued to base
rates on either historical or replacement cost.
We argue that courts and policy makers have largely ignored the
fact that this fundamental shift in regulatory approach demands an
equally fundamental shift in the approach to setting prices. Economic
theory suggests that regulatory authorities should base access prices on
market prices. In addition, because compelled access to most
telecommunications networks requires that competitors be permitted
to place equipment on the network owner's property, access
requirements constitute physical takings for which market-based
compensation must be paid. Although the unavailability of marketbased determinants once justified basing prices on some measure of
cost, the shift in regulatory policy (especially when combined with the
emergence of direct, facilities-based competition made possible by
technological convergence) has caused the justifications for refusing to
set rates on the basis of market prices to fall away.
We then use these insights to analyze access pricing with respect
to three emerging regulatory issues: (1) access to unbundled network
elements mandated by the Telecommunications Act of 1996, (2) the
access to utility poles compelled by the 19996 amendments to the Pole
Attachments Act, and (3) open access to digital subscriber line (DSL)
and cable modem networks providing high-speed broadband services.
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Access is becoming a potent conceptual tool for rethinking
our world view as well as our economic view, making it the
single most powerful metaphor of the coming age.
Jeremy Rivkin1
INTRODUCTION
One of the most striking economic developments of the last decade has
been the growing importance of telecommunications networks. Scientific
breakthroughs have allowed the information and communications sectors to
explode to the point where they now comprise more than eight percent of the
nation’s total economic production2 and have been responsible for a
disproportionate share of the country’s overall economic growth over the
past several years, having expanded at roughly twenty percent each year, a
rate more than five times faster than the economy as a whole.3
Telecommunications companies have also played a starring role in a
significant number of the recent megamergers that have transformed the
business environment, with six of the ten largest mergers in history involving
telecommunications-related companies,4 and also served as the driving force
1

JEREMY RIVKIN, THE AGE OF ACCESS 15 (2000).
U.S. DEPT. OF COMMERCE, ECONOMICS AND STATISTICS ADMINISTRATION, DIGITAL ECONOMY
2002, at 26 (Feb. 2002), at http://www.esa.doc.gov/508/esa/pdf/DE2002r1.pdf.
3
Id. at 25, 27 tbl.3.4 (reporting that the information technology sector has been responsible for
between twenty-five and thirty-two percent of annual GDP growth between 1996 and 2000).
4
The top ten mergers in world history include Mannesman-Vodafone (no. 1, $184 billion), America
Online-Time Warner (no. 2, $150 billion), SBC-Ameritech (no. 5, $63 billion), AT&T-MediaOne (no. 7,
$61 billion), Vodafone-AirTouch (no. 8, $60 billion), AT&T-TCI (no. 9, $54 billion), and Deutche
Telecom-VoiceStream Wireless (no. 10, $50 billion). Other significant telecommunications-related
mergers include Bell Atlantic-GTE ($49 billion), as well as the failed merger between WorldCom and
2
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behind the spectacular rise and equally spectacular fall of the NASDAQ
index. The increase in the importance of the telecommunications sector has
been matched by an increase in its volatility. Perhaps most dramatically, the
failure of WorldCom has produced the largest bankruptcy in U.S. history.
As FCC Chairman Michael Powell has noted, these developments have left
the telecommunications industry in a state of “utter crisis,” with banks
worldwide contemplating industry write-offs of up to half a trillion dollars
and telecom operators and vendors in the U.S. laying off half a million
workers in the space of a year and a half.5
The importance and the instability of the telecommunications sector have
only served to heighten the importance of understanding how this sector is
regulated. Not only does government policy play a key role in shaping
returns and investment incentives, a growing number of commentators have
suggested that regulation has played a decisive role in precipitating much of
the turmoil that has wracked the industry of late, having shaped both the
recent wave of mergers6 and the WorldCom bankruptcy.7 The direct linkage
between regulation and industry performance has made understanding the
economic implications of current regulatory policy all the more imperative.
For more than a century, telecommunications regulation was marked by
a remarkable degree of segmentation and invariability. Since each
communications service was available only through a single technology,
each medium of communications could be governed by its own, discrete
regulatory system that did not have to take into account the impact of other
technologies. In addition, because policy makers tended to regard each
medium as a natural monopoly, their basic approach was to subject
telecommunications networks to the now-classic regime of common carriage
regulation, in which state and federal regulatory authorities imposed
nondiscrimination and mandatory service requirements, monitored quality,
supervised investments, and restricted competitive entry. Most importantly,
this approach focused on the rates that telecommunications providers could
charge end users for purchasing outputs. The primary policy issue centered
on whether such rates should be based on historical cost or replacement
cost.8
Two forces have emerged that have begun to destabilize this century-old
regulatory consensus. The first force is technological. It follows from the
Sprint ($120 billion). Houlihan Lokey Howard & Zukin, Inc., 100 Largest Announcements in History,
MERGERSTAT REV. (Jan. 2000) (available on Lexis).
5
Too Many Debts; Too Few Calls, ECONOMIST, July 20, 2002, at 59.
6
See Jim Chen, The Magnificent Seven: American Telephony’s Deregulatory Shootout, 50
HASTINGS L.J. 1503 (1999).
7
For example, noted telecommunications expert Peter Huber has argued that “Washington created
WorldCom” on the grounds that “[m]uch of the telecom industry’s current woes can be traced to
government accountants who set interconnection tariffs at levels completely divorced from economic
reality.” Peter Huber, Washington Created WorldCom, WALL ST. J., July 1, 2002, at A14. See generally
PETER HUBER, LAW AND DISORDER IN CYBERSPACE (1997).
8
See infra notes 41-56 and accompanying text.
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fact that scientific advances are rendering different communications media
increasingly interchangeable. Not only has technological convergence
provided consumers and firms a dazzling variety of ways to access network
services, it has begun to put pressure on the historical regulatory distinction
among voice, video, and data communications, in which each type of service
was governed by a separate regulatory regime.9
The second driving force is the fundamental shift in regulatory approach
exemplified by the enactment of the Telecommunications Act of 1996.10 The
heart of the 1996 Act is designed to introduce competition into local
telephone service by compelling every incumbent local telephone company
to interconnect with its competitors on reasonable and nondiscriminatory
terms and to provide them with unbundled access to every element of its
network.11 Initially hailed as a major deregulatory change,12 it has become
increasingly apparent that, rather than representing a shift towards
deregulation, the 1996 Act marked a shift towards a different style of
regulation known as “access regulation.” Rather than regulating the terms
under which consumers purchase outputs, access regulation instead regulates
the ability of competitors to obtain access to inputs. A recent study revealed
that the 1996 Act is part of a broader shift in regulatory philosophy that
spans at least six network industries.13 As the author of the quote that opens
this Article aptly acknowledges, we do indeed live in “the Age of Access.”14
These two forces have economic and constitutional implications that
should fundamentally transform the manner in which policy makers
approach network industries. Somewhat surprisingly, however, regulatory
authorities have failed to take into account the full ramifications of
convergence and the shift to compelled access and have instead reflexively
adhered to the cost-based approaches associated with traditional rate
regulation without adequately considering whether the shift to compelled
access as the primary regulatory approach requires an equally fundamental
change in the means of implementation. Because of the protracted nature of
the legal proceedings regarding the implementation of compelled access,
these issues have not yet been fully addressed by the courts, with the
Supreme Court’s recent decisions in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC15

9

See Christopher S. Yoo, Vertical Integration and Media Regulation in the New Economy, 19 YALE
J. ON REG. 171, 284-89 (2002).
10
Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56.
11
See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(2)-(3).
12
See, e.g., Statement by President William J. Clinton Upon Signing S. 652, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N.
228-1, 228-4 (praising the Act for “providing a roadmap for deregulation in the future”); Congress Maps
a Telecom Future, CHI. TRIB., Feb. 6, 1996, at 14 (calling the overall thrust of the Act “clearly
deregulatory and pro-competitive”).
13
Joseph D. Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Grand Transformation of Regulated Industries
Law, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 1323, 1340-57, 1364-83 (1998).
14
See RIVKIN, supra note 1.
15
122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002).
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and National Cable and Telecommunications Ass’n v. FCC16 representing
only a few rounds of what will undoubtedly be a protracted series of major
court decisions addressing these issues.
The debates about access to telecommunication networks have been
further obscured by academic writings that have made networks seem like
increasingly complex and exotic phenomena. Many of the basic concepts
about networks remain poorly defined and misunderstood. In addition,
networks tend to be characterized by sunk costs as well as economies of
scale and scope that many theorists mistakenly believe distinguish the
economic analysis of networks from other forms of production. A
burgeoning literature argues that networks are susceptible to unique types of
market failures, so-called network externalities, which in turn require
regulators to intervene in ways not required in other industries.
This argument advanced in this Article is designed to place the issues
surrounding access pricing on a sounder economic and legal foundation that
takes into account the full import of the recent changes in technology and
regulatory theory. Part I demystifies networks as an economic phenomenon
by offering a more precise definition of what constitutes network access. As
we will explain in greater detail later, network access is properly viewed as
third-party use of the transmission services provided through the network.
Basic economic theory indicates that efficiency would best be promoted if
access to those network services were based on their market value. Reliance
on market-based pricing mechanisms tends not only to allocate goods to their
highest and best use; it also provides the proper signals to parties who are
thinking about investing in network technologies.
Rather than basing access prices on the market value of the network
services provided, regulators are currently employing access pricing
methodologies that focus instead on the cost of the inputs used to establish
the physical network. For the reasons we further explain in Part I, we find
this approach to be quite problematic. It is true that in a static world, the
costs of production would represent a good approximation of the earning
potential and thus the market value of those inputs. In a dynamic world,
however, improvements in production technology, innovations in goods and
services, shifts in consumer demand, entry and exit of producers, and
changes in factor prices can cause the cost of inputs to deviate from their
market value. The greater the rate of change of technology and other forces,
the greater this disparity is likely to be. Given the unpredictability of such
changes, the deviations from market value caused by basing access prices on
the cost of the inputs used to create the network will tend to lead to gluts or
shortages and will eventually induce entrants to over- or under-invest in
certain types of network capacity. Furthermore, basing access prices on
input costs ignores the fact that the whole is typically greater than the sum of
16

122 S. Ct. 782 (2002).
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its parts. So long as a firm is efficient and creative, the value of the services
provided by the firm is likely to exceed the cost of the inputs it uses.
The only plausible justification for basing regulated prices on cost in the
past was that the fact that the absence of external markets caused by the lack
of technological substitutes made it impossible to base rates on market
prices. By stimulating direct facilities-based competition, the two forces that
we have identified (technological convergence and the shift to access
regulation) have made market-based pricing both feasible and desirable. Part
I closes by refuting arguments advanced by other scholars suggesting that
network industries are somehow prone to unique forms of market failure that
would justify adhering to cost-based pricing. Our analysis shows that
economies of scale and scope, sunk costs and network economic effects do
not generally cause market prices to deviate from levels that promote
efficiency and do not change the basic analysis.
Part II describes the constitutional implications of the transformations we
have identified by evaluating the limits that the Takings Clause places on the
regulation of access pricing. Because rate regulation simply limits the terms
of the contracts for finished goods and services, it represents the type of
“adjustment of economic burdens”17 traditionally subject to the more
permissive analysis applied to nonpossessory takings. Access regulation, in
contrast, typically requires network owners to permit third parties to place
equipment on their property. As a result, access regulation necessarily falls
within the Supreme Court’s physical takings jurisprudence, which mandates
that the government reimburse property owners for the market value of their
property without regard to the economic impact of the regulation or whether
the regulation in question furthers important public interests.18 Therefore,
just compensation for compelled access exactly corresponds to the
economically efficient prices for compelled access.
Part III applies the analytical framework developed in the preceding
sections to three emerging policy problems: (1) unbundled access to
elements of local telephone networks that underlay the Supreme Court’s
recent decision in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC; (2) access to
networks of utility poles that formed the basis for the Court’s decision last
Term in National Cable & Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.;
and (3) open access to high speed broadband systems, encompassing both
cable modem systems and DSL systems, that represents the focus of two
ongoing proceedings before the FCC.19 We conclude that the steps taken to
implement each of these access regimes violates the economic and
constitutional principles that we have identified. Established principles of

17

Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. City of N.Y., 438 U.S. 104 (1978).
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
19
See infra notes 512-515, 535-539 and accompanying text.
18
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economics and constitutional law instead require that regulators adopt
methodologies that base access rates on market prices.
I.

EFFICIENT PRICING OF ACCESS TO NETWORKS

This Part focuses on removing some of the perceived mystery
surrounding the economics of network access. It begins in Section A by
offering a definition of what constitutes a network and access to a network.
Section B lays out the basic case for basing access rates on market pricing.
Section C discusses the various methodologies for determining market
prices. Section D offers a review of the various features of networks that
have led some commentators to suggest that reliance on market prices in
network industries might not constitute the best way to promote economic
efficiency.
In short, conventional economic principles dictate that access prices
should be based on the market value of the relevant input. Although the
absence of comparable transactions in external markets has historically led
regulatory authorities to eschew market-based pricing in favor of cost-based
pricing, technological convergence and the shift to access regulation have
drained this justification of its vitality. The emergence of direct facilitiesbased competition from alternative telecommunications networks has created
market-based benchmarks that can serve as independent bases for setting
rates. Contrary to the suggestion of some commentators, distinctive
economic features of networks such as sunk costs, economies of scale and
scope, and network economic effects, do not alter this core conclusion.
A. Defining Access to Networks
At its most basic level, a network is a system of nodes and links between
them. The nodes of a traditional telecommunications network are the
company’s switches and customer premises connections, while the links are
the wires. For a wireless network, the nodes are the receivers, transmitters,
and the links are the radio spectrum. Networks have many different
configurations. A star-shaped network is a simple configuration in which
there is a single hub and all lines are spokes. Hub-and-spoke networks have
multiple hubs with high-capacity trunk lines connecting the main hubs and
lower-capacity spokes reaching terminal points. The high-capacity trunk
lines aggregate traffic and offer cost economies in comparison to a network
that
provides
connections
between
every
individual
point.
Telecommunications networks have high-capacity trunks or backbones and
lower-capacity distribution lines such as the local loop to the individual
home or business. Economic life is critically dependent on many types of
privately owned networks: for communications (broadcast television and
radio, cable television, telephone, broadband data, utility poles), for energy
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(electric power transmission and distribution, natural gas and petroleum
pipelines), for transportation (airlines, railroads, bus and trucks, shipping),
and for distribution systems (postal services, product wholesale services).
The type of networks on which we are focusing generally are physical
production facilities that encompass factors of production such as land,
capital equipment, and technology.20 Construction of these facilities
necessarily requires network owners to invest in substantial fixed assets that
should be viewed in the same way as other types of capital equipment, such
as manufacturing plants, office buildings, and commercial structures. Like
other long-term assets the network’s physical production facilities do not
vary directly with output in the short-term. Like other capital investments,
the configuration of the network’s physical assets cannot be changed in the
short-term. Given sufficient time, however, the network’s capital equipment
is variable and can be adjusted to create different capacity levels. The
operation of a network’s facilities often requires variable inputs as well, such
as the labor used to maintain its facilities and to monitor its operations.
In combination, these productive inputs that constitute the network are
used to create a stream of services that are the outputs of the network, such
as the transmission and distribution of communications. Just as natural gas
transmission does not consume the physical pipeline, usage of a
telecommunications network does not consume the network itself but instead
only temporarily precludes the use of the network for providing services to
some other user. Of course, network use does impose some wear and tear on
the network’s physical production facilities. The measures of depreciation
employed under generally accepted accounting principles do not provide an
accurate indication of the value of the services provided by the equipment,
however. As a result, the applicable depreciation rules typically do not
provide an accurate reflection of the economic life of the equipment.
Access to a network refers to the usage of the network’s services, which
are the outputs of the network.21 Thus, access to a network does not
represent simply a physical connection to the network, which is but a means
to an end. Rather, access refers to the opportunity to benefit from the
services generated by the usage of the network. Since usage of network
elements by another company potentially reduces the services that the
20

Our focus is on physical facilities in transportation, energy, and communications networks. We
do not consider other usages of the term networks that refer to interconnected relationships between
people such as social or business relationships.
21
Although more general definitions of “access” exist, they seem too broad to provide guidance for
pricing access to network. See, e.g., BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 13 (6th ed., 1990) (defining access as
“an opportunity or ability to enter, approach, pass to and from, or communicate with”); OXFORD ENGLISH
DICTIONARY (defining the noun, access, as a “way or means of approach” such as “entrance, channel,
passage, or doorway” or the action of “coming to or towards; approaching,” and identifies the verb, “to
access,” as “to gain access to (data, etc., held in a computer or computer-based system, or the system
itself)”). We do not consider the notion of access as an entitlement, as is the case with access to facilities
under the Americans with Disabilities Act, or access to education or housing under antidiscrimination
statutes.
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network owner can provide, the correct price of access depends on what the
company could have obtained by using those network services itself or by
selling network services to some other party. The proper measure of the
value of network access is thus the value of the network services provided,
which in turn is determined by the value of the final output of the network.
B. Making the Economic Case for Market-Based Pricing of Network Access
1. Market Prices, Regulated Prices, and Efficiency
The modern consensus economic position is that market prices represent
the best reflection of value. The market price is the outcome of the forces of
supply and demand. The supply side of the market reflects the costs to
sellers of providing a good. The demand side of the market reflects the
benefits to buyers from consuming the good. At market equilibrium, prices
are thus determined by the marginal cost to sellers of providing the good and
the marginal benefit to buyers of consuming the good. Prices are adjusted
through the process of exchange to balance supply and demand and clear the
market so that prices are further reflections of scarcity—the meeting of
consumer wants and supplier capacities.22
Because the services of a network are comparable to the output of any
other type of production facility, they can be allocated by market processes.
Markets refer to the interaction of buyers and sellers,23 with market prices
mediating between what buyers are willing to pay and what sellers are
willing to accept. Market prices are determined through the activities of
suppliers, customers and intermediaries such as retailers and wholesalers. In
the short run, producers increase prices when demand exceeds supply and
lower prices when supply exceeds demand. In the long run, suppliers make
production decisions based on the incentives provided by the prices of goods
in comparison with costs and the prices of alternative goods the supplier
might provide. Firms that supply a good at some price are those whose cost
of each unit provided and the cost at the margin (the last unit provided) equal
or exceed the market price. Conversely, consumers make purchasing
22
The determination of market equilibrium prices and of value by the interaction supply and
demand, at least in the short run, were well understood by the classical economists, including Adam Smith
and David Ricardo. The classical economists had various cost-based explanations for the determination
of the long-run prices of land, labor, and capital. Beginning in the Nineteenth Century, the marginalist
revolution that led to the neoclassical economies of today extended the supply and demand analysis
consistently to output and input markets both in the short and long run. See WILLIAM STANLEY JEVONS,
THE THEORY OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (London MacMillan 1871); CARL MENGER, PRINCIPLES OF
ECONOMICS 119 (James Dingwall & Bert Hoselitz trans., 1950) (1871); LEON WALRAS, ELEMENTS OF
PURE ECONOMICS (William Jaffé trans., Richard D. Irwin, Inc. 1954) (1874); ALFRED MARSHALL,
PRINCIPLES OF ECONOMICS (London, MacMillan 1890). See generally MARK BLAUG, ECONOMIC
THEORY IN RETROSPECT 302 (1968).
23
On the role of intermediaries in market allocation mechanisms, see DANIEL F. SPULBER, MARKET
MICROSTRUCTURE: INTERMEDIARIES AND THE THEORY OF THE FIRM (1999).
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decisions based on the benefits that they derive from that good and the
availability of substitute goods. The consumers that purchase a good at some
price are those whose benefits of each unit consumed at the margin (the last
unit consumed) equal or exceed the market price. The price will eventually
adjust until the market clears, at which point supply and demand will be in
balance and the benefits to consumers will equal or exceed the costs to
suppliers. The market price equals the marginal benefit of the good and thus
indicates its economic value.
Markets are effective mechanisms for pricing not only physical products
such as automobiles and food but also services such as transportation or
restaurant services. Many types of services are routinely purchased and sold.
For example, video rental stores supply their customers with entertainment
services corresponding to viewing a movie at home. Movie theaters provide
similar entertainment services that require viewing the movie at the theater.
Automobile renting and leasing supplies customers with the transportation
services of a vehicle. There is no distinction in economic theory between the
market allocation of physical products and the market allocation of services.
Accordingly, markets can allocate services that are generated by networks
just as they do any other type of physical product or service.
Market prices promote allocative and dynamic efficiency. Allocation of
goods is said to be efficient when the purchasers of a particular good are
those who obtain the greatest benefit from consumption and when the
suppliers of the good are those who incur the lowest cost of production. By
allocating the good or service to the person or firm willing to pay the most
for it, the price mechanism also ensures that goods and services are placed in
the hands of those able to put them to their best use. The price mechanism
further insures that goods and services are provided by the most efficient
suppliers.
Dynamic efficiency is attained when economic actors make efficient
investment decisions. Investment decisions are efficient when the present
discounted value of the marginal returns to invest equal the marginal cost of
investment. Market prices provide incentives for efficient investment
decisions because the market prices of services created by capital facilities
are the best measure of the marginal benefit derived by users of those
services. A firm deciding whether or not to invest in production facilities to
produce a good or service makes efficient decisions by considering the
market value of the products and services to be created with those facilities
in comparison with the cost of investment. A firm choosing whether to
purchase a good or service or to construct its own production facilities makes
efficient decisions by comparing the market price of purchasing the good or
service with the investment costs of constructing its own facilities and the
costs of operating those facilities. Because market prices allocate productive
capacity efficiently, signaling marginal benefits and marginal cost, they
provide an accurate guide for investment decisions.

10
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Regulated prices based on costs tend not to represent an accurate
reflection of either the value of a good or services or the economic costs of
producing the service. This is because regulatory authorities are less
effective at processing information about costs and benefits than are the
many buyers and sellers that make up a market.24 Even worse, the
government typically must rely on the regulated entities, which of course
have a vested interest in the outcome, for much of the critical information.
As a result, it is not uncommon for regulated prices to cause allocative
inefficiency. To the extent that the regulated price deviates from the market
price, it sends incorrect signals to both users and suppliers of access. For
example, regulation that compels access to networks at regulated prices that
fall below market rates in effect requires network owners to subsidize
competitors. This in turn leads those competitors to demand more network
capacity than would be allocatively efficient. In addition, because access is
an input used in the production of other goods and services, pricing it below
market rates can cause competitors to make inefficient decisions about which
markets to enter, since below-market pricing may mislead competitors into
believing that the benefits of serving a particular market exceed the costs by
understating the true economic costs associated with entering that market. In
addition, the artificial reduction in input prices will cause secondary
distortions. If regulators set the price of network access below market levels,
competitors will naturally adjust the mix of inputs so that they employ
reduced quantities of other inputs and greater quantities of network access.
The result not only creates allocative inefficiency in the primary market by
stimulating excess demand for network access; it also creates secondary
distortions in the markets for the other inputs by increasing or reducing
demand for those inputs. To the extent that the suppliers of access are
regulated utilities, the burden will be borne by customers as well as the
utilities.
In addition to impeding allocative efficiency, imposition of regulated
pricing can also impede dynamic efficiency. Pricing access at below-market
levels discourages existing network owners from investing in additional
network capacity. At the same time, it also discourages competing
companies from investing in alternative capacity, including substitute
network technologies. This effect underscores the extent to which access
requirements represent something of a policy anomaly.25 The central focus
of competition policy is to prevent monopolies from emerging and to break
them up whenever they occur. Access requirements, in contrast, leave the
bottlenecks in place and instead simply require the monopolist to share its
facilities. In addition, by rescuing competing firms from having to supply
24
See FRIEDRICH A. HAYEK, THE FATAL CONCEIT (W.W. Bartley III ed., 1988); Friedrich A.
Hayek, The Use of Knowledge in Society, 35 AM. ECON. REV. 519 (1945).
25
See Yoo, supra note 9, at 246-47, 269.
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the relevant input for themselves, compelled access destroys their incentives
to invest in alternative network technologies and thus deprives providers of
emerging substitute technologies of their natural strategic partners. As a
result, compelled access can have the perverse effect of entrenching any
supposed bottleneck facility by forestalling the emergence of the alternative
facilities. This is particularly problematic in technologically dynamic
industries, in which the prospects of developing new ways either to
circumvent or to compete directly with the alleged bottleneck are the highest.
Finally, there is good reason to question the extent to which ratemaking
authorities will in fact make the pursuit of economic efficiency their primary
goal. As the burgeoning literature on public choice has demonstrated,
governmental institutions are subject to a wide variety of pressures that can
cause them to redirect competition policy towards noneconomic ends.26 The
system of cross subsidies in telephone pricing provides an apt illustration of
how governmentally established pricing can be directed towards political and
social goals and thus provide an imperfect guide for allocation of goods and
services or for investment decisions. A review of the FCC’s previous
attempts to use access requirements to promote competition provides little
basis for optimism in this regard.27
The end result is similar to any system of rent controls, with demand for
the service exceeding supply at the regulated price. Prices do not fully serve
their function of rationing capacity among users and stimulating the
provision of capacity among suppliers. Market prices, in contrast, send
correct signals to companies that seek access as well as to utilities that
provide access. Competing companies will have incentives to make
economically correct decisions about the amount of services to obtain from
the network access supplier and the extent to which the competing company
should invest in its own network services.
2. The Difference Between Market Prices and Unit Costs
As the foregoing discussion demonstrates, the market price of a good is
the best indication of its value. The market price of a good can differ from
the costs incurred in obtaining the inputs used to produce the good. This is
because there are many types of forces that affect market prices through
changes in demand and supply. New methods of production that increase
26

See, e.g., ROBERT H. BORK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX 347-64 (1978); Fred S. McChesney, Be
True to Your School: Chicago’s Contradictory Views of Antitrust and Regulation, in THE CAUSES AND
CONSEQUENCES OF ANTITRUST 323 (Fred S. McChesney & William F. Shughart II eds., 1995); William J.
Baumol & Janusz Ordover, Use of Antitrust to Subvert Competition, 28 J.L. & ECON. 247, 256-59 (1985);
Sam Peltzman, Toward a More General Theory of Regulation, 19 J.L. & ECON. 211 (1976); Richard A.
Posner, Natural Monopoly and Its Regulation, 21 STAN. L. REV. 548, 622 (1969); George Stigler, The
Theory of Economic Regulation 2 BELL J. ECON. 3 (1971).
27
See Donna M. Lampert, Cable Television: Does Leased Access Mean Least Access?, 44 FED.
COMM. L.J. 245 (1992).
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efficiency are likely to increase supply at any given price. Changes in the
relative prices of inputs, including finance capital, wages, land rents, and the
prices parts and components have complex effects on supply. The entry and
exit of producers and decisions to expand or contract production capacity
also impact supply. The introduction of innovative products can create shifts
in both demand and supply toward new products. Changes in consumer
tastes and income can also change demand at any give price. Changes in the
prices of substitute and complementary goods also shift demand.
Accordingly, the market prices of output are unlikely to correspond to the
past costs incurred to produce that output. Even if individual producers try
to anticipate output prices in their decisions, market uncertainty will defeat
their efforts, leading to randomness in profit margins.
Even if market prices were to reflect accurately the costs of the marginal
producer, they would depart from the costs of the inframarginal producer.
Costs tend to differ across firms; there are differences in business methods,
management techniques, production processes and technological knowledge
across firms. Moreover, the value of output can depart from the costs of
inputs because firms combine those inputs in different ways, creating
different products and addressing customer needs differently.
Firm
heterogeneity strongly implies that the unit costs of any individual firm are
likely to differ from the market price. Under the textbook paradigm of
perfect competition with identical firms and static demands, efficient entry
guarantees that the market price eventually equals the unit cost of firms.
This cannot be the case when unit costs vary across firms.
Because of uncertainty regarding changes in output markets, there are
likely to be deviations between output prices and unit costs. Some firms will
earn economic profits and others will suffer economic losses. Moreover,
firms often change prices in anticipation of developments since they respond
to the expectations of buyers and sellers about future market conditions.
Thus, prices are likely to depart from costs.28
Even though competitive forces tend to move market prices toward cost
through the exit of improvement of inefficient producers, the past costs of
producing a good are likely to differ substantially from current and future
costs. Costs change due to technological change and changes in input prices.
Market prices correspond more to current and forward-looking demand and
supply conditions than to past costs. Traditional cost-of-service regulation at
best adjusts prices to reflect past costs, thereby permitting regulated rates to
depart substantially from market prices. The fundamental reason for this
departure is that the economic cost of inputs used to produce some output is
not the same as the market price or economic value of an output produced
28
“The question of fact is thus whether entrepreneurs as a class receive on the average more or less
than the normal competitive rate of return on the productive services of person or property which they
furnish to the business. The question does not admit to any definitive answer on inductive grounds.”
FRANK H. KNIGHT, RISK, UNCERTAINTY AND PROFIT 364 (1921).
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with those inputs. This is why regulated rates based on the costs of
production are necessarily second best.
C. Determining Market Price
Saying that regulatory authorities should base rates for network access
on market prices leaves open the question of how to determine the prevailing
market price. Market transactions constitute the most (if not the only)
reliable indicator of individual preferences.29 Thus, regulators should
develop market benchmarks if they choose not to defer to market
mechanisms for allocation.
1. Pricing Based on External Market Transactions
Under standard valuation techniques, the most reliable indicator of
market price tends to be the comparable sales approach, in which the price
charged for the hypothetical transaction in question is determined by prices
changed in actual market transactions involving similar goods. Two types of
market transactions can serve as external benchmarks for comparable sales.
The easiest case occurs when network owner also sells the same type of
access mandated by the government into an external market. When that is
the case, determination of market value is easy, since comparable sales can
serve as a reliable proxy for the services provided.
In addition, market value may be inferred from the price charged for
access to a substitute transmission technology that provides similar services.
Although the historical balkanization of communications has long made such
determinations impossible, technological convergence has made resort to this
type of external benchmark increasingly feasible. Admittedly, transactions
involving substitute technologies can be slightly more difficult to apply as
benchmarks than can transactions using the same type of network.
Differences in network configuration can complicate direct comparisons
between alternative technologies. For example, although cable television
and digital broadcast satellite systems (DBS) have emerged as direct
competitors, the wire-based distribution of cable operators is necessarily
restricted to a limited geographic area, whereas the footprint of DBS
providers is inherently national in scope.30 In addition, network performance
and reliability levels provided by different types of network technology often
differ. As a result, prices must be adjusted to reflect differences in the type
of network before any comparisons can be drawn. Although such
29
See, e.g., Paul A. Samuelson, Consumption Theory in Terms of Revealed Preference, 15
ECONOMICA 243 (1948).
30
The fact that DBS is inherently national in scope makes it uniquely well suited to taking
advantage of the economies inherent in national distribution of video programming. See Christopher S.
Yoo, The Rise and Demise of the Technology-Specific Approach to the First Amendment, 91 GEO. L.J.
(forthcoming 2003),
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adjustments can be somewhat complicated, they are by no means so
intractable as to render transactions occurring on alternative networks useless
as external benchmark for inferring market prices.
The other principal market-based valuation method is known as the
income capitalization approach. When commercial property is involved,
regulators can use a discounted cash flow analysis to determine the present
value of the income that the input is projected to earn. Because the earnings
are based on the prices charged in the output markets, it is possible to apply
this method even if the input being priced is not sold in any external markets
whatsoever. In addition, because the income capitalization approach is based
from data derived from actual market transactions, it is still generally
regarded as a reliable means for determining market value.
2. The Second-Best Solution in the Absence of External Markets
If a market benchmark is not available, then an estimate based on the
economic costs of providing the service may be necessary. Such an estimate
should approximate the market value of all the inputs used to create and
operate the network, with the understanding that the market price of network
access can be greater or less than that estimate. Over time, the market price
of access should reflect the economic cost of all of the inputs used to provide
network services. In the short run, however, market prices may deviate from
economic cost. With scarcity of network access, the market price of access
would likely be greater than the replacement cost of the network.
Conversely, with a glut or network capacity or obsolescence of network
technology, the market price of access would likely be less than the
replacement cost of the network. For example, a glut in fiber optic capacity
would be expected to reduce the price of access to below the cost of the
network. Accordingly, it is important to distinguish the market value of a
good from the economic costs of providing that good. However, the
economic cost of providing that good properly estimated provides a secondbest alternative.
The economic cost of producing a product or service is the total
opportunity costs of all the inputs used to produce that product or service.
The economic cost of producing network services in telecommunications
includes the opportunity costs of such inputs as capital, land and land rights,
wires, utility poles, towers and fixtures, switches, control systems,
construction costs as well as operation and maintenance expenses and
management costs. The opportunity cost of an input refers to the value of the
best opportunity necessarily foregone, that is, the return from the best
alternative employment of that input. The user costs of capital associated
with owning plant and equipment is equal to the foregone return from the
best alternative investment of expenditures made for plant and equipment.
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For most productive inputs, the most accurate measure of opportunity
cost is the market value of that input, which is simply the current market
price of the input less the avoidable direct costs associated with providing the
input. For those inputs for which there is no market price that is readily
available, it is necessary to impute or estimate the market value. The best
estimate is based on the opportunity cost of the input. For example, if a
company owns a plot of land that it could rent to another company for the
$500, that is the opportunity cost of using the land.
Replacement cost of an input, which is the cost of purchasing that input
in the market at current market prices, is in turn provides a reasonable
approximation of market value. Accordingly, the market value of the inputs
used to create a network includes the replacement costs of facilities and
equipments as well as the user cost of capital evaluated using the market cost
of capital; land and land rights evaluated using current market rents, and
current operation and maintenance expenses. Replacement costs refer to
forward-looking costs of constructing the network and include all costs that
the utility would incur to rebuild its system including the costs of capital,
land, labor services, and management costs.31 A good proxy for replacement
cost is a recent purchase cost of the input. It is not a perfect measure, since
the market price may have increased or decreased since the most recent
purchase. Nonetheless, in the absence of indicia that measure market value
more directly, estimates of replacement cost based on comparable
transactions provide a useful and workable estimate of market value.
It is now generally accepted that replacement cost is superior to
historical cost as a measure of market value, because, as noted by thenProfessor Stephen Breyer, “[a] competitive marketplace values assets, not at
their historical price, but at their replacement value—the present cost of
obtaining the identical service that the old asset provides.”32 Historical costs
suffer from several well-recognized infirmities. For example, the market
value of an input may have increased or decreased since its purchase. In
addition, historical costs will typically be based on the book values of plant
and equipment (also known as “embedded costs”). The depreciation
schedules allowed under the applicable accounting rules and tax laws often
fail to constitute proper economic measures of depreciation. Replacement
31

Scholars and policy makers have disputed whether the replacement cost determination should be
based on the network as it is currently configured or on a hypothetical network employing the most
efficient technology and configuration available. Resolution of this debate, while undoubtedly important
in implementing any access regime, falls outside the scope of this Article, which focuses primarily on the
importance of making sure that any access prices set by regulatory authorities include some measure of
the market demand for access. For an early argument in favor of hypothetical networks, see Missouri ex
rel. Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission, 262 U.S. 276, 312 (1923) (Brandeis,
J., concurring in the judgment). For a modern argument in support of basing replacement cost on the
configuration of existing networks, see J. GREGORY SIDAK & DANIEL F. SPULBER, DEREGULATORY
TAKINGS AND THE REGULATORY CONTRACT 419-25 (1997); J. Gregory Sidak & Daniel F. Spulber,
Givings, Takings, and the Fallacy of Forward-Looking Costs, 72 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068 (1997).
32
STEPHEN BREYER, REGULATION AND ITS REFORM 38 (1982) (emphasis in original).
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costs, in contrast, more accurately reflect changes in value. It is true that
replacement cost is not without its own complications and that short-term
changes can temporarily cause replacement cost to rise above or fall below
equilibrium levels. On the whole, however, replacement cost provides a
reasonably reliable measure of the direct costs of providing the services of a
network.
The costs of supplying network access also include transaction costs.
The network operator must devote management and employee resources to
handling the provision of network services including arranging network
connections, monitoring usage, and billing for use of the network. In the
face of mandated access, the owner of the network must determine what are
the existing demands for capacity and make arrangements to provide
additional capacity to meet regulatory requirements. For example, in the
case of pole attachments, the FCC requires that a utility take steps to expand
the capacity of its poles, ducts, conduits, and even rights of way upon request
by telecommunications carriers and cable operators.33 The provision of pole
attachment services also may involve actions that generate convenience or
transaction cost savings for the telecommunications or cable TV companies
seeking access in comparison with producing their own system of poles.34
Transaction costs may be difficult to recover when rates are regulated
because they may appear intangible to regulators. Despite this fact,
transaction costs significantly affect prices and decisions in competitive
markets.
3. The Efficient Component Pricing Rule
As emphasized thus far, pricing access to a network refers to the prices
attached to the services generated by the entire network. An alternative
regulatory approach to network access grants users the services of particular
inputs to the network rather than the output of services from the network as a
whole. This originates with trackage rights in railroads, whereby rights were
given to third party operators of trains on a railroad’s track, and is reflected
in the Telecommunications Act of 1996, which mandates a very different
type of network access based on usage of the services of individual
components of the network rather than the services of the network itself.
Thus, this approach focuses on the services of inputs to the network rather
than the outputs of the network. For example, with regards to network
components such as the local loop, switches, or other facilities (called
“network elements”), the 1996 Act requires that incumbent local exchange
33
Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 16075-76 ¶¶ 1162-1163 (1996).
34
Id. at 16076-77 ¶ 1164 (declining to require companies seeking access under the Pole Attachments
Act to exhaust the possibilities of leasing capacity from other providers before requesting the pole owner
to expand its capacity).
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carriers (LECs) to provide “nondiscriminatory access . . . on an unbundled
basis at any technically feasible point.”35 In the case of collocation,
incumbent LECs have the duty to provide “physical collocation of equipment
necessary for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements at the
premises of the local exchange carrier.”36 Access to unbundled network
elements corresponds to a manufacturer providing another company with
usage of a piece of capital equipment, such as a machine tool. Collocation
corresponds to a manufacturer allowing another company to locate its
equipment in the manufacturer’s factory.
Regulatory pricing of access to isolated network inputs raises some of
the same issues that came up in a connection with pricing of access to
services provided by the network as a whole. The best way to price access to
inputs is to consider the market price of similar access. If a market
benchmark is not available, there is a need to resort to cost-based estimates
of providing access to the input. Again, the market value of the input is a
desirable benchmark if available.
It would be misleading to assume, as does the FCC, that the cost of
providing usage of an input to the network is confined to the direct cost of
that input.37 The input is part of a network and, accordingly, the usage of a
network component by another company necessarily has an impact on the
output of services using the network. The capacity of the network element to
provide network services is correspondingly diminished, thus reducing the
output of services by the network itself. To take a simple example, a set of
tires for an automobile may cost only $400, but allowing another motorist to
use the tires would preclude usage of the automobile. The foregone value of
the automobile might be say $20,000. In the same way, the cost of allowing
competing telecommunications companies access to unbundled network
elements would depend not on the direct cost of providing that element but
on the indirect cost of removing the services of that element from the
network of the incumbent telephone company. Accordingly, the cost of
providing access to unbundled network elements should not be measured in
terms of the cost of obtaining the input. Rather, the cost depends on the
reduction in overall network services that result from using a network
element for another purpose by another company.
The proper valuation of the cost of making an input available is the
direct cost of the input plus the value of the diminished output. Thus, prices
set at economic cost of an input must represent the sum of the direct
35

47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3).
Id. § 251(c)(6).
37
As will be discussed in greater detail later, the FCC issued regulations that prices for the
unbundled access to network elements be based on each element’s Total Element Long Run Incremental
Cost (TELRIC). This cost notion corresponds with the direct cost that a manufacturer would incur in
providing another company with the usage of a piece of capital equipment in the manufacturer’s factory.
It does not include any factors designed to capture opportunity costs.
36
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incremental cost of providing the input and the opportunity costs associated
with providing the input to a competitor. The analytical methodology for
setting input access prices at these levels is known as the Efficient
Component Pricing Rule (ECPR), which would set access prices according
to the following formula:
access price = incumbent’s per-unit incremental cost of
providing access + the incumbent’s opportunity cost of
providing the unbundled input.
Since usage of network elements by another company potentially reduces the
services that the network can provide, the correct price of those network
elements depends on what the company could have obtained by selling
network services. Thus, the market price of network services, the outputs of
the network, should be used as the basis for determining the value of access
to the services of network components, the inputs of the network.38 In the
absence of market prices for network output, the opportunity cost calculation
can be based on the regulated rates for the incumbent firm’s output.
We acknowledge that allocating the retail markup among multiple
products using ECPR (or any other access pricing method) poses conceptual
and administrative problems. For example, if a competitor were to lease two
or more network elements from an incumbent LEC, it would be improper, of
course, to include the entire retail markup in the opportunity cost component
for both elements, since that would in effect allow the incumbent LEC to
recover twice for the same markup. The retail markup could be divided
among the various elements, but doing so would require some method
(probably based in cost accounting) for apportioning the markup to particular
elements. While this problem is most easily posed when the same
competitor leases both elements, the same problem arises if two different
competitors were to lease the same elements or even two different elements
in the same chain of production. Although the allocation of foregone retail
margin to particular components is inevitably somewhat arbitrary, such
problems are endemic to any system of establishing prices for inputs.
Apportioning the foregone retail margin should not prove any more
intractable than the apportionment of common costs that must inevitably
occur under any regulatory scheme that relies on compelled access.39 In any
event, the pricing of the element should at least cover its direct incremental
cost to avoid cross subsidization.
The market-determined efficient component pricing rule (M-ECPR)
adjusts the calculation of opportunity costs by using a benchmark market
38

Cites to ECPR literature here.
See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions in Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15852-53 ¶ 696 (1996) (proposing several possible approaches to allocating
common costs).
39
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price (if one exists) rather than using regulated rates for the incumbent firm’s
output. It is again likely that regulated rates for network services will not
correspond to the market price of competing alternatives. Thus, the MECPR provides a method of adjusting access prices to reflect market prices
of network services. This promotes efficient allocation of network services
as well as dynamic efficiency of investment decisions.40
Opportunity cost is the means by which access pricing attempts to reflect
market demand for the network services in question. Any regime that bases
access prices solely on production costs without taking market demand into
account would lead to allocative inefficiency and dynamic inefficiency. It
would ignore the importance of a demand component that formed the
foundation for the emergence of neoclassical economics.
4. Traditional, Cost-Based Approaches to Setting Rates in Regulated
Industries
Conventional economic theory thus suggests that access rates in network
industries promote economic efficiency only if they are set on the basis of
market prices. If market-based pricing is unavailable, the appropriate
second-best solution is to base rates on the economic costs of providing
access, which is a concept that embraces both direct incremental costs and
opportunity costs. Historically, however, regulatory authorities have
established rates solely on the basis of direct costs without taking opportunity
costs into account. The dominant initial position was the “fair value”
principle associated with the landmark decision in Smyth v. Ames,41 which
required that rates be based on the replacement cost of the assets used to
provide the service. The preference for replacement costs was based on the
recognition that if the regulated entity constituted a natural monopoly, by
definition no external transactions would exist that could serve as the basis
for market-based pricing. At the same time, parties who obtain service under
a regulated rate always had the option of constructing a substitute facility.
This meant that in the long run replacement cost would tend to reflect market
demand. Although technological and functional obsolescence could cause
replacement cost to be a misleading reflection of market value in some
circumstances, in the absence of data based on actual transactions
replacement cost remained a useful proxy.42
The primary alternative to the replacement cost methodologies
associated with Smyth v. Ames was the historical cost methodologies
40

See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 307-33.
169 U.S. 466 (1898). On its face, Smyth v. Ames appeared to offer a laundry list of considerations
to guide the ratemaking determination. Id. at 546-57. When placed in context, it becomes clear that
Smyth v. Ames and its progeny firmly endorsed the replacement cost approach to rate regulation. Stephen
A. Siegel, Understanding the Lochner Era: Lessons from the Controversy over Railroad and Utility Rate
Regulation, 70 VA. L. REV. 187, 227-28 (1984).
42
See Siegel, supra note 41, at 221-22, 229, 231; supra note 31-32 and accompanying text.
41
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associated with Justice Brandeis’s separate opinion in Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.43 Although
Brandeis recognized that the comparable sales would represent the most
accurate methodology for determining the utility’s value for ratemaking
purposes, he concluded that such prices were impossible to determine, “since
utilities, unlike merchandise or land, are not commonly bought and sold in
the market.”44 Brandeis further noted that calculate value by capitalizing the
utility’s earnings necessarily embroiled regulatory authorities in a “vicious
circle.”45 As the Court later noted, “The heart of the matter is that rates
cannot be made to depend upon ‘fair value’ when the value of the going
enterprise depends on earnings under whatever rates may be anticipated”; the
result is that fair value becomes “the end product of the process of ratemaking not the starting point.”46
In the absence of some market-determined basis for setting rates,
Brandeis believed that rates necessarily must be based on some measure of
cost. Brandeis recognized that replacement cost might well represent the
best evidence of present value, since replacement cost constituted a better
reflection of technological improvements.47 In the end, however, pragmatic
considerations led Brandeis to advocate relying on historical costs.
Determining replacement cost was an inherently speculative endeavor
fraught with unnecessary uncertainty.48 In addition, basing value on
replacement cost would expose both consumers and investors to the risks
associated with fluctuations in market prices.49 In comparison, relying on
historic cost allowed for less variable and subjective determinations of
value.50
Brandeis’s argument quickly became one of the focal points in the
debate over rate setting methodologies.51 The Supreme Court has frequently
invoked it as the definitive explanation for the decision of various regulatory
43

262 U.S. 276, 292-94 (1923) (Brandeis, J., concurring in the judgment).
Id. at 292.
45
Id.
46
FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 601 (1944); accord Verizon Communications, Inc. v.
FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1658 (2002); Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 308 n.5 (1989); FPC v.
Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. 575, 603 (1942) (Black, J., concurring); St. Louis & O’Fallon Ry. v.
United States, 279 U.S. 461, 505 n.23 (1929) (Brandeis, J., dissenting); Jim Chen, The Second Coming of
Smyth v. Ames, 77 TEX. L. REV. 1535, 1556 (1999); Siegel, supra note 41, at 246.
47
Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 300.
48
Id. at 293-302.
49
Id. at 302-08. To the extent that Brandeis’s opinion evinces a strong desire to insulate both
consumers and investors from the dislocation caused by market fluctuations, it exhibits some strikingly
anti-economic tendencies. His position is perhaps explained by the desire to promote classical-style
democracy that permeates his jurisprudence. See L.S. Zacharias, Repaving the Brandeis Way: The
Decline of Developmental Property, 82 NW. U. L. REV. 596, 634-38 (1988). A more cynical observer
might suggest that his interest in protecting investors from market fluctuations followed more from the
fact that he held a substantial amount of his wealth in commercial paper issued by utilities. See id. at 63738.
50
Southwestern Bell, 262 U.S. at 308-10.
51
Siegel, supra note 41, at 240 n.227.
44
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authorities not to use market-based pricing when setting rates.52 Eventually,
however, the controversy between historical and replacement cost ended in a
somewhat inconclusive draw. Rather than resolving this dispute on its
substantive merits, in the end the Supreme Court invoked notions of
administrative deference and judicial restraint to reject the notion that rates
must be set in accordance with any particular approach. Instead, the Court
resolved to uphold any rate determination regardless of methodology so long
as it fell within a fairly broad zone of reasonableness.53 Applying these
principles allowed the Court to sustain a wide variety of ratemaking
methodologies based on increasingly complicated versions of historical or
replacement cost.54 Eventually, formal ratemaking gave way to the
imposition of price caps, in which the maximum rates that utilities could
charge in any particular year did not depend on costs, but rather on the rates
set the previous year, reduced by a fixed percentage to reflect increases in
productivity. Price cap methodologies did not cure the basic flaw of failing
to reflect demand considerations, since the rates charged for the initial year
in the typical price cap scheme were based on historical cost.55
The unifying thread to all of these approaches was their consistent
commitment to basing rates on direct cost (whether historical or replacement
cost) and their consistent refusal to include a component taking opportunity
cost or market-based influence into account.56 Fortified by this background,
regulators charged with implementing access regimes have tended to follow
their traditional patterns and based access rates solely on either historical or
replacement cost. As the foregoing discussion reveals, however, that
regulatory approaches that base rates solely on direct costs suffer from a
fundamental conceptual flaw. In failing to incorporate some dimension that
reflects the earning potential of the regulated input, approaches based on

52

See Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1657-58; Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 308-09 & n.5; Natural Gas Pipeline
Co., 315 U.S. at 603 (Black, J., concurring).
53
As the Court noted in Hope Natural Gas, “it is the result reached not the method employed which
is controlling. It is not theory but the impact of the rate order which counts. . . . The fact that the method
employed to reach that result may contain infirmities is not then important.” 320 U.S. at 602 (citations
omitted); accord Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 314-16; Natural Gas Pipeline Co., 315 U.S. at 586. See
generally Siegel, supra note 41, at 252-59. It should be noted that the approach taken by the Court in
Hope Natural Gas was itself circular.
54
See, e.g., Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1665-76, 1679-80 (upholding replacement cost methodology as a
matter of statutory construction, but declining to address the overall reasonableness of rates on ripeness
grounds); Duquesne, 488 U.S. at 310-12 (upholding rates based on modified historical cost methodology);
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 761, 768-74 (1968) (upholding rates based on composite
cost data from an entire area rather than prevailing field prices); Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 596-98,
603-05 (upholding rates based on historical cost).
55
Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1660 (citing United States Tel. Ass’n v. FCC, 188 F.3d 521, 524 (D.C. Cir.
1999); and Alfred E. Kahn, Timothy J. Tardiff, & Dennis L. Weisman, The Telecommunications Act at
Three Years: An Economic Evaluation of its Implementation by the Federal Communications
Commission, 11 INFO. ECON. & POL’Y 319, 330-32 (1999)).
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Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1659 (citing ALFRED KAHN, ECONOMICS OF REGULATION 40-41 (1988)).
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direct cost, whether historical or replacement cost, fail to reflect the basic
insight that has guided economics for the last century.57
The only conceivable justification for failing to base rates on market
prices is that the absence of comparable transactions rendered any attempt to
base rates on market value inherently circular. Indeed, as the foregoing
discussion reveals, that was precisely the reasoning upon which Justice
Brandeis and the regulatory authorities and courts that followed his lead
relied to justify their advocacy of cost-based approaches.58 What modern
regulatory authorities have failed to recognize is the manner in which
technological convergence and the shift from rate regulation to access
regulation has now made it possible to base rates on market benchmarks.
The possibility of input substitution allows external markets for inputs to
exist even when external markets for final goods do not. In addition, the
raison d’etre of access regulations is to foster the emergence of competition
in final goods markets. Any success in doing so will only serve to further
undercut the justification for refusing to base rates on market transactions.
The shift from output to input regulation has also undermined the previously
proffered reasons for rejecting the income capitalization approach. When
regulation focuses on the rate charged for an input rather than for a final
good, the regulated price is only one of many factors that determines the
good’s overall earning potential rather than its sole determinant. So long as
the input remains only one component of the overall good, it can no longer
be said that the income capitalization approach will is inherently tautological.
The degree of circularity will be limited to percentage of the total cost of the
final good represented by the regulated input.
Equally important is the manner in which technological change has also
allowed for competition among different network platforms to develop. The
availability of substitute networks employing alternative means of
transmission has in turn created external markets that now make it possible
for regulatory authorities to base rates on prices charged in actual market
transactions. In addition, the advent of facilities-based competition in turn
can lead to deregulation of the rates charged for the final good, which in turn
will eliminate the circularity inherent in the income capitalization approach.
Simply put, the two fundamental changes that we believe are
transforming the basic approach to regulating network industries are both in
the process of eviscerating the reasons underlying ratemaking authorities’
longstanding decision to base rates on some measure of direct costs and to
57
Siegel, supra note 41, at 251-52 (noting that although some jurists used neoclassical economics to
attack the replacement cost methodology associated with Smyth v. Ames, the critique ultimately proved
too much by also undermining attempts to base rates on historical cost); Herbert Hovenkamp, The
Marginalist Revolution in Legal Thought, 46 VAND. L. REV. 305, 325 (1993) (noting that neoclassical
economics affected the debate between basing rates on historical cost as opposed to an alternative
measure that were based either a capacity to earn a profit or replacement cost).
58
See supra notes 44-46 and accompanying text.
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exclude from their ratemaking calculus components designed to reflect the
regulated good’s earning potential. Together the shift to access regulation
and the development of technological convergence have rendered continued
adherence to that position untenable and mandate as a matter of economic
policy that regulatory authorities begin to base access rates on market prices.
D. Demystifying Network Economics
Fundamental economic principles thus indicate that efficiency would
best be promoted if network access prices were based on the market value of
the relevant inputs. If direct, market-based indicia are not available,
regulatory authorities should use a methodology such as ECPR that includes
both the direct costs as well as the opportunity costs of providing the input.
Recent academic commentary, however, has suggested that network
industries possess features such as sunk costs, economies of scale and scope,
and network economic effects that may cause market prices to deviate from
levels that promote efficiency. The analysis that follows refutes those
arguments. Most of these features are not unique to network industries and
are easily taken into account by traditional price mechanisms.
1. Economies of Scale and Scope
There are economies of scale and scope in networks, but these do not
prevent markets from allocating the services that networks provide.
Economies of scale are said to exist for a single product firm if unit costs
decline as a function of output. For a multiple-product firm, economies of
scale means that total costs of production exceed the total of each output
times its marginal cost. Economies of scope are said to exist if a company
achieves cost economies by producing goods in combination rather than
separately.
Networks certainly exhibit economies of scale. Large-scale networks
can employ advanced high-capacity switches. Moreover, building and
operating a large network benefits from economies of scale since the firm
can spread out the overhead costs associated with constructing and
maintenance over a larger set of activities. Economies of scale may also be
present because of volume-surface relationships, so that the volume of a
conduit can be expanded with a less than proportional increase in the surface.
Moreover, the unit costs of capacity in a transmission line decline because
there are fixed costs of constructing the conduit that must be incurred which
are somewhat invariant to the number of transmission wires inside the
conduit. This is why telecom companies find that the incremental cost of
installing additional fiber capacity at the time of the initial installation is less
than the unit cost of installing fiber capacity.

24

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

Economies of scope are also present in networks, since multiple services
can be provided using common facilities. For example, the same switch can
be used to provide many different services such as call waiting and call
forwarding. Economies of scope in networks also derive from network
structure. Suppose that the products of the network are viewed as
connections between pairs of network users. Rather than operating a pointto-point network, traffic can be aggregated in trunk lines with points reached
by distribution or feeder lines. By realizing economies of scale in the trunk
lines, the firm achieves economies of scope in the production of multiple
connections.
Economies of scale and scope exist in practically any industry. For
example, in the automobile industry, the unit costs of producing automobiles
are lower the more automobiles are produced. Producing only a few cars
requires making them practically by hand. Producing many cars allows the
development of a large plant that takes advantage of automation as well as
the benefits of specialization and division of labor recognized by Adam
Smith.59 Economies of scope are also familiar. They explain why a
company can obtain costs savings from producing multiple types of
automobiles. The company shares common costs of manufacturing,
engineering, and management across multiple products.
The presence of cost economies in manufacturing does not prevent
markets from allocating goods and services that are produced with
economies of scale. Multiple producers can have economies and scale and
scope and compete with each other in supplying goods and services. For
example, automobile manufacturers compete with each other to sell cars
unhindered by the presence of cost economies in manufacturing. There is no
a priori reason that markets for telecommunications services should differ in
any way. Multiple networks can operate with economies of scale and scope
and compete to supply services to customers. Market prices continue to be
an accurate measure of value.
Sufficient scale relative to the size of the market results in natural
monopoly.60 A given industry is said to exhibit natural monopoly
59

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 3-16 (Random House 1965) (1776).
Economies of scale are said to be present if the marginal costs of production are less than the
average costs of production over the relevant range of output. Economies of scale can be due to many
different technological factors, such as specialization of function and division of labor permitted by
increased output. Fixed costs are a source of economies of scale that is particularly significant to the
telecommunications industry – and to all other industries that require networks, such as railroads, oil and
natural gas pipelines, electricity, and water services. Fixed costs are costs that do not vary with
fluctuations in output, unlike operating or “variable” costs. The fixed costs of establishing a network
system are the costs of facilities such as transmission lines, which are not sensitive to the level of
transmission on the lines. The firm’s average cost function refers to the cost per unit of output evaluated
at each output level. The firm’s marginal cost function refers to the additional cost of producing one more
unit of output, evaluated at each level of output. Economies of scale at a given output level is not
necessary for natural monopoly. The natural monopoly property can be present at an output level at
which the cost function exhibits decreasing returns to scale. For further discussion, see DANIEL F.
SPULBER, REGULATION AND MARKETS 117 (1989).
60
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characteristics if the cost function derived from the underlying technology is
“subadditive,” i.e., if a single firm can supply the entire market at lower cost
than can two or more firms.61 If the technology of local telephone service
were to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, then a single firm could
construct and operate that network at a lower cost than can two or more
firms. Multiproduct cost functions are said to exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics if and only if the cost function derived from the underlying
technology is subadditive across products, that is, the costs faced by a single
firm producing the entire set of products is less than the costs that would
result if the same production were divided between two firms. There is some
controversy over whether the technology of existing telecommunications
networks fall within this definition.62
The existence of natural monopoly does not necessarily preclude
competitive entry, however.
For example, even if a particular
telecommunications technology were to exhibit natural monopoly
characteristics, efficient retail prices could still be achieved if providers were
required to compete through periodic auctions for the right to serve the
market.63
Moreover, proponents of “contestability” theory have
demonstrated that so long as entry and exit are easy, the potential for new
entry can drive prices towards competitive levels even if the technology
makes it most efficient for a single firm to serve the entire market.64 Even if
the incumbent prices at cost there are thus still some situations in which an
incumbent monopoly cannot find prices that sustain its position against entry.
61
The concept of natural monopoly is generally credited to John Stuart Mill, who emphasized the
problem of wasteful duplication of transmission facilities that can occur in utility services. 1 JOHN S.
MILL, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY 132-54 (W.J. Ashley, ed., Augustus M. Kelly 1961) (1848).
The connection between natural monopoly and regulation is developed by Leon Walras with reference to
the construction and operation of railroads. LEON WALRAS, ETUDES D’ECONOMIE SOCIALE: THEORIE DE
LA REPARTITION DE LA RICHESSE SOCIALE (1936).
62
Statistical studies showing that costs are not subadditive include Richard Shin & John Ying,
Unnatural Monopolies in Local Telephone, 23 RAND J. ECON. 171 (1992), who find that the costs of local
exchange carriers were not subadditive before the AT&T divestiture using data from 1976 to 1983, and
David S. Evans & James J. Heckman, A Test for Subadditivity of the Cost Function with an Application to
the Bell System, 74 AM. ECON. REV. 615, 620 (1984), who show that AT&T’s costs were not subadditive.
Estimating telecommunications network costs is problematic for companies that have been regulated
because data is obtained from regulatory accounting information. Also, the data are often presented at a
aggregate level that is not suited to evaluation of cost functions. The estimation of cost functions using
standard econometric techniques is difficult at best since an established legacy system built up over
decades is not likely to be optimized. Engineering cost models that make assumptions about system
configurations need not describe the costs of existing systems. Moreover, the notion of comparing the
costs of two identical systems serving the same geographic area is likely to be counterfactual. For a
review of the literature analyzing whether costs in the cable television industry are subadditive, see
Thomas W. Hazlett, Duopolistic Competition in Cable Television: Implications for Public Policy, 7 YALE
J. ON REG. 65, 71-75 (1990).
63
See Harold Demsetz, Why Regulate Utilities?, 11 J.L. & ECON. 55 (1968) (arguing that with
sufficient bidders and absent collusion, periodic auctioning of monopoly franchises can yield competitive
pricing); Richard A. Posner, The Appropriate Scope of Regulation in the Cable Television Industry, 3
BELL J. ECON. 98 (1972) (applying Demsetz’s analysis to cable television).
64
WILLIAM J. BAUMOL, JOHN C. PANZAR, & ROBERT D. WILLIG, CONTESTABLE MARKETS AND
THE THEORY OF INDUSTRY STRUCTURE (rev. ed. 1988).
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Moreover, natural monopoly technology need not impede competition
because the technology of entrants can differ from that of incumbents. In the
standard textbook definition of natural monopoly, which also underlies most
public policy discussions, it is presumed that incumbents and entrants have
the same cost function and presumably the same underlying technology.65
The assertion is that all firms have the same technology and that there is not
enough room in the market for more than one firm, so that there is little that
an entrant could add to productive capacity. Even if the incumbent’s
technology were to exhibit natural monopoly characteristics, assuming that
an entrant would need to construct the same network certainly assumes the
conclusion. It is unrealistic, however, to presuppose that the incumbent and
the entrant will employ the same technology.66 Entrants may employ capital
equipment of more recent vintage than the incumbent so that their systems
embody different technologies. Given the rapid pace of technological
change in telecommunications, an entrant can operate a network with a
different configuration.
Thus, an incumbent might operate a traditional telecommunications
network with twisted copper pair to the home, a technology that is over a
century old, while an entrant might offer wireless service. There are many
transmission technologies including coaxial cable television systems, fiberoptic cable, various land-based wireless systems, and satellite-based systems.
Each of these transmission approaches has different properties in terms of
costs and performance. The many uses of transmission networks, including
telephony, mobile communications, data transmission, and video, suggest
that different transmission technologies are suited to different uses. Entrants
that offer specialized networks targeted to particular applications are likely to
have different technologies than the incumbent. Moreover, the entrant can
target specialized market segments without the need to duplicate the
incumbent’s system.67
Competition from Internet telephony, cable
telephony, and wireless provides alternatives to the traditional telephone
system. Thus, competitive markets for network services can form and
market prices continue to be an accurate measure of value.
2. Sunk Costs
The substantial sunk costs in establishing certain types of
telecommunications networks, particularly the traditional wireline network,
do not prevent markets from allocating network services or prevent market
65
See, e.g., id. at 17 (defining natural monopoly as an industry in which all of the firms have the
same cost function).
66
Daniel F. Spulber, Deregulating Telecommunications, 12 YALE J. ON REG. 25 (1995).
67
The discussion in this section draws upon id. at 45-50; and Daniel F. Spulber, Competition Policy
in Telecommunications, in HANDBOOK OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS ECONOMICS (Martin Cave et al. eds.,
forthcoming, 2002).
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prices from representing an accurate measure of value. Sunk costs are
present in most industries to a greater or lesser extent. Expenditures for
research and development and marketing are generally regarded as sunk
investment. Generally, the inability to recover expenditures is a fact of life
otherwise known as business risk with few implications for the performance
of market transactions. Moreover, most forms of manufacturing entail sunk
costs in the form of capital equipment, whether it is used for manufacturing
automobiles or extracting crude oil. This does not prevent in any way the
market allocation of the products manufactured using that capital equipment.
The method of manufacture does not alter the ability of market transactions
to allocate a good or service. Telecommunications is not different even if it
requires nonrecoverable expenditures in plant and equipment, namely wires
and switches.
The notion often put forward in public policy discussions and legal cases
involving telecommunications is that sunk costs prevent competition in
telecommunications services and hence result in market failure. In
particular, sunk costs are often said to be a barrier to entry if entrants need to
make irreversible investments in capacity, while incumbents have already
incurred these costs. The standard reasoning is as follows. The incumbent
need only price to recover operating expenses and incremental capital
expenditures, since the irreversible investment costs of entry can be written
off. An entrant, in contrast, must anticipate earnings exceeding operating
costs, incremental investment as well as the irreversible costs of establishing
its facilities before it will decide to enter.68
In the AT&T case, Judge Greene observed with regards to barriers to
entry, “The evidence introduced at the trial of this case clearly demonstrated
that duplication of the ubiquitous local exchange networks would require an
enormous and prohibitive capital investment, and no one seriously questions
that this is true.”69 Richard Posner points out, however, that nonrecurring
costs of entry are “irrelevant if there are small firms in the market that can
grow to be large firms.” He continues, “In any event, there is grave doubt
whether there are important nonrecurring costs of entry-barriers to entry in
the true sense.”70 Posner further notes that costs of capital are not a barrier
since the costs should be comparable for firms already in the market.
There are many ways for potential entrants into an industry to reduce the
risks associated with making nonrecoverable expenditures, including
contracting with customers before irreversible investments are made and
entering into joint ventures or mergers with incumbents. Furthermore, in
68
See, e.g., William J. Baumol & Robert D. Willig, Fixed Costs, Sunk Costs, Entry Barriers, and
Sustainability of Monopoly, 96 Q.J. ECON. 405 (1981). According to George Stigler, barriers to entry are
long-run costs imposed on entrants that are not present for incumbents. GEORGE J. STIGLER, THE
ORGANIZATION OF INDUSTRY 67 (1968)
69
United States v. W. Elec. Co., 673 F. Supp. 525, 538 (D.D.C. 1987).
70
RICHARD A. POSNER, ANTITRUST LAW: AN ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVE 92 (1976).
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competitive markets, duplication of investment often occurs. The entry of
excess or insufficient capacity can take place as a consequence of uncertainty
regarding costs, technology, or market demand. Overcapacity in automobile
manufacturing or restaurants is part of the competitive process and certainly
does not indicate the presence of market failure. Indeed, periods of
excessive capacity so often observed in a wide variety of industries
demonstrates that sunk costs are unlikely to deter vigorous competition. The
same is true in telecommunications, of course in the absence of regulatory
intervention that favors or penalizes incumbents.
Technological change further mutes the impact of sunk costs on
entrants.71 Entrants commit capital resources in those markets or market
segments where they expect to earn competitive returns on their investments.
The sunk costs involved in establishing a telecommunications system, given
currently available technologies, are not different from irreversible
investments in any other competitive market. Concern over sunk costs in
telecommunications may be due to the substantial level of investment needed
to establish a traditional telecommunications network, in particular due to the
ubiquity of the regulated Bell System monopoly. This is a quantitative
difference but hardly a qualitative one. Entrants can invest smaller amounts
to create networks targeted at particular customers and specific services.
The argument that sunk costs are a barrier to entry also depends in part
on the similarity of the technology of the incumbent and entrant, as in the
earlier case of natural monopoly discussions. Yet, an entrant need not
duplicate the incumbent’s network. An entrant with lower operating costs
could be assured of recovering at least the difference between the
incumbent’s operating costs and the entrant’s own operating costs, which
could well be sufficient to recover the costs of entry. This scenario is likely
since technological change in telecommunications, such as the application of
microprocessors in switching, potentially lowers the costs of operating
networks. Moreover, even if the entrant’s operating costs are greater than
the incumbent’s, entrants can generate incremental revenues to offset the
costs of entry by offering enhanced or specialized services.
By
differentiating its offerings through branding, customer service and location,
entrants gain incremental revenues to cover the costs of entry. New
technologies offer enhanced performance including switched services, the
mobility of wireless services and the increased bandwidth of coaxial and
fiber-optic systems, thus allowing competition with established networks that
have different technologies.
Even the need to sink costs into a telecommunications network has been
altered by technological change. For example, wireless technologies avoid
customer-specific irreversible investment for the “last mile” to the
customer’s location. Wireless transmission towers can be relocated. Thus,
71

See SPULBER, supra note 60, at 608-10; Spulber, supra note 66, at 49.
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even if substantial sunk costs are required to reproduce the incumbent’s
wireline network, a wireless alternative is an effective competitor without the
same sunk costs. Thus, sunk costs in telecommunications need to impede the
market allocation of telecommunications services.
3. Compatibility and Interconnection
Although there are clear benefits from compatibility and interconnection
of networks, these benefits do not prevent markets from allocating network
services so that market prices continue to be an accurate measure of value.
The interconnection of networks is necessary for a call placed by a customer
served by a network to reach a customer served by another network.
Because the number of connections enhances the value of a network, it is in
the interest of network operators to interconnect.
There is an extensive set of network interconnections. Local networks
have access to most if not all long distance and international networks.
Wireless services are connected to both local and long distance networks.
Local telecommunications networks, wireless systems, digital subscriber
lines, and broadband cable can be used to access the Internet. The Internet
itself as a network of networks represents a vast number of interconnections.
The terms of such interconnections are established both through market
agreements and through regulated charges. Given this set of interconnection
agreements, access to the services of a network implicitly entails access to
the connections offered by the network. The customer may obtain some of
these connections as part of the network service or the customer may pay for
individual connections, just as retail telecommunications customers purchase
local and long-distance services separately. Accordingly, the benefits from
interconnecting networks enhance the ability of competitive firms to provide
network services and do not conflict with market pricing of network services.
4. Network Economic Effects
Many networks have the property that the number of people connected to
them determines their value. The classic example of a network that exhibits
such an effect is the telephone system, since the value of a telephone network
is determined in large part by the number of people with whom one can
communicate through that network. The more people that are part of the
network, the more valuable the network becomes. The result is that the value
of network access depends not only by the access price charged, but also on
the number of users who have access to the network. This economic
literature refers to this characteristic as a network economic effect.
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Some economists consider network economic effects to be a kind of
externality.72 Externalities occur whenever individuals do not bear all of the
economic consequences of their actions. Proponents of the network
externalities view suggest that network users’ inability to capture all of the
benefits generated by their usage represents a positive externality that will
cause overall utilization of the network to drop below efficient levels.73
These theorists also suggest that network externalities can turn network
access into a competitive weapon. By refusing to interconnect with other
networks, network owners can force users to choose one network to the
exclusion of others. Forcing users to commit to one network naturally leads
users to flock to the largest network. It is argued that network owners can
thus use network externalities to create or reinforce a monopoly position.
In addition, other scholars argue that network effects can adversely affect
technological adoption and product selection decisions.74 In their view,
network externalities can cause a different market failure known as
technology lock-in, in which markets adhere to previous technology
commitments notwithstanding the arrival of new, more efficient network
technologies. If users cannot capture all of the benefits created by their
decision to adopt a new technology, they may refrain from making a
technological change even when doing so would increase total welfare.
These considerations have led some to argue that compelled access is
required to ensure that the early leaders in any network technology and
owners of large networks do not use their leading position to stifle
technological innovation.75 It also provides a basis for questioning whether
basing access rates on market prices would in fact promote efficiency.
The concept of network externality thus suggests that network industries
are uniquely susceptible to market failures that prevent the price mechanism
from playing its usual role in generating efficient outcomes. If network
externalities prevent markets from functioning efficiently, then it might
follow that the market equilibrium market price of network access might
somehow be distorted as well. Although formal models developed by
72
See, e.g., Michael L. Katz & Carl Shapiro, Network Externalities, Competition, and Compatibility,
75 AM. ECON. REV. 424 (1985) [hereinafter Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities]; Michael L. Katz &
Carl Shapiro, Systems Competition and Network Effects, 8 J. ECON. PERSP. 93 (1994) [hereinafter Katz &
Shapiro, Systems Competition].
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Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 72, at 100.
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See Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 72, at 100; Joseph Farrell & Garth Saloner,
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See Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential
Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 306 (2001); Jerry A. Hausman et al., Residential Demand for
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YALE J. ON REG. 129, 161-64 (2001); Mark A. Lemley & Lawrence Lessig, The End of End-to-End:
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proponents of the network externality view have demonstrated that such
market failures are possible, we believe that claims of widespread market
failure are exaggerated. A critical review of the economic literature reveals
that network externality theories are subject to several conceptual limitations
that suggest that network externalities do not in fact cause markets to fail and
that even if markets do fail, other features of the market exist that can
mitigate, if not eliminate, such problems. In addition, theoretical models
simply demonstrate that a particular type of market failure is possible.
Determining whether such a market failure is likely depends upon a close
empirical evaluation of whether the preconditions underlying any particular
theory actually exist. To date, network externality theorists have relied on a
handful of supposedly classic examples of technology lock-in as the sole
empirical support for their positions. A close review of those examples
reveals that they do not properly represent examples of market failure. The
absence of even a single documented case of technology lock-in raises
significant skepticism about the propriety of these claims. And lastly, these
proponents must answer the question whether the cure might be worse than
the disease. More specifically, resolution of the regulatory question depends
not just on whether a market failure exists, but also on whether government
intervention is likely to do better or worse than private ordering.
a. Network Economics as a Questionable Source of Market Failures —
As noted above, theories that rely on the supposed presence of network
externalities to justify more intrusive regulation of network industries suffer
from several conceptual shortcomings.76 On closer inspection, it becomes
clear that arguments that network externalities tend to entrench incumbents
and existing technologies is far too simplistic. As Joseph Farrell and Garth
Saloner have pointed out, a consumer’s decision to adopt a new technology
actually gives rise to two distinct and countervailing externalities. When the
value of a network depends on the number of people using the network, any
decision to adopt a new technology enhances the value of the new network
for those who have already joined the network as well as to those who will
join it in the future. It is the presence of this externality that can cause
markets to become locked in to obsolete technologies, a phenomenon that
Farrell and Saloner refer to as “excess inertia.”77
At the same time, the adoption of a new technology also gives rise to a
countervailing negative externality that tends to produce precisely the
opposite effect. This is because any decision to adopt a new technology
simultaneously lowers the value of the old technology by reducing the
number of people using it. In effect, adoption of the new technology tends to
strand the installed base in the old technology. Individuals who adopt a new
technology thus do not fully internalize all of the costs created by their
76
77

The discussion that follows is based in part on Yoo, supra note 9, at 278-82.
Farrell & Saloner, supra note 74, at 941.
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actions. This may make that individual willing to adopt a new technology
even when the costs to society exceed the benefits, a situation variously
called “excess momentum”78 or “insufficient friction.”79
It is thus
theoretically possible that the presence of network economic effects may
prevent network providers from realizing all of the available economies of
scale and may accelerate the pace with which new technologies are adopted
beyond levels. Whether network externalities would in fact cause a market
failure thus depends upon which of these two countervailing effects
dominates.
Even if the balance of these two network externalities tends to produce
excess inertia, a series of insightful articles authored by Stan Liebowitz and
Stephen Margolis demonstrates that such effects are unlikely to lead to
market failure.80 Their explanation distinguishes between two different types
of network externalities that were identified by the seminal articles in the
literature, but not developed therein. Direct network externalities are those
generated “through a direct physical effect of the number of purchasers on
the quality of the product,”81 with the leading example being the number of
subscribers attached to a telephone network. Indirect network externalities,
in contrast, involve instances that do not involve a direct physical
connection. Instead, the value of a good is determined by the number of
other people who purchase the same good, with the examples commonly
cited including the network of users of a particular type of format of video
cassette recorder (VCR), a particular type of software, or a particular
computer operating system.82
With respect to direct network externalities, Liebowitz and Margolis
argue that private ordering can easily resolve any of the problems that may
exist. This is because direct network externalities have the benefit of
occurring within a physical network that can be owned. Thus, although
individual users may not be in a position to capture all of the benefits created
by their demand for network services, the network owner will almost
certainly be in a position to do so. The existence of a single network owner
allows the problems associated with this type of externality to be solved
through the same mechanism used to solve externality problems that arise in
78
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other contexts, i.e., by placing property in the hands of a single owner and
protecting it with well-defined property rights.83 Any benefits created by
network participation can thus be internalized and allocated through the
interaction between the network owner and network users.84
Reliance on unitary ownership of a network to internalize any network
externalities that may exist does not necessarily mean that competition
cannot emerge. In many cases, a network need not occupy the entire market
in order to realize all of the available demand-side economies of scale.
When this occurs, no unexploited gains from trade regarding network size
remain, and the equilibrium solution is competition among multiple
proprietary networks. The point can be illustrated through the now classic
problem presented by overfishing of a lake. Because individual anglers do
not internalize all of the costs of their actions, they lack sufficient incentives
to undertake efficient levels of conservation and investment. The solution is
to vest property rights to the entire lake in a single owner. Doing so will not,
however, eliminate competition in the market for fish, since giving owners
unitary property rights over a particular lake is not the same thing as giving
them control over all lakes and the various owners of different lakes will
continue to compete with one another. Placed in the context of networks, the
proper policy question becomes one of defining property rights in away that
insures that networks achieve sufficient size to realize all of available
network economies. It does not necessarily mean that only one network will
emerge and that government indiscretion is required to ensure that that
network is the “right” one.85
Indirect network externalities pose a somewhat different problem, since
the lack of a direct physical connection among users means that policy
makers cannot simply rely on network ownership to internalize the relevant
externalities.86 To date, scholars have focused primarily on the fact that
indirect network externalities typically arise in markets that involve
complementary goods and that proprietary control of a network provides
network users with some assurance that a ready supply of complementary
goods will remain available.87 Although these concerns are correct as far as
83
See R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1 (1960); Garrett Hardin, The
Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCIENCE 1243 (1968).
84
Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at 11-13; Liebowitz & Margolis,
Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 80, at 137, 141-44.
85
Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon Tragedy, supra note 80, at 140-42; see also Liebowitz &
Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at 13-15 (describing how the assumptions embodied in formal
models of network externalities in effect assume away this problem by positing inexhaustible economies
of scale).
86
Note that to the extent that key network elements receive some degree of patent, copyright, or
trademark protection, it is conceivable that the use of well-defined property rights may solve as a solution
to some types of indirect network externalities. Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at
11.
87
See James B. Speta, Handicapping the Race for the Last Mile?: A Critique of Open Access Rules
for Broadband Platforms, 17 YALE J. ON REG. 39 (2000) (citing Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities,
supra note 72, at 103-04).
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they go, the work of Liebowitz and Margolis has demonstrated that theories
of market failure based on indirect network externalities theories typically
suffer from deficiencies that are far more fundamental.
In order to understand the nature of this conceptual shortcoming, it is
necessary to review the basic flaws contained in A.C. Pigou’s classic
analysis of increasing-and decreasing-cost industries.88 Pigou erroneously
believed that the industry marginal cost curve represented the true social cost
of production. Because prices tended to be uniform, he concluded that all
industries that did not involve constant costs required either a tax or a
subsidiary in order to attain efficient levels of output. The mistake in
Pigou’s analysis is that markets produce efficient outcomes whenever the last
unit produced (i.e., the marginal unit) is priced at marginal cost. Pricing
other units (i.e., inframarginal units) above marginal cost simply effects a
transfer of wealth from consumers to producers without affecting price and
output levels. Although this redistributes total surplus, it does not have any
impact on efficiency. Indirect network externalities are essentially no
different from the type of wealth transfer mistakenly decried by Pigou.
Markets will set network outputs at efficient levels so long as the price
charged to the marginal network user at marginal cost. Although charging
inframarginal users higher prices has distributional consequences, it has no
impact on efficiency. Indeed, internalizing these externalities may actually
be harmful, since doing so would create monopsony power.89
Furthermore, it is often impossible to distinguish an indirect network
externality from the results of a properly functioning market. Even if prices
fall as networks grow in size, it is not necessarily indicative of a market
failure. It may represent nothing more than the declining costs associated
with a classic natural monopoly. If so, the drop in price would simply reflect
movement along the cost curve rather than an externality that caused a
deviation from the cost curve. In addition, any decline in price may also
represent the type of ordinary technological progress that typically occurs
when participation in a particular technology increases. In either event, there
is no efficiency loss to be abated. Any remedies imposed in the name of
compensating for a network externality would thus be the cause of, rather
than the solution to, market failure. Even worse, the true source of the
decline in cost may lie in one of the input markets rather than the output
market. Positing that the problem is an indirect network externality
operating in the output market may thus prompt an incorrect policy response
by focusing attention away from the input markets that may be the true locus
of whatever market failure that may exist.90
88

See A.C. PIGOU, WEALTH AND WELFARE (1912).
Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at 3-7; Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon
Tragedy, supra note 80, at 136-38.
90
Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at 7-10; Liebowitz & Margolis, Uncommon
Tragedy, supra note 80, at 138-39.
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At the same time, it is important to recognize the adoption of a new
technology carries significant costs. The standardization associated with the
existence of an established technology can create real benefits by facilitating
compatibility between complementary products that would be lost if a new
technology were adopted. In addition, changes in technology necessarily
impose significant transaction costs, since production of new technological
platforms and adaptation of existing network infrastructure to incorporate
innovations can be quite costly.91 Accordingly, some delay in the
introduction of new products may reflect efficiency, not market failure.
Absent a compelling reason to believe that network externalities are causing
efficiency losses that the market cannot properly redress, regulations
designed to counteract network economic effects cannot be justified.
Even assuming for the sake of argument that the type of network
externalities that tend to cause monopolistic dominance and technology lockin actually exist, it is far from clear that other features of the market and the
structure of consumers preferences might not serve to mitigate, if not
eliminate, these adverse effects. For example, the market can dislodge an
existing network technology so long as the additional value provided by the
new technology exceeds the value of the network externalities supporting the
old technology.92 As Steven Kaplan and Mark Ramseyer succinctly put it,
“an entrenched inefficient technology is potentially a twenty-dollar bill lying
on the sidewalk.”93
In addition, network externalities may be substantially mitigated if user
preferences are nonuniform. As Michael Katz and Carl Shapiro have noted:
Customer heterogeneity and product differentiation tend to
limit tipping and sustain multiple networks. If the rival
systems have distinct features sought by certain customers,
two or more systems may be able to survive by catering to
consumers who care more about product attributes than
network size. Here, market equilibrium with multiple
incompatible products reflects the social value of variety.94
91
Timothy F. Bresnahan, New Modes of Competition: Implications for the Future Structure of the
Computer Industry, in COMPETITION, INNOVATION AND THE MICROSOFT MONOPOLY: ANTITRUST IN THE
DIGITAL MARKETPLACE 155, 200 (Jeffrey A. Eisenach & Thomas M. Lenard eds., 1999).
92
Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 72, at 106 (observing that new, incompatible
standards may emerge despite the presence of network externalities if “consumers . . . care more about
product attributes than network size”); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, The Fable of the Keys, 33
J.L. & ECON. 1, 4 (1990) (noting that a “greater the gap in performance between the two standards, . . . the
more likely that a move to the efficient standard will take place”), reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF
ECONOMICS 90, 92 (Daniel F. Spulber ed., 2002); and LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 80, at 19, 2122.
93
Steven N. Kaplan & J. Mark Ramseyer, Those Japanese Firms with their Disdain for
Shareholders: Another Fable for the Academy, 74 WASH. U. L.Q. 403, 405 (1996).
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Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 72, at 106 (citing Joseph Farrell & Garth
Saloner, Standardization and Variety, 20 ECON. LETTERS 71 (1986)); S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E.
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The existence of large users may further mitigate any problems caused
by network economic effects. If a single user controls a significant portion
of the network, that user would be able to internalize more of the benefits of
its adoption decision, which would help minimize any slippage caused by the
existence of the network externality. Furthermore, because large users are in
a position to capture a disproportionate share of the benefit resulting from the
adoption of a new technology, they have has a significant incentives to make
the investments needed to begin the shift towards the new technology.95
Indeed, formal models of such market structures indicate that “the sponsor of
a new technology earns greater profits than its entry contributes to social
welfare. In other words, markets with network externalities in which new
technologies are proprietary exhibit a bias towards new technologies.”96 Far
from being a bane, the existence large network players may be a blessing in
disguise.
Finally, significant growth in market size can render any network
externalities that lead markets to tend towards market dominance and
technology lock-in irrelevant.97 If a market is undergoing explosive growth,
market outcomes are determined by the commitments that future users will
make and not the decisions of the users who have already committed to a
particular technology.98 In such cases, the fact that a particular firm may
currently dominate a market is of little consequence. People concerned
about lock in will focus on the network that will exist in the future, not the
one that exists today.
b. The Lack of Empirical Support for Market Failures Caused by
Network Economics — The fact that markets seem fully capable of resolving
most of the supposed market failures identified by the theoretical literature
on network economics suggests that any attempt to remedy these supposed
problems should be approached with considerable caution. Indeed, it would
seem appropriate to insist on empirical proof that such problems actually
exist before authorizing governmental action to redress them. Proponents of
network externality theories have yet to offer any systematic evidence to
support their theories. Instead, most of these theorists have opted instead to
Margolis, Should Technology Choice Be a Concern of Antitrust Policy?, 9 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 283, 292
(1996) (“Where there are differences in preference regarding alternative standards, coexistence of
standards is a likely outcome.”).
95
Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 72, at 101; Katz & Shapiro, Technology
Adoption in the Presence of Network Externalities, 94 J. POL. ECON. 822, 825 (1986); Liebowitz &
Margolis, Market Failure, supra note 80, at 11, 13. The fear of being held up after committing to a
network might make consumers reluctant to join proprietary networks. Katz and Shapiro describe a
number of ways that a network owner can allay such fears. See Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities,
supra note 72, at 104-05, 107.
96
Katz & Shapiro, supra note 79, at 73.
97
Id. at 67, 73 (concluding that exponential market growth effectively prevents excess inertia);
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 94, at 292 (“Entrenched incumbents are less entrenched when
consumers react to new sales . . . .”).
98
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 94, at 312.
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invoke a handful of well-known anecdotes concerning supposed technology
lock-in. The example most commonly cited is the persistence of the
conventional typewriter keyboard layout (called the Qwerty keyboard for the
after the arrangement of letters in the upper left-hand corner of the array)
despite the emergence of a rival layout known as the Dvorak keyboard that is
supposedly more efficient.99 The next most popular example cited is the
emergence of VHS as the standard format for videocassettes despite the
supposed technical superiority of the Beta format.100
The lack of systematic evaluation has allowed the proponents of network
externality theories to be maddeningly imprecise about what constitutes lockin. The lack of clear definition of terms ignores the fact that no technological
standard is permanent and that over a long enough time horizon all
technological standards are subject to change. Whether a technology has
become locked in is thus in no small part a function of the period of time
deemed relevant for evaluating such a change. The failure to explain terms
essentially renders the concept of lock in currently employed in the literature
arbitrary and obscures any attempt to prove or falsify its existence
empirically.
Furthermore, close analysis of the historical record reveals that none the
key examples that form the empirical basis for network externality theory
can properly be regarded as market failures. Specifically, the evidence
suggests that the Qwerty keyboard does not represent an obsolete technology
locked into place by network externalities. On the contrary, it appears that
the Qwerty keyboard first emerged as the winner of a vibrant competition on
the merits, in which various keyboard designs were tested against one
another in a series of typing contests. Modern ergonomic studies suggest
that any technical difference between the Qwerty and the Dvorak keyboard
remains nominal. In addition, the evidence supposedly demonstrating the
Dvorak keyboard’s superiority is riddled with conflicts of interest, since all
of the key studies, including the Navy tests that represent perhaps the
primary support for these claims, were conducted by the person who
invented and patented the Dvorak keyboard.101
The historical record also belies any suggestion that VHS’s emergence as
the prevailing standard for videocassettes represents the perseverance of an
obsolete technology. The evidence suggests that the final resolution of the
competition between Beta and VHS turned on a design tradeoff, with Beta
incorporating a smaller cassette in order to enhance portability and VHS
opting for a larger cassette in order to provide for longer playing and
recording time. VHS’s victory over Beta thus seems to have resulted from
99
See, e.g., Paul A. David, Clio and the Economics of QWERTY, 75 AM. ECON. REV. 332 (1985);
JEAN TIROLE, THE THEORY OF INDUSTRIAL ORGANIZATION 405 (1988); Farrell & Saloner, supra note 74,
at 941, 942.
100
See, e.g., W. Brian Arthur, Positive Feedbacks in the Economy, 262 SCI. AM. 92, 92 (1990).
101
Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 92.
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consumers’ preference for videotapes capable of recording a two-hour movie
on a single cassette rather than from any market failure that frustrated the
efficient outcome. In fact, any suggestion that VHS’s victory was the result
of inefficient lock-in effects is contradicted by the fact that Beta was
deployed first and was the early leader in VCR technology. If anything,
then, the final outcome is more properly regarded as an example of how
markets can use differences in product value and the availability of an
expanding customer base to displace an existing technology rather than an
example of lock in.102
The other anecdotal examples upon which network externality theorists
rely have been similarly debunked.103 Moreover, against the absence of
empirical evidence indicating that network externalities have caused markets
to fail is arrayed a large number of instances in which new technologies have
displaced incumbent technologies that were firmly entrenched. For example,
vinyl and cassette recordings have been displaced by compact disks, and the
VHS video format is in the process of being displaced by the digital video
disc (DVD) format. In short, the empirical record provides little reason to
believe that networks are in any way sufficiently prone to market failure to
justify more intrusive regulation than any other type of industry. If anything,
the history of technological change suggests the contrary.
c. The Limits of Regulation as a Solution to Market Failure — Lastly,
even if it were proven that certain economic features of networks can cause
markets to fail, it would not necessarily support regulatory intervention. As
noted earlier, solutions imposed by the government often fall short of
efficient outcomes even when they are imposed in the name of correcting a
market failure.104 Not only can imposition of an access regime harm
allocative efficiency if access prices are set at inefficient levels, regulation
can also harm dynamic efficiency by causing incentives to invest in network
technologies to fall below efficient levels and by creating de facto entry
barriers.105 Thus, regulatory authorities confronting a market failure must
ask themselves the logically subsidiary question whether governmental
intervention is likely to improve matters or make matters worse.
Consider, for example, the particular regulatory decisions associated
with any state-sponsored attempt to solve the problems of technological
lock-in. Such intervention would necessarily require the government to
102
LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 80, at 120-27, reprinted in FAMOUS FABLES OF
ECONOMICS, supra note 92, at 111-16; S.J. Liebowitz & Stephen E. Margolis, Path Dependence, Lock-In,
and History, 11 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 205, 218-22 (1995); Liebowitz & Margolis, Market Failure, supra
note 80, at 147-49; Liebowitz & Margolis, supra note 94, at 314-16.
103
See LIEBOWITZ & MARGOLIS, supra note 80, at 116-21.
104
See supra notes 24-25 and accompanying text.
105
Under rate regulation, which still represents the traditional governmental response to market
failure, regulatory authorities explicitly prohibit competitors from entering the market. Although access
regulation does not involve any de jure prohibition of market entry, it can forestall the emergence of
facility-based competition to existing networks by rescuing users from having to invest alternative
capacity. See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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replace clear winners in the technology marketplace with what it believed
represented the superior technology. Moreover, in order to be effective, the
government must do so at a fairly early stage in the technology’s
development, when making such determinations is the most difficult.
Regulators would also typically have to make such determinations on
extremely thin information that in most cases would be provided by parties
with a direct interest in the outcome of the regulatory process. In addition,
decisionmakers would have to insulate themselves from the types of
systematic biases traditionally associated with political decisionmaking
processes. It is for these reasons that even supporters of network externality
theories caution that governmental intervention might well make the problem
worse, not better.106
* * *
In short, there appears to be ample reason to be skeptical of claims that
network economic effects will cause widespread market failure in network
industries. Not only are such claims problematic as a theoretical matter, they
also appear to be essentially devoid of any empirical support. There thus
appears to be little justification for believing that basing access rates on
actual market transactions would lead to inefficient outcomes. On the
contrary, basic economic principles indicate that market-based pricing
represents the most appropriate way for ratemaking authorities to ensure that
access rates are set at levels that promote both allocative and dynamic
efficiency. The only plausible justification for failing to do so—that the
absence of technological substitutes rendered market-based pricing a
practical impossibility—has been drained of its vitality by the feasibility of
direct, facilities-based competition made possible by the two fundamental
transformations that we have identified (i.e., technological convergence and
the shift to access regulation).
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON THE PRICING OF ACCESS TO NETWORKS
Just as regulatory authorities have largely failed to recognize the
economic significance of both technological convergence and the shift from
rate regulation to access regulation, so also have they failed to appreciate that
these transformations compel a different constitutional analysis as well.
Because rate regulation simply adjusts the terms under which parties can
contract, it represents the type of nonpossessory regulation traditionally
subjected to a rather permissive standard of review under the Taking Clause
that only requires that the rate set fall within a zone of reasonableness.
Compelling access to a physical network, in contrast, invariably requires the
network owner to permit third parties to locate equipment on its property.
106

Bresnahan, supra note 91, at 200-03; Katz & Shapiro, Network Externalities, supra note 72, at
112-113.

40

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

As such, access regulations are subject to the more restrictive standards
associated with the Court’s physical takings jurisprudence.
Unlike
nonpossessory regulations, in which reductions in the value of property are
not necessarily compensable, physical takings necessarily command market
value compensation. Principles of constitutional law thus reinforce the basic
economic conclusion that network access should be priced at market levels.
A. The Distinction Between Physical and Nonpossessory Takings
1. The Emergence of Nonpossessory Takings Doctrine
Initially, it was generally believed that the Takings Clause only protected
against direct appropriations of private property by the government or
invasions that effectively ousted the owner of possession to the same extent
as would have occurred had the government formally condemned the
property.107 Governmental actions that merely reduced the value of property
did not qualify.108 The Court subsequently recognized two types of takings
that can arise without a physical occupation. First, the Court acknowledged
that a rate regulation may effect a taking if the rate is set so low as to be
“confiscatory.” Second, the Court has recognized that the government may
effect a “regulatory taking” even if no physical occupation or appropriation
is involved, if the government “goes too far”109 in limiting the manner in
which owners can use their property.
a. Confiscatory Ratemaking — Confiscatory ratemaking doctrine is
rooted in the notion that, although regulatory authorities may limit the
amounts that regulated industries may charge for their services, “it is not to
be inferred that this power of limitation or regulation is itself without limit.
This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and limitation is not the
equivalent of confiscation.”110 As a result, the Court early on acknowledged
that the Constitution forbid rates that are set so low as to be confiscatory.111
107
See, e.g., Transp. Co. v. Chicago, 99 U.S. 635, 642 (1878) (holding that dam that barred access to
property without physically invading it did not effect a taking even though it effectively rendered the
property worthless); Meyer v. City of Richmond, 172 U.S. 82 (1898) (holding that deprivation of highway
access which did not involve physical invasion did not constitute a taking). See generally Lucas v. S.C.
Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992); Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1480 n.21 (2002).
108
Transp. Co., 99 U.S. at 642 (noting that “acts done in the proper exercise of governmental
powers, and not directly encroaching upon private property, though their consequences may impair its
use, are universally held not to be a taking”); Legal Tender Cases, 79 U.S. (12 Wall.) 457, 551 (1871)
(holding that the Takings Clause “has never been supposed to have any bearing upon or to inhibit laws
that indirectly work harm and loss to individuals” even if the government action “render[s] valuable
property almost valueless”).
109
Pa. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922).
110
Railroad Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886).
111
See. e.g., Covington & Lexington Turnpike Road Co. v. Sandford, 164 U.S. 578, 597 (1896); see
also Munn v. Illinois, 94 U.S. 113, 142-43 (1877) (Field, J., dissenting) (observing that property could be
“practically confiscated” by excessively low rates); Stone v. Wisconsin, 94 U.S. 181, 184-85 (1877)
(Field, J., dissenting) (same).
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Although the Court was initially unclear regarding whether its confiscatory
ratemaking doctrine was based on takings or due process principles,
subsequent decisions have since made clear that its conceptual home lies in
the Takings Clause.112
Whether a particular rate is confiscatory cannot be determined solely by
examining at the methodology on which it is based.113 Instead, determining
whether a particular rate falls within the zone of reasonableness required by
the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence involves a “balancing of
the investor and the consumer interests.”114 Rates are constitutional so long
as they provide a return on equity that is sufficient to cover operating
expenses, allow for returns that are “commensurate with returns on
investments in other enterprises having corresponding risks,” and are
“sufficient to assure confidence in the financial integrity of the enterprise, so
as to maintain its credit and to attract capital.”115 In so holding, the Court
made clear that the mere fact that a particular rate reduced the value of the
utility’s property more was not by itself sufficient to render a rate
confiscatory. As the Court acknowledged, “Rate-making is indeed but one
species of price-fixing. The fixing of prices, like other applications of the
police power, may reduce the value of the property which is being regulated.
But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation is
invalid.”116
In the process, some Justices have emphasized that the Court’s
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence occupied a sphere that was distinct
and separate from its physical taking jurisprudence. For example, Brandeis
recognized that the Court’s decisions regarding the determination of value in
condemnation cases did not serve as precedents for confiscatory ratemaking
purposes, and vice versa. Such considerations played no part in determining
value for ratemaking purposes.117 Justice Black offered a similar observation
in FPC v. Natural Gas Pipeline Co.118 In condemnation cases, “ ‘the value
of property, generally speaking, is determined by its productiveness,—the

112

JAMES W. ELY, JR., THE CHIEF JUSTICESHIP OF MELVILLE W. FULLER, 1888-1910, at 104 (1995).
As the Court concluded, “an otherwise reasonable rate is not subject to constitutional attack by
questioning the theoretical consistency of the method that produced it. ‘It is not theory, but the impact of
the rate order which counts.’ ” Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch, 488 U.S. 299, 314 (1989) (quoting FPC v.
Hope Natural Gas Co., 320 U.S. 591, 602 (1944)).
114
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(Black, J., concurring).
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profits which its use brings to the owner.’ ”119 In addition, “when property is
taken under the power of eminent domain the owner is ‘entitled to the full
money equivalent of the property taken, and thereby to be put in as good
position pecuniarily as it would have occupied, if its property had not been
taken.’ ”120 Those principles, Black pointed out, “have no place in rate
regulation.”121 All rate regulation necessarily reduces the value of the
property, but that fact had not been construed as “stay[ing] the hand of the
legislature or its administrative agency in making rate reductions.”122
b. Regulatory Takings — Regulatory takings represent the second type
of nonpossessory taking recognized by the Supreme Court. As the Justice
Holmes explicitly acknowledged in his seminal opinion in Pennsylvania
Coal Co. v. Mahon,123 regulatory takings necessarily involve a difficult
balance of interests. On the one hand, the government must have wide
latitude in regulating the use of property, even if such regulation reduced the
property’s value. Indeed, “[g]overnment hardly could go on if to some
extent values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for
every such change in the general law.”124 On the other hand, the
government’s ability to impose limits on the use of property “must have its
limits” if the constitutional protection of property was to be at all
meaningful.125 Without some restriction on the government’s ability to
qualify the manner in which owners can use their property, “the natural
tendency of human nature [would be] to extend the qualification more and
more until at last private property disappears.”126 Thus, “[t]he general rule at
least is that while property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation
goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.”127 Although the Supreme
Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence originally emerged in the context of
land use restrictions, it has since been applied more generally to any
governmentally imposed nonpossessory restriction on property.128
119
Id. at 603 (Black, J., concurring) (quoting Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312,
328-29 (1893)).
120
Id. (quoting United States v. New River Collieries Co., 262 U.S. 341, 343 (1923)).
121
Id.
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Id.
123
260 U.S. 393 (1922). Although Pennsylvania Coal is generally regarded as the seminal opinion
on regulatory takings, see, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1014 (1992), it was not
without its historical antecedents. See, e.g., Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394 (1915);
Commonwealth v. Perry, 155 Mass. 117, 123 (1891) (Holmes, J., dissenting).
124
260 U.S. at 414.
125
Id.
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Id. at 415.
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Id. For more recent restatements of the same rationale, see Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1014; and TahoeSierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency, 122 S. Ct. 1465, 1480 n.21 (2002).
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See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156 (1998) (interest on attorney trust accounts);
Concrete Pipe & Prods. of Cal., Inc. v. Constr. Laborers Pension Trust, 508 U.S. 602 (1993) (pension
plans); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483 U.S. 587 (1987) (welfare payments); Connolly v. Pension Benefit Guar.
Corp., 475 U.S. 211 (1986) (pension plans); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984)
(pesticide formulas); Pension Benefit Guar. Corp. v. R.A. Gray & Co., 467 U.S. 717 (1984) (pension
plans); United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78 (1982) (liens on real property); Andrus v.
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In the landmark decision in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,129
the Court squarely held what it had frequently noted in dicta in other
cases130: that a nonpossessory regulation may constitute a per se taking if it
deprives the owner of all economically beneficial or productive use of its
land.131 When a restriction reaches this level, it can no longer be considered
a regulation “simply adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life” and
instead is more properly regarded as “the equivalent of a physical
appropriation.”132
The more difficult issue is when a restriction that falls short of
eliminating all economically beneficial use nonetheless constitutes a
regulatory taking. Holmes did not elaborate on the proper way to balance the
interests of property owners and the government aside from noting that “this
is a question of degree.”133 The Court did not offer much additional
guidance until 1978, when the Court issued its opinion in Penn Central
Transportation Co. v. City of New York134 recognizing that, although
determining whether a particular governmental action constituted a taking is
an “essentially ad hoc, factual inquir[y]” that turns on the particular
circumstances of each case,135 it was possible to identify three factors that
have particular significance. Specifically, the Court focused on (1) “the
economic impact of the regulation” on the property owner, (2) “the extent to
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed
expectations,” and (3) “the character of the governmental action.”136 The
Court immediately thereafter emphasized that “[a] ‘taking’ may more readily
be found when the interference with property can be characterized as a
physical invasion by government than when interference arises from some
public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of economic life to
promote the common good.”137
What is perhaps most striking about Penn Central is its suggestion that
physical and regulatory takings might be governed by the same analysis.
The Court’s observation that a taking may “more readily” be found when the
regulation affects a physical invasion arguably implied that the presence of a
physical invasion of property was not dispositive of whether a taking had
Allard, 444 U.S. 51 (1979) (eagle feathers); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976)
(black lung benefits); see also E. Enters. v. Apfel, 524 U.S. 498, 522-37 (1998) (plurality opinion) (retiree
benefits in the coal industry).
129
505 U.S. 1003 (1992).
130
See Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 834 (1987); Keystone Bituminous Coal Ass’n
v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 495 (1987); Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S.
264, 295-96 (1981); Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260 (1980).
131
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015.
132
Id. at 1017 (internal quotation marks omitted).
133
260 U.S. at 416.
134
438 U.S. 104 (1978).
135
Id. at 124.
136
Id.
137
Id. (citation omitted).
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occurred. Instead, it was simply one consideration that could be overcome if
the other factors weighed in the opposite direction. This conclusion seemed
to be confirmed in the Court’s subsequent decision in PruneYard Shopping
Center v. Robins,138 in which the Court upheld the California Supreme
Court’s decision requiring that the owner of a shopping center allow a group
of high school students to engage in political speech on his premises. In
holding that this requirement did not violate the Takings Clause, the Court
flatly stated that the fact that the students may have physically invaded the
shopping center owner’s property “cannot be viewed as determinative.”139
Many noted scholars have downplayed the importance of this language and
argued that PruneYard can be explained solely on First Amendment
grounds.140 Nevertheless, a number of lower courts followed this reading of
PruneYard and held that the Penn Central factors governed takings that
effected physical invasions as well as nonpossessory restrictions on the use
of property.141
The Supreme Court would soon remove any remaining doubts about the
issue. In the first of two leading cases on the proper takings analysis applied
to attempts to compel access to communications networks, the Court’s
landmark decision in Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.142
firmly reestablished the distinction between the Court’s physical and
regulatory takings jurisprudence.
2. Loretto and the Distinction Between Physical and Regulatory
Takings
At issue in Loretto was the fact that the deployment of cable television in
Manhattan depended on the cable operator’s ability to string coaxial cables
on apartment buildings. Such cables served two distinct purposes. First,
they allowed cable operators to provide service to each building’s tenants.
Second, even if no tenant in a particular building subscribed to cable, the
cable operator still often needed to string a “crossover” line in order to
service customers in buildings that lay on the other side of the building from
the cable operator’s central facility, commonly called the “headend.”143 In
1970, a building owner agreed to allow the local cable operator to install a
thirty-five foot crossover line on its property that was less than one-half inch
in diameter and which ran eighteen inches above the building’s roof. The
138

447 U.S. 74 (1980).
Id. at 84.
140
See, e.g., LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 9.5, at 600 (2d ed. 1988); cf.
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 450-51 (1982) (Blackmun, J., dissenting)
(implying that Loretto overruled the takings rationale of PruneYard).
141
See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330-34 (N.Y. 1981),
rev’d, 458 U.S. 419 (1982).
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458 U.S. 419 (1982).
143
Id. at 422.
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operator also attached cubical directional taps measuring four inches on each
side on the front and rear of the roof along with two silver boxes along the
roof cables measuring eighteen inches by twelve inches by six inches. When
some of the building’s tenants eventually subscribed to cable service, the
cable operator also installed another cable running down the front of the
building to the first floor to provide that service.144
The cable operator originally compensated building owners for such
access by paying them a standard rate of five percent of the gross revenues
realized from the particular property. A new statute went into effect in 1973
requiring that landlords permit the cable operator to install equipment on
their property and providing that the rate of compensation would be set by a
state regulatory agency. The agency eventually set the compensation for
such incursions at a one-time payment of one dollar. The owner of the
building at issue brought a takings challenge to the statute.145 Consistent
with the suggestion of the language in Penn Central and PruneYard quoted
above, the New York Court of Appeals held that a physical occupation
authorized by government is not necessarily a taking.146
The Supreme Court responded with a ringing reaffirmation of the
distinction between physical and regulatory takings. In particular, the Court
rejected the conclusion that the takings determination should in all cases be
governed by the ad hoc standards announced in Penn Central. Instead, the
Court held that any regulation that authorizes a permanent physical
occupation of property constitutes a per se taking. It made no difference
whether the government itself occupied the property itself or simply
empowered a third party to do so. As the Court reasoned, “A permanent
physical occupation authorized by state law is a taking without regard to
whether the State, or instead a party authorized by the State, is the
occupant.”147
The Court based its decision on three considerations. The first was
based on precedent: a review of the Court’s prior decisions revealed that that
“when the character of the governmental action is a permanent physical
occupation of property, our cases have uniformly found a taking to the extent
of the occupation, without regard to whether the action achieves an important
public benefit or has only minimal economic impact on the owner.”148
Indeed, the Court referred to treating a permanent physical occupation as a
per se taking as the “historical”149 and “traditional” rule.150 In so holding, the
144

Id. at 422, 438 n.16.
Id. at 423-24.
146
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 423 N.E.2d 320, 330-34 (N.Y. 1981).
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458 U.S. at 433 n.9.
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(reviewing precedents).
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Id. at 435.
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Court explicitly limited or disavowed language in Penn Central and
PruneYard suggesting the contrary.151
Second, the Court drew support for its conclusion from the general
policies underlying the existence of property rights.
Permanent
appropriation of property “is perhaps the most serious form of invasion of an
owner’s property interests.”152 In so reasoning, the Court invoked the now
familiar metaphor that conceives of property as a bundle of rights
encompassing three separate strands, i.e., the rights to possess, use, and
dispose of the property. Unlike regulatory takings, which affect only the
strand relating to the use of the property, physical invasions “chop[ ] through
the bundle, taking a slice from every strand.”153 Specifically, physical
occupations necessarily foreclose owners from either possessing or using the
occupied portion of property themselves.154 Even though the owner retains
the theoretical right to dispose of the occupied space, the presence of
equipment attached to that space essentially empties that right of any value.
In addition, the Court concluded that these injuries are particularly severe
when the government authorizes a stranger to invade and occupy the owner’s
property, since doing so vitiates the longstanding expectation that a property
owner “will be relatively undisturbed at least in the possession of his
property.”155 As a result, the Court concluded that a permanent physical
occupation “is qualitatively more severe than a regulation of the use of
property, even a regulation that imposes affirmative duties on the owner,
since the owner may have no control over the timing, extent, or nature of the
invasion.”156
Lastly, the Court invoked practical considerations. Treating permanent
physical invasions as per se takings “avoids otherwise difficult line drawing
151

The Court reasoned that nothing in the Court’s opinion in Penn Central “repudiate[s] the rule that
a permanent physical occupation is a government action of such a unique character that it is a taking
without regard to other factors that a court might ordinarily examine.” Id. at 432. The Court emphasized
that the “permanence and absolute exclusivity” of the physical occupation at issue in Loretto served to
differentiate it from the “temporary limitations on the right to exclude” at issue in PruneYard. Id. at 435
n.12. In addition, the Court distinguished PruneYard on the grounds that the invasion in that case was
“temporary and limited in nature” and because “the owner had not exhibited an interest in excluding all
persons from his property.” Id. at 434. The Court further narrowed PruneYard’s scope in Nollan v.
California Coastal Commission, 483 U.S. 825, 832 (1987), in which the Court held that because
easements grant individuals “a permanent and continuous right to pass to and fro,” they constitute a
permanent physical occupation under Loretto, even though no particular individual is permitted to station
himself permanently upon the premises. The Court further emphasized that in PruneYard “the owner had
already opened his property to the general public, and in addition permanent access was not required.” Id.
at 832 n.1. For a recent analysis of PruneYard, see Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Exclusivity and Speech:
The Legacy of PruneYard v. Robins, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 21, 33-50 (1997).
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458 U.S. at 435; accord id. at 441 (concluding that a permanent physical occupation “is
qualitatively more intrusive than perhaps any other category of property regulation”).
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Id. at 435.
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problems.”157 Unlike the necessarily ad hoc quality of the Penn Central
balancing test, “whether a permanent physical occupation has occurred
presents relatively few problems of proof. The placement of a fixed structure
on land or real property is an obvious fact that will rarely be subject to
dispute.”158 As a result, when the government action takes the character of a
permanent physical invasion, that factor by itself becomes
“determinative.”159
Although the size and economic impact of the
occupation is relevant in ascertaining the amount of compensation due,160
those considerations play no role in determining whether a taking has
occurred.161
In so holding, the Court was careful to emphasize that its holding did not
contradict the “substantial authority upholding a State’s broad power to
impose appropriate restrictions upon an owner’s use of his property.”162
Citing Penn Central, the Court observed that “[s]o long as these regulations
do not require the [property owner] to suffer the physical occupation of a
portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed under the
multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory governmental
activity.”163 The reference to Penn Central indicates that by this the Court
meant conventional regulatory takings doctrine.
Loretto thus established two principles that play a central role in our
analysis. First, it articulated a strong rationale for subjecting physical takings
to the highest degree of protection under the Takings Clause. If a regulation
requires a property owner to allow third parties to install equipment on its
property on an indefinite basis, it constitutes a per se taking without regard to
the size of the physical invasion or the public purposes advanced by the
regulation.164 Second, it reasserted the sharp distinction between the Court’s
physical takings and regulatory takings jurisprudence. When a physical
taking is involved, the regulatory takings precedents simply do not apply.
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Id.
Id. at 437; see also Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 628 (2001) (noting that when a
physical taking is involved, “the fact and extent of the taking are known.”).
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458 U.S. at 426.
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Id. at 437-38.
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See id. at 430, 434-35, 436. As Justice Marshall quipped, “whether the installation is a taking
does not depend on whether the volume of space it occupies is bigger than a breadbox.” Id. at 438 n.16.
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Id. at 441; accord id. at 440 (“[O]ur holding today in no way alters the analysis governing the
State's power to require landlords to comply with building codes and provide utility connections,
mailboxes, smoke detectors, fire extinguishers, and the like in the common area of a building.”).
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Id. at 440 (citing Penn Central).
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It bears emphasizing that the argument advanced in this Article is far narrower than the one
advanced in SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 229-32, which claimed that Loretto required
compensation any deviation from investment-backed expectations resulting from a change in regulatory
systems and that the introduction of a data stream by a third party constituted a physical occupation.
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Loretto, which is that regulations authorizing the permanent placement of equipment on another person’s
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3. Florida Power and the Distinction Between Physical Takings and
Confiscatory Ratemaking
The Supreme Court sounded similar themes in the other leading case
involving a takings challenge to an attempt to compel access to a
communications network: FCC v. Florida Power Corp.165 As noted in the
foregoing discussion of Loretto, the deployment of cable television depended
on its ability to establish a web of coaxial cables connecting individual
households. Although in urban areas this could be accomplished by
compelling apartment owners to allow cable operators to string cable across
their properties, in suburban and rural areas the network of existing utility
poles owned by telephone and electric companies represented the only
feasible means of establishing the physical infrastructure needed for the
provision of cable television service. Congress was concerned, however, that
utility companies were exploiting their monopoly position by overcharging
cable operators for the right to attach their coaxial cables to existing utility
poles. As a result, Congress enacted legislation in 1978 known as the Pole
Attachments Act that authorized the FCC to regulate the terms and
conditions of pole attachment agreements in any state that did not impose
such regulation itself.166
The Court held that the Pole Attachments Act did not constitute the type
of permanent physical occupation authorized by the government required to
constitute a per se taking under Loretto. What was missing was the “element
of required acquiescence” present in the statute at issue in Loretto.167
Nothing in the original version of the Pole Attachments Act gave “cable
companies any right to occupy space on utility poles or prohibit[ed] utility
companies from refusing to enter into attachment agreements with cable
operators.”168 Instead, the Act simply regulated the rents charged by those
parties who voluntarily choose to enter into such agreements. The Court
found dispositive the language from Loretto concluding that, “ ‘[s]o long as
these regulations do not require the landlord to suffer the physical
occupation of a portion of his building by a third party, they will be analyzed
under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to nonpossessory
governmental activity.’ ”169
165

480 U.S. 245 (1987).
480 U.S. at 247-48. Although cable companies could theoretically have instead employed the
underground rights of way owned by natural gas companies, as a general matter underground installation
of cables was either impossible or impractical. Id. at 247.
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Id. at 252.
168
Id. at 251.
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Id. at 252 (quoting Loretto, 458 U.S. at 440). The Court further noted, “Appellees contend, in
essence, that it is a taking under Loretto for a tenant invited to lease at a rent of $7.15 to remain at the
regulated rent of $1.79. But it is the invitation, not the rent, that makes the difference. The line which
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interloper with a government license.” Id. at 252-53.
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Having held that the original version of the Pole Attachments Act fell
outside the per se rule announced by Loretto to govern physical takings, the
Court proceeded to evaluate whether it nonetheless represented a
nonpossessory taking. Rather than proceeding to cite the Penn Central
factors, as its quotation of Loretto suggested, Florida Power held that the
Takings Clause simply required that the rates set not be confiscatory.170 The
Court concluded that the pole attachment rates established by the statute
allowed for sufficient return on investment to satisfy the requirements its
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence.171
Florida Power thus reinforced the same key principles that underlay
Court’s decision in Loretto. First, although the Court stopped short of
addressing the issue explicitly,172 the Court’s reasoning strongly implied that
had the Pole Attachments Act compelled utilities to give cable television
systems access to their poles, it would have constituted a per se taking under
Loretto. Second, Florida Power underscored the sharp distinction between
the Court’s physical takings and confiscatory ratemaking precedents.
Echoing the admonitions offered by Justices Brandeis and Black cautioning
that physical takings and confiscatory ratemaking represented distinct
jurisprudential spheres,173 the Court established that its confiscatory
ratemaking precedents did not have any application to cases involving
physical takings.
4. Implications
a. Towards a Possible Synthesis of Regulatory Takings and
Confiscatory Ratemaking Doctrine — Although courts and scholars typically
treat regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking as conceptually
distinct,174 the court’s opinions in Loretto and Florida Power suggest that
both of those lines of precedent may in fact represent a single concept. It is
quite easy to reconceptualize a restriction on the amount that a person can
charge for access to a piece of property as either a restriction on the
property’s use or as a “public program adjusting the benefits and burdens of
economic life to promote the common good” that characterizes the classic
regulatory taking.175 Moreover, both lines of precedent appear to be
animated by similar concerns. Each line of authority recognizes that almost
every government action necessarily affects the value of private property and
that imposing too stringent a leash on regulatory action would conflict with

170
480 U.S. at 253 (citing St. Joseph Stock Yards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38, 53 (1936), and
Permian Basin Area Rate Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 761, 770 (1968)).
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Id. at 253-54.
172
Id. at 251 n.6.
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See supra notes 117-122 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 213.
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See Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124
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the exigencies of modern governance.176 At the same time, both attempt to
balance this concern against the recognition that, if taken to excess, the
power to regulate can constitute the power to destroy.177 In addition, both
employ almost identical methodologies that emphasize the fact specific
nature of the claims178 and focus in large part on the economic impact of the
restriction both on the regulated entity179 and on the expectations of
investors.180
Finally, certain precedents suggest that these two approaches may be
fungible. For example initial discussion in the Court’s Florida Power
opinion invoked the Court’s regulatory takings jurisprudence when it
suggested that, in the absence of some requirement that utilities permit
permanent occupation of their poles by cable companies, the regulations
would be “ ‘analyzed under the multifactor inquiry generally applicable to
nonpossessory governmental activity.’ ”181 Immediately following that
observation, however, the Court held that, in the absence of such
compulsion, the Pole Attachments Act was properly analyzed under the
Court’s confiscatory ratemaking precedents.182 The juxtaposition of these
two observations in the same opinion indicates that the Court may well have
viewed these two lines of precedent as simply being variations of the same
doctrine.
The reasoning contained in the Court’s rent control precedents raise a
similar inference. For example, the Court analyzed the rent control
ordinance at issue in Pennell v. City of San Jose183 in terms of the Court’s
176
Compare, e.g., Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 413 (“Government hardly could go on if to some extent
values incident to property could not be diminished without paying for every such change in the general
law.”), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 601 (“The fixing of prices … may reduce the value of the
property which is being regulated. But the fact that the value is reduced does not mean that the regulation
is invalid.”).
177
Compare Pa. Coal, 260 U.S. at 415 (noting that without some limit on the government’s ability
to restrict the manner in which owners can use their property, “the natural tendency of human nature
[would be] to extend the qualification more and more until at last private property disappears”), with
Railroad Comm’n Cases, 116 U.S. 307, 331 (1886) (“[I]t is not to be inferred that this power of limitation
or regulation [of rates] is itself without limit. This power to regulate is not a power to destroy, and
limitation is not the equivalent of confiscation.”).
178
Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (calling the regulatory takings standard an “essentially
ad hoc, factual inquir[y]”), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (observing that determining whether a
rate is confiscatory depends upon a series of fact-intensive inquiries focusing on the net effect of the rate
on the utility’s property).
179
Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “the economic impact of the regulation on
the claimant” as a factor in the regulatory taking analysis), with Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603
(recognizing the importance of ensuring that the regulated entity receives “enough revenue not only for
operating expenses but also for the capital costs of the business”).
180
Compare Penn Central, 438 U.S. at 124 (identifying “the extent to which the regulation has
interfered with distinct investment-backed expectations” as a factor in the regulatory taking analysis), with
Hope Natural Gas, 320 U.S. at 603 (noting that investors have “a legitimate concern with the financial
integrity of the company whose rates are being regulated”).
181
FCC v. Fla. Power Corp., 480 U.S. 245, 252 (1987) (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan
CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 (1982)).
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Id. at 253.
183
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confiscatory ratemaking precedents. In contrast, the Court analyzed the rent
control ordinance in Yee v. City of Escondido184 in terms of its regulatory
taking jurisprudence, explicitly stating that the rent control ordinance at issue
“merely regulate[s] petitioners’ use of their land by regulating the
relationship between landlord and tenant.”185 Indeed, the Court specifically
equated ceilings on the rents the landlord can charge with other types of use
restrictions and declared that both types of restrictions were properly
analyzed under classic regulatory takings precedents such as Pennsylvania
Coal v. Mahon and the progeny of Penn Central.186 The parallels between
the two doctrines are further underscored by the fact that the Court’s opinion
in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council187 described the strand of
regulatory takings doctrine used to invalidate regulations that prohibit all
economically beneficial use of land as being directed against “confiscatory”
regulations.188
It is thus arguable that amount to the Court’s regulatory takings and
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence actually slightly different aspects of a
single doctrine. Unfortunately, the Court has never clearly addressed the
relationship between these two lines of precedent, and scholarly analysis
shed little additional light on the issue.189 In addition, it would be somewhat
anachronistic to suggest that the Court had a unified takings jurisprudence in
mind from the outset. The Court’s jurisprudence on confiscatory takings
long antedates its recognition of regulatory takings in Pennsylvania Coal, let
alone the announcement of the ad hoc factors in Penn Central. In fact, since
rate regulation was primarily state regulation and the Takings Clause was not
assimilated against the states until 1897,190 the earliest confiscatory
ratemaking cases arose under the Due Process Clause, rather than the
Takings Clause. The historical dichotomy is further reinforced by the views
of Justice Brewer, who was perhaps the primary architect of the Court’s early
takings jurisprudence. His famous speech at Yale Law School on the subject
clearly evinces his belief that rate regulation and use restrictions represent
distinct lines of authority.191
184
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b. The Paradigmatic Importance of the Shift to Access Regulation —
Fortunately, we need not resolve the precise relationship between regulatory
takings and confiscatory ratemaking in order to press our argument.
Although the cases do not shed much light on whether or not regulatory
takings and confiscatory ratemaking represent distinct concepts or instead
represent slightly different aspects of the same doctrine, for our purposes, it
is sufficient that the Court has emphasized the importance of keeping both of
the categories distinct from its physical takings jurisprudence.192 If a
regulation authorizes a third party to establish a permanent physical invasion,
Loretto and Florida Power together make clear that it constitutes a per se
taking without resort to any of the considerations typically invoked under
both the Court’s regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking
jurisprudence.
Equally importantly, the Court has frequently reiterated that its physical
and nonpossessory takings precedents occupy separate spheres and that its
decisions involving nonpossessory takings have no application to physical
takings. For example, the Court held in Yee v. City of Escondido193 that a
regulatory takings challenge was not fairly included in a question presented
focusing on physical takings on the grounds that “[c]onsideration of whether
a regulatory taking occurred would not assist in resolving whether a physical
taking occurred as well.”194 In so holding, the Court emphasized that both
questions “exist side by side, neither encompassing another.”195 The Court
struck a similar note in Palazzolo v. Rhode Island196 when it recognized that
physical takings “present[ ] different considerations than cases alleging a
taking based on a burdensome regulation.”197
The Court issued its most recent reaffirmation of these principles last
Term in Tahoe-Sierra Preservation Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional
Planning Agency.198 The Court reaffirmed that whenever a physical taking
occurs, the government has a categorical duty to compensate the owner,
regardless of the size of the occupation or whether the government only takes
part of a larger parcel.199 Echoing its more extended discussion in Loretto,
the Court found it appropriate to treat physical takings in such categorical
fashion because “physical appropriations are relatively rare, easily identified,
and usually represent a greater affront to individual property rights.”200 As a
result, when determining whether a physical taking has occurred, there is no
need to evaluate the magnitude of the economic impact of the government’s
192
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action on the property owner or to inquire into the substantiality of the
governmental interest underlying the regulation. Any physical invasion, no
matter how small, is sufficient.201 Most importantly for our purposes, the
Tahoe-Sierra Court emphasized these differences “make[ ] it inappropriate to
treat cases involving physical takings as controlling precedents for the
evaluation of a claim that there has been a regulatory taking, and vice
versa.”202
Tahoe-Sierra thus reaffirmed the core substantive holding of Loretto by
reiterating that permanent physical occupations constitute per se takings
without regard to the economic impact or the public purpose served by the
invasion. Equally importantly, it offered the Court’s plainest statement to
date that its regulatory takings decisions do not constitute precedent in cases
involving physical takings.
B. Physical Takings Jurisprudence Applied to Network Access
Determining whether a takings violation has occurred thus requires
resolution of two separate questions. First, has the governmental action in
question effected a taking? As the foregoing discussion underscores, the
approach to resolving this question varies depending on whether the
regulation at issue is alleged to be a physical taking. Second, if so, has the
government provided just compensation for its actions.
1. Determining Whether a Taking Has Occurred
In contrast to the analysis applied to both regulatory takings and
confiscatory ratemaking, which attempt to balance the interests of the public
with those of the utility and which carefully examine the regulation’s
economic impact, physical takings are governed by a simple bright line rule.
As the Court held in Loretto and reaffirmed several times since, government
action is a per se taking if it authorizes a permanent physical occupation,
such as occurs when a regulation gives third parties the right to place
telecommunications equipment on the network owner’s property.203 If a
permanent physical occupation is involved, it does not matter whether the
action furthers an important public interest or achieves an important public
benefit.204 Nor does it matter that the size or economic impact of the
invasion may be minimal.205 Indeed, a permanent physical invasion is still a
201

Id.
Id. (footnote and internal quotation marks omitted).
203
See supra notes 147-164 and accompanying text.
204
Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479; Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015, 1028
(1992);
Yee, 503 U.S. at 530; Nollan v. Cal. Coastal Comm’n, 483 U.S. 825, 831-32 (1987); Loretto v.
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426, 434-35 (1982)).
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See Tahoe-Sierra, 122 S. Ct. at 1479; Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606, 617 (2001);
Lucas, 505 U.S. at 1015; Nollan, 483 U.S. at 831-32; Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435, 437, 438 n.16.
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per se taking even if it causes the value of the property to increase.206 The
Court reasoned:
[This] conclusion . . . [is] premised on our longstanding
recognition that property is more than economic value; it
also consists of “the group of rights which the so-called
owner exercises in his dominion of the physical thing,” such
as “the right to possess, use and dispose of it.” While the
[property] at issue here may have no economically realizable
value to its owner, possession, control, and disposition are
nonetheless valuable rights that inhere in the property.207
Thus, any regulation that requires a network owner to permit third parties
to place equipment on its property constitutes a per se taking under Loretto.
This fact underscores the constitutional significance of the shift from rate
regulation to access regulation. As will be discussed in greater detail during
the application of this analytical framework to three current policy problems,
regulations that compel access to wireline telecommunications networks
generally require the placement of third-party equipment on the network
owner’s property.208 As a result, the shift from rate regulation to access
regulation generates an equally fundamental shift in the constitutional
analysis. Finding that a taking has occurred is only the first step in the
constitutional inquiry, however. Whether access regulations violate the
Takings Clause thus depends on whether the regulation provides for just
compensation.
2. Determining Just Compensation
Once a court determines that a taking has occurred, the constitutionality
of the regulation in question is determined by whether the government
provides just compensation for the property taken. The Loretto Court did not
address the question of compensation, leaving that for consideration by the

206

See Phillips v. Wash. Legal Found., 524 U.S. 156, 169-70 (1998); Loretto, 458 U.S. at 437 n.15.
Phillips, 524 U.S. at 170 (citations omitted) (quoting United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323
U.S. 373, 378 (1945)); accord Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36.
208
Interestingly, it is less clear whether a regulation compelling access to a wireless network would
invariably constitute a physical taking. In contrast to wireline communications, which depend on having a
physical connection to the network, spectrum-based communications may require nothing more than the
appropriate placement of antenna owned by the property holder or occupant. Regulations mandating
access to wireless networks thus do not necessarily require the installation of third-party equipment on
private property. For example, the D.C. Circuit recently rejected a takings challenge to an FCC order
intended to ensure access to different forms of television service by in essence requiring property owners
to allow residents to install antennas needed to receive DBS service, broadcast signals, and other forms of
television programming. The court concluded that, since the regulation in question did not compel a
physical invasion of property, it did not constitute a per se taking under Loretto and was properly analyzed
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state courts on remand.209 In addition, most courts confronted with this issue
have held the issue not yet ripe for judicial consideration.210
a. Market Value as the Preferred Measure of Just Compensation —
The Court has often averred that the guiding principle in determining what
constitutes just compensation has been that “the owner shall be put in as
good position pecuniarily as he would have been if his property had not been
taken.”211 As a result, the Court established that the predominant measure of
just compensation should be “market value.”212 As Justice Frankfurter
reasoned in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States213:
Most things . . . have a general demand which gives them a
value transferable from one owner to another. As opposed
to such personal and variant standards as value to the
particular owner whose property has been taken, this
transferable value has an external validity which makes it a
fair measure of [just compensation].214
The external validity identified by Frankfurter has both a theoretical and
practical basis. As a theoretical matter, market value reflects the seminal
insights of neoclassical economics that effectively transformed value from an
intrinsic concept into a one based on market-based evidence of the property’s
earning potential. This shift was already evident in the very first case in
which the Court addressed the principles that would guide the just
compensation inquiry, Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States,215 in
which the federal government condemned a lock and a dam operated by a
209

Loretto, 458 U.S. at 441.
See, e.g., Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1679-80 (2002); Gulf Power
Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Gulf Power II”), rev’d on other grounds sub nom.
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002); Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 187
F.3d 1324, 1338 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Gulf Power I”); Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir.
1997), rev’d & remanded in part on other grounds, AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999);
Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC, 911 F.2d 776, 780 (D.C. Cir. 1990).
211
United States v. 564.54 Acres of Land, 441 U.S. 506, 510 (1979) (“Lutheran Synod”) (quoting
Olson v. United States, 292 U.S. 246, 255 (1934)). As Richard Epstein has noted, “In principle, the ideal
solution is to leave the individual owner in a position of indifference between the taking by the
government and the retention of the property.” See RICHARD A. EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY
AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN 182, (Harvard University Press 1985). For the earliest statements
of this principle, see Monongahela Nav. Co. v. United States, 148 U.S. 312, 326 (1893); Seaboard Air
Line Ry. v. United States, 261 U.S. 299, 304 (1923).
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See, e.g., United States v. 50 Acres of Land, 469 U.S. 24, 29 (1984) (“Duncanville Landfill”);
Kirby Forest Indus., Inc. v. United States, 467 U.S. 1, 10 (1984); Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511;
Almota Farmers Elevator & Warehouse Co. v. United States, 409 U.S. 470, 474 (1973); United States v.
Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); United States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Nav. Co., 338 U.S. 396, 402 (1949); Gen. Motors, 323 U.S. at 379; United States v. Miller, 317 U.S. 336,
374 (1943); Olson, 292 U.S. at 255; Mitchell, 267 U.S. at 343; United States v. New River Collieries Co.,
262 U.S. 341, 344 (1923). Although the cases at times refer to this standard as “fair market value,” as the
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338 U.S. 1 (1949).
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Id. at 5.
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148 U.S. 312 (1893).
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private company pursuant to a state franchise. The issue was whether the
Takings Clause simply required compensation for the tangible property taken
or whether the federal government also had to compensate the company for
the tolls the facility would have earned by using that property. The Court
held that the Takings Clause required payment of “a full and perfect
equivalent for the property taken,”216 which, “generally speaking, is
determined by its productiveness,—the profits which its use brings to the
owner.”217 “The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of
construction, but more by what the completed structure brings in the way of
earnings to its owner.”218 As a result, it followed that the income that the
lock and the dam would have earned had to be regarded as an intrinsic part of
the property’s value.219 The Court has subsequently reaffirmed the principle
on numerous occasions.220
Practical considerations provide additional reasons for preferring
exchange-oriented approaches over cost-oriented approaches when
determining just compensation. As the Court observed, the shift to the
market value standard was driven in part by the “need for a clear, easily
administrable rule governing the measure of ‘just compensation.’ ”221 The
use of external measures of value eliminated many of the “serious practical
difficulties in assessing the worth an individual places on particular property
at a given time.”222 Permitting such subjective considerations to determine
what constitutes just compensation “would enhance the risk of error and
prejudice.”223
The Court has stated that the market value standard is not a constitutional
mandate and has held out the possibility that the Court might permit some
deviation from it.224 Indeed, the Court has long recognized that the market
value fails to give the principle of putting property owners in as good a
position as if their property had not been taken “its full and literal force.”225
216
Id. at 326; accord id. (alternatively stating the test as “a full equivalent” and “a full and exact
equivalent” for the property taken).
217
Id. at 328.
218
Id.
219
Id. at 329.
220
See, e.g., Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1017 (1992) (“ ‘For what is the land but
the profits thereof?’ ” (quoting 1 E. COKE, INSTITUTES, ch. 1, § 1 (1st Am. ed. 1812) (alterations
omitted)); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 9 (“The market value of land as a business site tends to be as
high as the reasonably probable earnings of a business there situated would justify.”).
221
Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.15.
222
Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511; accord United States ex rel. Tenn. Valley Auth. v. Powelson,
319 U.S. 266, 280 (1943) (noting that the market value standard avoided “serious practical difficulties in
assessing the worth an individual places on particular property at a given time”).
223
Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 36
224
See United States v. Cors, 337 U.S. 325, 332 (1949) (cautioning against making a “fetish” of
market value); see also Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 512; Kirby
Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.14; United States v. Fuller, 409 U.S. 488, 490 (1973); United States v. Va. Elec.
& Power Co., 365 U.S. 624, 633 (1961); Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402; United States v.
Miller, 317 U.S. 369, 374 (1943).
225
Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 511.
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For example, the market value standard fails to require the government to
provide “compensat[ion] for all values an owner may derive from his
property.”226 In particular, the Court has frequently observed that just
compensation does not necessarily require compensation for the special
value that a piece of property may have for a particular user.227 Furthermore,
the Court does not allow recovery of any transaction costs imposed by the
taking.228 As a result, the market value standard has been criticized for
failing to make whole those whose property is taken.229
The Court has nonetheless concluded that the market value standard
offers an appropriate accommodation for the exigencies of modern
governance. In most cases market value “achieves a fair ‘balance between
the public’s need and the claimant’s loss,’ ”230 thereby mediating “the
conflict between the people’s interest in public projects and the principle of
indemnity to the landowner.”231 Although the failure to take subjective
valuation into account can impose real costs on those whose property is
taken, such slippage is “properly treated as part of the burden of common
citizenship.”232 As a result, any exceptions to the market value rule that may
exist remain very narrow.233
b. Determining Market Value under the Takings Clause — Market
value is defined as the amount that would be paid for the property in a
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller.234 Consequently,
market value must take into account any aspect of the property that would
affect the price that a reasonable buyer would be willing to pay.235 For
example, in Boom Co. v. Patterson, the Court held that in determining the
value of condemned land, “the same considerations are to be regarded as in a
sale of property between private parties. The inquiry in such cases must be
what is the property worth in the market, viewed not merely with reference
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Id.
Id. (citing Miller, 317 U.S. at 374-75; and Cors, 337 U.S. at 332).
228
See, e.g., United States v. Petty Motors Co., 327 U.S. 372, 377-78 (1946); cf. supra notes 33-34
and accompanying text (noting that transaction costs are real costs that should be taken into account when
compensating network owners for access to their inputs).
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See, e.g., James Geoffrey Durham, Efficient Just Compensation as a Limit on Eminent Domain,
69 MINN. L. REV. 1277, 1300 (1985). See generally D. Michael Risinger, Direct Damages: The Lost Key
to Constitutional Just Compensation When Business Premises Are Condemned, 15 SETON HALL L. REV.
483, 526-40 (1985) collecting commentary); Michael DeBow, Unjust Compensation: The Continuing
Need for Reform, 46 S.C. L. REV. 579, 579-80 & n.7 (1995) (same).
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Id. at 33 (quoting Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402).
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Powelson, 319 U.S. at 280.
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Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 5.
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DeBow, supra note 229, at 581; Ann E. Gergen, Why Fair Market Value Fails as Just
Compensation, 14 HAMLINE J. PUB. L. & POL’Y 181, 195 (1994) ; Glynn S. Lunney, Jr., Compensation
for Takings: How Much Is Just?, 42 CATH. U. L. REV. 721, 729-31, 759-61 (1993).
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Almota, 407 U.S. at 474 (plurality opinion); Va. Elec., 365 U.S. at 635-36; Olson, 292 U.S. at
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227

58

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

to the uses to which it is at the time applied, but with reference to the sues to
which it is plainly adapted.”236
The Court reiterated these principles in Olson v. United States.237 When
determining the price upon which a willing buyer and a willing seller would
settle, “there should be taken into account all considerations that fairly might
be brought forward and reasonably be given substantial weight in such
bargaining.”238 The Court involved the concept of opportunity cost when it
noted that “[t]he highest and most profitable use for which the property is
adaptable and needed or likely to be needed in the reasonably near future is
to be considered, not necessarily as the measure of value, but to the full
extent that the prospect of demand for such use affects the market value
while the property is privately held.”239 In addition, “to the extent that
probable demand by prospective purchasers or condemnors affects market
value, it is to be taken into account.”240
Consistent with the economic principles identified above,241 the Court
has held that an evaluation of comparable sales represents the most reliable
way to determine how much a willing buyer would have agreed to pay to a
willing seller had the property been transferred on the open market. As the
Court observed in Kimball Laundry, “If exchanges of similar property have
been frequent, the inference is strong that the equivalent arrived at by the
haggling of the market would probably have been offered and accepted, and
it is thus that ‘market price’ becomes so important a standard of
reference.”242
Other measures may be required when the property being valued is so
infrequently traded that in effect no market for it exists.243 In the absence of
comparable sales, the Court has sanctioned use of the income capitalization
approach when valuing commercial property, in which market value is
determined to be the net present value of the property’s projected income.244
Although this approach has the advantage of being based on data derived
236

98 U.S. at 407-08.
292 U.S. 246 (1934).
238
Id. at 257; accord id. at 255 (“Just compensation includes all elements of value that inhere in the
property . . ..”).
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Id. at 255.
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Id. at 256 (citing Boom Co.); accord Almota, 409 U.S. at 477-78 (valuing property based on
every consideration that the market would have included had the property been sold in an open market);
id. at 479 (Powell, J., concurring) (given weight to every value that would have been given weight in a
transaction between a willing buyer and a willing seller).
241
See supra Part I.C.1.
242
338 U.S. at 6.
243
See, e.g., Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 29; Kirby Forest, 467 U.S. at 10 n.14; Lutheran
Synod, 441 U.S. at 512; United States v. Commodities Trading Corp., 339 U.S. 121, 123 (1950); Kimball
Laundry, 338 U.S. at 6; Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 337 U.S. at 402; Miller, 317 U.S. at 374-75.
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See Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 515 (noting that “the uses to which commercial property is put
can often be valued in terms of the capitalized earnings produce”); Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 16-17
(“One index of going-concern value offered by petitioner is the record of its past earnings.”). For an
application of these principles in the context of telecommunications, see Illinois Bell Telephone Co. v.
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from actual market transactions, the Court has recognized that it does carry
some risks. Estimates of value based on capitalization of income are only as
reliable as the data upon which they are based. For example, projections of
future income are typically based on the income that a particular property has
earned in the past. While such data are often reliable indicators of future
earnings, at times they may fail to reflect the full range of technological and
economic developments.245
In addition, the Court has suggested that in the absence of better
measures of value, it is appropriate for courts to consider replacement cost
when determining whether the government has provided just compensation.
As noted earlier, replacement cost is better than historic cost at reflecting
changes in value across time.246 It also provides a useful ceiling, since all
those who would purchase access would also have the option of making it
themselves. At the same time, approaches that focus on replacement cost
suffer from several conceptual limitations. First and foremost, such
approaches are problematic in that they do not necessarily reflect exchange
value.247 In addition, by failing to incorporate any element that reflects
demand, the replacement cost approach may fail to take technological
obsolescence into account and as a result may require compensation even
“when no one would think of reproducing the property.”248 Moreover, in
order to compensate for functional obsolescence, courts must analyze the
replacement cost of a plant of equal efficiency by including an allowance for
physical depreciation. Failing to do so would have the effect of bestowing a
windfall on the property owner, represented by the difference in quality
between the new, replacement facility and the older facility actually taken.
The addition of depreciation as a valuation factor adds considerable
uncertainty to the valuation process.249
The Court reserved its heaviest criticism for the valuation approach upon
which regulatory authorities have most often relied in network industries:
historical cost. The Court’s criticism of historical cost methodologies dates
back to its earliest takings decisions.250 As the Court explained in United
States v. Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo Navigation Co.,251 historical cost all
too often represents a “false standard of the past” that bears no necessary
245
See Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 337 U.S. at 398, 403 (finding earnings record based on ferry
routes from 1916 to 1932 inapposite when the development of alternative ferry routes in 1928 rendered
those routes obsolete).
246
See supra notes 31-32 and accompanying text.
247
4 JULIUS L. SACKMAN, NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN § 12.01[1], at 12-33 to -34 (rev. 3d ed.
2001).
248
Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 337 U.S. at 403. For example, the Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo
Court determined that replacement cost was misleading in light of the fact that the development of rail
lines and larger ferries had rendered ships of the type in question obsolete. Id. at 399-400.
249
Duncanville Landfill, 469 U.S. at 34-35; Lutheran Synod, 441 U.S. at 518 (White, J., concurring).
250
See Monongahela, 148 U.S. at 328 (“The value, therefore, is not determined by the mere cost of
construction . . ..”).
251
338 U.S. 396 (1949).
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relationship with present value.252 As a result, the Court condemned
historical cost as “a backward-looking measure that is unreliable in
determining a current fair market value.”253 The Court elaborated further in
Olson, in which it pointed out that market value
may be more or less than the owner’s investment. He may
have acquired the property for less than its worth or he may
have paid a speculative and exorbitant price. Its value may
have changed substantially while held by him. . . . The
public may not by any means confiscate the benefits, or be
required to bear the burden of the owner’s bargain . . . He
must be made whole but is not entitled to more.254
Because of the problems associated with these other methodologies, the
Court has consistently indicated that the comparable sales approach
represents the best evidence of market value.255 Indeed, the Court has gone
so far as to refer to other valuation methodologies (including replacement
cost) as exceptions to the comparable sales approach and to hold these other
methodologies inapplicable whenever market-based transactions in similar
properties exist.256 The Court offered its most dramatic statement to this
effect in United States v. New River Collieries Co.,257 in which the Court
held that “[w]here private property is taken for public use and there is a
market price prevailing at the time and place of the taking, that price is just
compensation.”258 When comparable sales data existed, evidence of income
and replacement cost was properly held inadmissible.259 The implication is
252

Id. at 403 (footnote and citations omitted).
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292 U.S. at 255; accord 4A NICHOLS ON EMINENT DOMAIN, supra note 247, § 15.09[1], at 15-62
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sales approach”); Lunney, supra 233, at 728 (noting that the Court “has preferred that a party establish
market value through the comparable sales approach”).
256
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U.S. at 10 n.14; Toronto, Hamilton & Buffalo, 338 U.S. at 402. The Court has also suggested in dicta that
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that whenever equivalent property is regularly traded on an established
market, comparable sales represent the sole measure of compensation. Only
if such data is unavailable may courts resort to other methodologies, and
even when doing so, it should turn first to the income capitalization approach
and then the replacement cost approach before evaluating value in terms of
historical cost.
The arguments advanced by Justice Brandeis and later offered by the
Court to justify reliance on historical cost when evaluating takings
challenges to conventional rate regulation are not to the contrary.260 At no
point did anyone suggest that cost-based methodologies are superior under
the principles of economics and fairness embodied in the Takings Clause.
Instead, the Court made clear that it was sanctioning the use of cost-based
methodologies only because of market-based methodologies were
unavailable. Implicit in this argument is the recognition that use of costbased methodologies was valid only so long as comparable sales did not
exist and that the emergence of market-based benchmarks would require a
return to the established principles of constitutional law.
The foregoing analysis underscores the constitutional significance of
both of the transformations that we have identified. The fundamental shift
from rate regulation to access regulation makes it far easier for regulatory
authorities to incorporate external reference points that reflect the demand
side of the valuation equation. Because conventional rate regulation set the
prices charged for the final outputs, any attempt to base rates on the final
prices charged was hopelessly circular. Access regulation, in contrast,
alleviates much of the circularity problem by allowing market-based
competition to determine the prices charged for final goods. It is true that
some circularity remains under access regulations. Regulatory authorities
must still establish rates to govern the terms under which incumbent firms
must provide access to competitors, and the rates set will have some
influence on the prices charged for final goods. But the circularity problems
will be mitigated to some extent by the fact that network access remains only
one of several inputs required in the production of the final good. If network
access comprises only a small percentage of the total cost, access rates will
not represent a significant determinant of final good prices.
The emergence of direct, facilities-based network competition is also of
considerable constitutional moment. Indeed, the emergence of direct
competition undercuts the justifications for imposing access regulation as a
matter of first principles. But even setting aside the basic policy question
about whether access represents good policy, the emergence of substitute
network technologies has equally profound implications for the
implementation of any access regime. By facilitating the emergence of
alternative networks capable of providing market-based indicia of
260
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competitive pricing, the convergence of telecommunications technology is in
the process of vitiating the justification for using cost-based methodologies
to set rates. As competition allows market benchmarks to emerge, precedent
indicates that any continued reliance on cost-based methodologies would be
improper.
c. Partial Takings of Utility Property — Although the Supreme Court’s
takings jurisprudence recognizes that the compensation paid by the
government should generally reflect earning potential of the property taken,
it should be noted that the government generally does not need to pay for the
going concern value of the property when the government takes the entire fee
and divests the current owner of title, it need not pay compensation for the
going concern value of the property.261 As the Court explained in Kimball
Laundry, “the denial of compensation in such circumstances rests on a very
concrete justification: the going-concern value has not been taken.”262 In
such circumstances, “only the physical property has been condemned,
leaving the owner free to move his business to a new location.”263 The Court
further reasoned that “[i]n such a situation there is no more reason for a taker
to pay for the business’ going-concern value than there would be for a
purchaser to pay for it who had not secured from his vendor a covenant to
refrain from entering into competition with him.”264
The Kimball Laundry Court has identified two circumstances in which
the compensation for going concern value is nonetheless appropriate. The
first occurs when the government takes a public utility that possesses natural
monopoly characteristics.265 “Since a utility cannot ordinarily operated
profitably except as a monopoly, investment by the former owner of the
utility in duplicating the condemned faculties could have no prospect of a
profitable return.”266 In such cases, “[t]he owner retains nothing of the
going-concern value that it formerly possessed.”267 Taking over a public
utility thus “has the inevitable effect of depriving the owner of the goingconcern value of his business,” it properly is regarded as a taking for which
compensation must be paid.268
The second situation identified in Kimball Laundry in which a firm must
receive compensation for its going concern value arises when the
government physically takes less than the fee interest in the owner’s
property.269 The Court elaborated further in United States v. General Motors
261
See, e.g., Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 11; United States v. Gen. Motors Corp., 323 U.S. 373,
379 (1945).
262
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Corp.,270 in which the Court has recognized that, although the government
need not pay compensation for a property’ going concern value when it takes
the full fee interest,271 “[i]t is altogether another matter when the Government
does not take [the owner’s] entire interest, but by the form of its proceeding
chops it into bits, of which it takes only what it wants, however few or
minute, and leaves him holding the remainder.”272 The fact that only part of
the property was taken in effect made it impossible for the property owner
simply to reestablish its business elsewhere. In such cases, the proper
measure of compensation was not just the cost of the property taken, but
rather must also reflect the going concern value of the property as reflected
by rental for use of the property that could be obtained on the open market.273
Both considerations underscore the constitutional problems that would
result from basing network access rates solely on cost and counsel in favor of
allowing the rates charged to reflect the probable demand for network
services. To the extent that access to any particular portion of a network is
justified, it must be because that portion bears natural monopoly
characteristics. Since it is infeasible for the network owner to establish
similar facilities elsewhere, the physical occupation of those facilities
requires that the network be compensated for the going concern value of the
property taken, which in this case is reflected by the value of the network
services provided. In addition, the partial nature of the physical taking
effected by access requirements provides yet another reason for requiring the
government to compensate network owners for their lost profits. The fact
that access necessarily involves a physical taking that is considerably less
than the full fee interrupts the owner’s use of the property and leaves the
property inextricably intertwined with others’ use of the property. Because
these encumbrances effectively prevent the owner from using its property for
other purposes, they require that compensation for such a partial physical
taking include compensation for the property’s going concern value.
3. Implications
It is no doubt tempting for regulatory authorities and courts to resolve
takings challenges to regulations of network industries according to the same
principles applied in cases involving conventional rate regulation. Those
principles are based on balancing tests that regard regulations backed by
strong public policy justifications and having minimal economic impact as
constitutionality unproblematic. In addition, adherence to the preexisting
approaches allows regulators to continue to employ the cost-based
methodologies with which they are by now quite familiar. It would thus
270

323 U.S. 373 (1945).
Id. at 379.
Id. at 382.
273
Id.; Kimball Laundry, 338 U.S. at 7.
271
272
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allow ratemaking authorities to maximize the leverage gained from the
regulatory tools developed in relation to their previous ratemaking efforts.
Blind application of existing principles, however, would ignore the
constitutional import of the shift from rate regulation to access regulation.
As noted earlier, access regulation typically requires network owners to
permit permanent physical occupations of their property. Unlike rate
regulation, then, access regulation effects a physical taking for which the
government must pay compensation without regard to the magnitude of the
invasion, its impact on investment-backed expectations, or the importance of
the policy interests furthered by the regulation. The Court has made clear
that the precedents regarding regulatory takings and confiscatory ratemaking
upon which regulatory authorities have previously relied in rejecting takings
challenges have no application to cases in which a physical taking is
involved.274
The Court’s takings jurisprudence also makes clear that the best measure
of just compensation is market value and that, in turn, market value is best
determined on the basis of actual market transactions. Although the absence
of external, market-determined benchmarks once may have justified reliance
on cost-based valuation methodologies, technological convergence and the
shift from regulating outputs to regulating inputs have undercut the
justification for continuing to do so by making it increasingly possible for
regulatory authorities to determine value on the basis of actual market
transactions. The implication is that the theoretical and technological
transformation of regulated industries law in turn commands a similarly
fundamental transformation of the principles used to evaluate takings
challenges to the imposition of access regulation to network industries.
Since front-line policy makers charged with implementing access regulations
have to date largely ignored these implications, the obligation to enforce
these principles will fall to the courts as they begin to address the merits of
takings challenges to this type of regulation.
III. CURRENT POLICY APPLICATIONS
This Part applies the framework developed above to the three most
salient access-related policy issues of the day: (1) access to local telephone
networks, (2) access to networks of utility poles, and (3) access to high-speed
broadband networks. This analysis will demonstrate how access necessarily
involves a permanent physical invasion. It will also show how technological
developments and the shift to access regulation have now made marketbased pricing possible.

274

See supra notes 164, 173, 192-202 and accompanying text.
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A. Access to Local Telephone Networks
Access to local telephone systems represented the keystone to the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, which has been lauded as the most
sweeping reconceptualization of telecommunications policy since the initial
enactment of the Communications Act of 1934. This subpart will provide an
overview of the access requirements that have been imposed on local
telephone networks. It will then analyze that regulatory regime in light of
the economic and constitutional principles developed above. Both sets of
principles compel the same conclusion: that the current approach to setting
rates for access to elements of local telephone networks are flawed and
should be replaced by an approach that better reflects market pricing.
1. Regulatory Framework
In a typical narrowband network, customers connect to the telephone
network through a pair of copper wires known as the local loop. The local
loops terminate at a circuit switch located in the LEC’s central office, which
receives calls in analog format and routes them either to another local
customer whose loop is also connected to the same switch or conveys the call
a designated interconnection point (called a “point of presence” or “POP”)
where it can hand the call off to a long distance carrier. The typical local
telephone network performs two distinct functions. It allows customers to
place local calls to other customers in the same geographic area, a function
known as “local exchange services” (represented in Figure 1 by the
connection between Customer Premises A and Customer Premises B).275 It
also connects customers to long distance carriers by providing what became
known as “exchange access services” (represented in Figure 1 by the
connection between Customer Premises A and the point of presence
maintained by the long distance carrier).
Policy makers initially regarded the entire telephone network as a natural
monopoly. First, the significant fixed costs associated with constructing the
initial network of wires, switches, and other equipment necessary to provide
telephone service caused costs to decline across all relevant volumes.
Second, the fact that the value of any local telephone network to any
particular user is determined in no small part by the number of other users
are connected to the same network caused local telephone systems tend to
exhibit network economic effects.

275

If a local exchange area is particularly large, the LEC may employ more than one central office
switch connected together by high-speed trunk lines to serve a single calling area.
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FIGURE 1
TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF A BASIC LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK
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Over time, policy makers came to realize that portions of the telephone
network could be competitive. Usually at the prodding of the courts, the
FCC eventually began to allow and encourage competition in various
portions of the overall telephone system, such as the markets for telephonerelated equipment276 and long distance services.277 This initial movement
culminated in the breakup of AT&T,278 which was aimed at preventing the
Bell System from using its monopoly control over local telephone service to
impede competition in the long distance and equipment markets by
preventing any provider of local telephone service from providing long
distance or equipment.279 The decision that ordered the breakup, known as
the Modified Final Judgment (MFJ), did not challenge the idea that local
telephone service remained a natural monopoly and consequently made no
attempt to promote competition at the local level.280
Over time, dramatic decreases in the cost of switching and transmission
technology led policy makers to question whether local telephone service
remained a natural monopoly. The initial step in fostering competition in
local telephony was the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding,281
276
See, e.g., Hush-A-Phone Corp. v. United States, 238 F.2d 266, 268 (D.C. Cir. 1956); Use of
Carterfone Device in Message Toll Tel. Serv., Decision, 13 F.C.C.2d 420, 424 (1968).
277
See, e.g., MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. FCC, 561 F.2d 365 (D.C. Cir. 1977); MTS and WATS
Market Structure, Report and Third Supplemental Notice of Inquiry and Proposed Rulemaking, 81
F.C.C.2d 177 (1980).
278
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982) (“MFJ”), aff’d mem. sub
nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
279
For a complete discussion of the theories underlying the breakup of AT&T, see Roger Noll &
Bruce M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE ANTITRUST
REVOLUTION 290, 295-326 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989).
280
Implementation of Local Competition Provision in Telecomms. Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 14171, 14173-74 ¶ 4 (1996).
281
See Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 7 F.C.C.R. 7369 (1992) (“Special Access Order”); Expanded Interconnection with
Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Second Report and Order and Third Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R.
7374 (1993) (“Switched Transport Order”).
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which attempted to promote competition in local telephone service by
nurturing the development of a new category of carriers known as
Competitive Access Providers (CAPs). The increasing feasibility of
competition in local telephony eventually culminated with the enactment of
the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act.
a. The Expanded Interconnection Proceeding — When they first
emerged, CAPs focused on offering corporate customers dedicated
connections with long distance carriers that allowed those customers to
bypass the incumbent LEC’s facilities by transporting calls all the way from
the customer’s premises to the long distance carrier’s.282 CAPs also began to
offer partial bypass services that covered either the segment running from the
customer’s location to the incumbent LEC’s central office (a service known
as “special access”) or the segment running from the central office to the
long distance carrier’s POP (a service known as “switched transport”).
CAP-provided services possessed many advantages over those provided
by the incumbent LECs. First, CAP networks tended to employ more
modern technology, such as fiber optic rings, which allowed them to offer a
greater range of features and a more attractive price structure than could the
incumbent LECs.283 Unlike incumbent LECs, moreover, CAPs were not
required to provide uniform services according to published tariffs approved
by the FCC. As a result, they were able to respond more quickly to the
market and to tailor pricing and terms of service to each customer’s
particular needs. Lastly, the untariffed nature of CAP services also allowed
them to avoid the cross subsidies embedded in the system of access charges
created by the FCC.
CAPs were important for a far more fundamental reason, however. The
deployment of CAP networks did not only allow for the emergence of
competition in the market for access to long distance services. The eventual
expansion of CAP networks to cover the entire core business districts of
major metropolitan areas made it possible for CAPs to begin to offer local
telephone service in direct competition with the incumbent LECs.284
The FCC recognized that if CAPs were to compete with the major
LECs,285 they needed to interconnect with the incumbent LECs’ networks on

282

For a detailed description of regulations designed to encourage the development of CAPs, see
Alexander C. Larson & Douglas R. Mudd, Collocation and Telecommunications Policy: A Fostering of
Competition on the Merits?, 28 CAL. W. L. REV. 263, 274-84 (1992).
283
Specifically, use of fiber optics provided dramatic improvements in amount of bandwidth
available. It also decreased service costs in general and made them much less distance sensitive. Fiber
optics also allowed CAPs to take advantage of the efficiencies made possible by computer processing,
such as improved switching and digital compression.
284
See David J. Teece, Telecommunications in Transition: Unbundling, Reintegration, and
Competition, 1 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 47, 66, 78 (1994-1995) (describing CAP entry into
local telephone service in New York, Chicago, and Grand Rapids).
285
The FCC limited these expanded interconnection requirements to Tier I LECs, which they
defined as LECs with revenues of at least $100 million who were not NECA pool members. See Special
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the same terms and conditions that the LECs provided for their own circuits.
As a result, the FCC gave CAPs the right to place any equipment needed to
terminate calls in the LECs’ central offices.286 The FCC believed that this
right, which the FCC dubbed “physical collocation,” was necessary to ensure
that the interconnection provided to the CAPs was comparable to that used
by the LEC for itself. If the LEC’s central office lacked the physical space to
accommodate physical collocation, the LEC could instead provide “virtual
collocation,” which required the LEC to install and maintain on its property
equipment that allowed the requesting carrier to interconnect with the LEC’s
network through a location outside of the LEC’s central office.287
Interconnection prices for both physical and virtual collocation would be
governed by price caps. As in other price cap regimes, initial rates would be
based historical cost.288 The FCC also rejected arguments that the physical
collocation requirement violated the Takings Clause on the grounds that
physical takings doctrine was not applicable to public utility property, which
was governed exclusively by the framework applied to regulatory takings.289
Even assuming that physical collocation did constitute a taking, the FCC
argued in the alternative that the compensation provided was sufficient to
Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7372 n.1, 7398 ¶ 57; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7376 ¶ 1 &
n.1.
286
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7389-90 ¶ 39, 7391 ¶ 42; Switched Transport Order, 8
F.C.C.R. at 7391-92 ¶ 29. This requirement applied only to central office equipment needed to terminate
basic transmission facilities. It did not cover equipment (such as enhanced services or customer premises
equipment) unrelated to the competitive provision of transmission services. See Special Access Order, 7
F.C.C.R. at 7413-14 ¶ 93; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7412-13 ¶ 63. This was by no means
the only obstacle that hindered CAPs from emerging as direct competitors to the LECs. The existing
tariffs required customers purchasing partial bypass services from the CAPs to pay for both the special
access and switched transport segments even though they were using the CAP to bypass one of legs. This
had the effect of forcing CAP customers to pay twice for the same service, which in turn rendered CAP
pricing uneconomical. In order to cure this problem, the FCC ordered Tier I LECs to unbundle their
special access and switched transport tariffs. See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7424-25 ¶ 120;
Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7418 ¶ 75.
287
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7390-91 ¶ 41; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at
7393-94 ¶ 31. The FCC also approved virtual collocation should both parties agree that such
arrangements were preferable to physical collocation or if state regulatory authorities determined either
that virtual collocation was preferable to physical collocation or that the decision about which form of
collocation to allow should be made by the LEC. See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7390-91 ¶¶ 4041; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7393-95 ¶¶ 31-32. The FCC added specific conditions on
LEC provision of virtual collocation to minimize any technical differences between physical and virtual
collocation. First, the FCC required that LECs permit interconnectors using virtual collocation to
designate the type of equipment dedicated to their use, although the interconnectors would have to bear
any additional costs associated with their choice of equipment. In addition, the FCC required that the
LECs install, maintain, and repair virtually collocation equipment under at least the same time intervals
and with the same failure rates that apply to the LEC’s own equipment. Lastly, LECs must allow
interconnectors to monitor and control the equipment remotely. See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at
7392-94 ¶¶ 44-46; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at 7392 ¶ 30.
288
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7428-29 ¶ 127; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at
7419 ¶ 79; Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking and
Notice of Inquiry, 6 F.C.C.R. 3259, 3267 ¶¶ 52-53 (1991).
289
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7476-83 ¶¶ 230-40; Switched Transport Order, 8
F.C.C.R. at 7475 ¶ 144.
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render it constitutional.290 State regulatory authorities issued similar orders
in order to facilitate CAP entry into local telephone service.291
The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s collocation rules in Bell
Atlantic Telephone Cos. v. FCC292 on the grounds that it exceeded the FCC’s
statutory authority. The court reasoned that giving CAPs the right to place
equipment in the LECs’ central offices represented precisely the type of
permanent physical occupation that constituted a per se taking under
Loretto.293 As a result, the physical collocation requirement ran afoul of the
principle that statutes should not be construed so as to create “ ‘an
identifiable class of cases in which application of a statute will necessarily
constitute a taking.’ ”294
The FCC responded to the Bell Atlantic decision by ceasing to make
physical collocation mandatory and by giving the LECs the option of
providing virtual collocation instead. The FCC continued to maintain that
mandatory physical collocation did not constitute a per se taking, but argued
that, regardless of whether that were true, offering the LECs virtual
collocation as an option eliminated any such constitutional infirmity.295
Before the courts could address the validity of these revised regulations, the
entire scheme was rendered moot by the collocation provisions of the 1996
Act.296
b. The Local Competition Provisions of the 1996 Act — The local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act were designed to “open[ ] all
communications services to competition,” including local telephone service,
by eliminating local providers’ bottleneck control over the elements needed
to originate or terminate telephone calls.297 Rather than regulating the retail
prices charged for local telephone service, the local competition provisions
of the 1996 Act focused instead on regulating the price at which new entrants
could obtain access to key elements of the incumbent LEC’s network. As
such, it represents a prime example of the shift from output regulation to
input regulation taking place throughout regulated industries.
Congress envisioned that competition in local telephone markets might
emerge through one of three paths.298 First, a new entrant might obtain all of
290
Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7482-83 ¶ 240; Switched Transport Order, 8 F.C.C.R. at
7475 ¶ 144.
291
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7374-75 ¶ 7 & nn.10-12.
292
24 F.3d 1441 (D.C. Cir. 1994).
293
Id. at 1445-47.
294
Id. (quoting United States v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 474 U.S. 121, 128 n.5 (1985)).
295
Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9
F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 ¶¶ 22-23 (1994).
296
See Pac. Bell Co. v. FCC, 81 F.3d 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1996) (table) (opinion available at 1996 WL
175198).
297
See H.R. REP. NO. 104-204, pt. I, at 48-49, reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1, 11-13.
298
See Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report
and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 ¶ 12 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”); Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1662 (2002);
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the necessary elements from the incumbent LEC and resell them.299 Second,
a new entrant might construct an entirely new network. Because the inability
to complete calls to the incumbent LEC’s customers would render any new
network relatively unattractive, the 1996 Act required that incumbent LECs
allow any requesting telecommunications carrier to interconnect with their
networks “at any technically feasible point.”300 It also required that the
interconnection be equal in quality to the interconnection that the incumbent
LEC provides to itself301 and be provided according to “rates, terms, and
conditions that are just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory.”302
Congress recognized, however, that not every facilities-based entrant
would be able to have its entire network in place at the time it began to offer
local service.303 In order to allow competition to emerge before entrants had
fully established their networks, Congress established a third path for
entering local telephone markets by requiring every incumbent LEC to
provide other carriers with access to all of its network elements on an
unbundled basis. Such access must be provided at any technically feasible
point under rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory.304
By their nature, both interconnection and access to unbundled network
elements typically require the requesting carrier to place some of its
equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property. For example, mandatory
interconnection necessarily presupposes that competitors will establish
physical connections to the incumbent LEC’s network.305 In addition, access
to elements of the incumbent LEC’s network necessarily presupposes some
ability to combine those elements with facilities supplied by the new entrant.
In either case, requesting carriers must be allowed to establish physical
connections between their equipment and the incumbent LEC’s network.
The element most likely to be accessed in this manner is the local loop,
which possesses the characteristics of a natural monopoly more than perhaps
any other network element. A carrier who requests unbundled access to the
local loop needs to be able to terminate that loop by connecting it to the
requesting carrier’s switching equipment.
As result, the 1996 Act included collocation requirements that were quite
similar to those adopted by the FCC in its Expanded Interconnection
299

See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4).
Id. § 251(c)(2)(B).
301
Id. § 251(c)(2)(C).
302
Id. § 251(c)(2)(D).
303
S. CONF. REP. NO. 104-230, at 147 (1996).
304
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(3). In determining which network elements would be subject to the
unbundled access requirement, the statute required the FCC to consider whether “access to such network
elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary” and whether “the failure to provide access to such
network elements would impair the ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the
services that it seeks to offer. Id. § 251(d)(2)(A) & (B) (emphasis added).
305
See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15514 ¶ 26 (defining interconnection as “the
physical linking of two networks for the mutual exchange of traffic”).
300
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proceedings.306 Specifically, the statute requires incumbent LECs to permit
“physical collocation of equipment necessary for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements.”307 When technical considerations or space
limitations render physical collocation impractical, incumbent LECs need
only provide virtual collocation.308
The 1996 Act required that prices for interconnection and access to
unbundled network elements be determined through voluntary negotiations
between the incumbent LEC and the requesting carrier, at times aided by
mediation by a state public utility commission.309 If the parties are unable to
reach a voluntary agreement, the statute gives state public utility
commissions the authority to set rates through binding arbitration, which
would be governed by one of two statutory mandates. First, rates for
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements set by arbitration
shall be “based on the cost . . . of providing the interconnection or network
element,” provided that cost is “determined without reference to a rate-ofreturn or other rate-based proceeding.”310 Second, the statute required that
compensation for traffic originating on the network of one LEC and
terminating on the network of another be governed by the principle of
“reciprocal compensation,”311 which “provide[s] for the mutual and
reciprocal recovery by each carrier of costs associated with the transport and
termination on each carrier’s network facilities of calls that originate on the
network facilities of the other carrier.”312 Such costs must be determined “on
the basis of a reasonable approximation of the additional costs of terminating
such calls.”313
c. Implementation of the 1996 Act — The FCC implemented the local
competition provisions of the 1996 Act in a massive order issued just three
months after the statute’s enactment.314
Although that order dealt
encyclically with a wide range of implementation-related issues, including
the scope of the unbundling requirements that gave rise to the Supreme
Court’s decision in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd.,315 for our purposes it is
306

See supra Part II.A.1.a.
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
308
Id.; see also supra notes 287, 295 and accompanying text (describing similar virtual collocation
provision with respect to CAPs).
309
47 U.S.C. § 252(a)(1).
310
Id. § 252(d)(1)(A)(i). The statute further requires that rates must be “nondiscriminatory,” id.
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(ii), and “may include a reasonable profit, id. § 252(d)(1)(B).
311
Id. § 251(b)(5).
312
Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(i).
313
Id. § 252(d)(2)(A)(ii). The statute specifically allowed carriers to waive mutual recovery in favor
of other arrangements, such as bill-and-keep systems. Id. § 252(d)(2)(B)(i).
314
Implementation of Local Competition Provisions of Telecomms. Act of 1996, First Report and
Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 15499, 15509 ¶ 12 (1996) (“Local Competition Order”).
315
525 U.S. 366 (1999). The FCC initially defined the elements subject to unbundled access broadly
without considering whether equally cost-effective inputs were otherwise available. Local Competition
Order, 11 F.C.C.R.. at 15642 ¶ 283, 15643 ¶ 285. The FCC gave a similarly broad interpretation to the
equipment subject to physical collocation. Id. at 15628 ¶ 250, 15794 ¶ 579. The Supreme Court struck
307
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sufficient to focus on the aspects of that decision regarding the methodology
for setting rates for interconnection, unbundled access, and physical
collocation.
The FCC has implemented the provisions governing rates for
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements by adopting a
methodology known as Total Element Long Run Incremental Cost
(TELRIC). TELRIC bases rates on the element’s “economic costs,” which
the FCC defined as the sum of the incremental costs directly attributable to
the specified element and a reasonable allocation of common costs.316
TELRIC’s most distinctive feature was the fact that it assessed both the
incremental and common costs on a forward-looking basis by focusing on
what it would cost to replace a particular network element rather than its
historical cost.317 The FCC believed that basing rates on forward-looking
incremental cost represented the best way to replicate, to the extent possible,
the conditions of a competitive market.318 In addition, TELRIC further
accommodates technological change by requiring that costs be determined on
the basis of the most efficient technology available and the lowest cost
network configuration given the existing location of the incumbent LEC’s
current wire centers.319 It declined to incorporate an element to reflect the
opportunity cost borne by the network owner providing unbundled access to
network elements to competitors.320
Although the statutory mandate underlying TELRIC on its face applied
only to compensation for interconnection and access to unbundled network
elements, the FCC determined that compensation for physical collocation
the FCC’s interpretation of the scope of the unbundled access requirements as an improper construction of
the statutory requirement that a network element must be “necessary” to providing telecommunications
service before it is subject to unbundled access and that withholding access to that element would
“impair” the requesting carrier’s ability to provide such service. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 387-92. The
D.C. Circuit applied similar reasoning in striking down the FCC’s initial collocation orders. GTE Serv.
Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 422-24 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389-90). On
remand, the FCC reinterpreted the “necessary” and “impair” standards in a way designed to give
substance to those terms. Implementation of Local Competition Provision of Telecomms. Act of 1996,
Third Report and Order and Fourth Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3712 ¶ 22 (1999)
(“UNE Remand Order”). The FCC also revised its rules to limit collocation to equipment whose primary
purpose is to provide the requesting carrier either with interconnection that is “equal in quality” to the that
provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services or with “nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled
network element. Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Fourth
Report and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”). A
judicial challenge to the revised collocation rules is pending before the D.C. Circuit. See Verizon Cal.,
Inc. v. FCC, No. 01-1371 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2001).
316
47 C.F.R. § 51.505(a). TELRIC properly refers only to the first of these two components. For
simplicity, however, we will refer to both parts of the methodology collectively as TELRIC.
317
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15857-59 ¶¶ 704-707 (citing 47 U.S.C.
§ 252(d)(1)(A)(i)). TELRIC avoids the problems caused by the distinction between fixed and variable
costs by measuring incremental costs from a “long run” perspective, which is defined to be a period long
enough that all of a firm’s costs become variable or avoidable. Id. at 15845 ¶ 677, 15851 ¶ 692.
318
Id. at 15847 ¶ 679.
319
47 C.F.R. § 51.505(b)(1).
320
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709.
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should also be governed by the same pricing rules.321 In addition, the FCC
determined that TELRIC represented the appropriate interpretation of the
“the additional costs of terminating such calls” that govern reciprocal
compensation.322 TELRIC thus governs all of the important pricing aspects
of the access regime created by the 1996 Act.
In so ruling, the FCC rejected arguments that imposition of TELRIC
violated the Takings Clause. In contrast to the reasoning advanced in its
Expanded Interconnection proceedings, which argued that takings of public
utility property are governed by the Court’s regulatory takings
jurisprudence,323 the FCC argued that the guiding principle for determining
whether regulation of public utilities violates the Constitution depends on
whether the rates are confiscatory.324 Alternatively, assuming for the sake of
argument that physical collocation constitutes a physical taking, the FCC
found that its ratemaking methodology satisfies the just compensation
standard, since the constitutional requirement that the government pay the
fair market value of the property taken as compensation did not permit
recovery of monopoly rents.325 The FCC reaffirmed this reasoning in its
Collocation Order and its Collocation Reconsideration Order.326
The Supreme Court upheld TELRIC as a matter of statutory construction
in Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC.327 As several lower courts had
done previously,328 the Court declined to reach the merits of the underlying
321
Id. at 15816 ¶ 629. The FCC reasoned that physical collocation is simply a method of obtaining
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements and, as such, should be priced in the same
fashion. Id.
322
Id. at 16025-26 ¶ 1058 (ruling that that a reasonable allocation of common costs represent an
appropriate “additional cost” under the standard for reciprocal compensation); 47 C.F.R. § 51.705(a)(1)
(requiring that reciprocal compensation be determined on the basis of forward-looking economic costs
pursuant to the methodology governing pricing for interconnection and access for unbundled network
elements). The FCC allowed for two alternatives. State public utility commissions could either adopt a
proxy range set by the FCC (at 0.2 and 0.4 cents per minute for termination) or impose “bill and keep”
arrangements where the traffic flowing in each direction is roughly equal. Id. at 16024 ¶ 1055, 16026-28
¶¶ 1060-62, 16054-58 ¶¶ 1111-18. The Eighth Circuit struck down the use of proxy prices in Iowa
Utilities Board v. FCC, 219 F.3d 744, 756-57 (8th Cir. 2000), rev’d on other grounds sub nom. Verizon
Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002). This portion of the Eighth Circuit’s decision does
not appear to have been challenged before the Supreme Court.
323
See supra notes 289, 295 and accompanying text.
324
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15869-70 ¶ 733 (citing Duquesne Light Co. v. Barasch,
488 U.S. 299, 307 (1989)).
325
Id. at 15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748, 755-56 (Ct. Cl.
1949)); see also id. at 15811 ¶ 617, 15811 ¶ 818.
326
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4778-79 ¶ 31 (1999) (“Collocation
Order”); Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Order on
Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fifth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17838 ¶ 68 (2000)
(“Collocation Reconsideration Order”).
327
122 S. Ct. 1646 (2002).
328
See Iowa Utils. Bd. v. FCC, 120 F.3d 753, 818 (8th Cir. 1997), rev’d in part on other grounds
sub nom. AT&T v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999); Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel v. FCC, 183
F.3d 393, 428-29 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 530 U.S. 1213, cert.
dismissed, 531 U.S. 975 (2000); US West Communications, Inc. v. Minn. Pub. Utils. Comm’n, 55 F.
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takings claim. Instead, it explicitly adopted the clear implication of its
previous decisions and held that takings challenges to ratemaking
methodologies were generally inappropriate until the methodology in
question had been embodied in an actual rate order. Although the Court
entertained the possibility that a ratemaking methodology might have such
sweeping implications that would justify addressing the constitutionality of a
methodology on its face, the facts of the case before the Court did not justify
doing so.329
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
As Part I demonstrated, the best way to promote economic efficiency
when compelling access to an input is to price the input at its market value.
Doing so promotes allocative efficiency by providing the signals that firms
need in order to calibrate the amount of each input purchased and to ensure
that they are employing the optimal mix of possible inputs. Employing
market-based pricing also promotes dynamic efficiency by signaling
incumbents and new entrants alike of the need to invest in additional
capacity. As Justice Breyer noted in his separate opinion in Iowa Utilities
Board:
[A] sharing requirement may diminish the original owner’s
incentive to keep up or to improve the property by depriving
the owner of the fruits of value-creating investment,
research, or labor. And as one moves beyond the sharing of
readily separable and administrable physical facilities, say,
to the sharing of research facilities, firm management, or
technical capacities, these problems can become more
severe. . . . [One cannot] guarantee that firms will undertake
the investment necessary to produce complex technological
innovations knowing that any competitive advantage
deriving from those innovations will be dissipated by the
sharing requirement. The more complex the facilities, the
more central their relation to the firm’s managerial
responsibilities, the more extensive the sharing demanded,
the more likely these costs will become serious. And the
more serious they become, the more likely they will offset

Supp. 2d 968, 990 (D. Minn. 1999); Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. AT&T Communications of Southwest,
Inc., No. A. 97-CA-132 SS, 1998 WL 657717, at *12 (W.D. Tex. Aug. 31, 1998).
329
Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1679-80.
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any economic or competitive gain that a sharing requirement
might otherwise provide.330
In addition, “compulsory sharing can have significant administrative and
social costs inconsistent with the Act’s purposes.”331 If taken to an extreme,
“[r]ules that force firms to share every resource or element of a business
would create, not competition, but pervasive regulation, for the regulators,
not the marketplace, would set the relevant terms.”332
The best way to promote economic efficiency would thus be to base
access rates on the price the input in question would command on the open
market. Such prices are easy to determine when comparable inputs are
purchased in external markets.333 Although local telephone service has long
been regarded as a natural monopoly in which direct competition is
impossible, technological convergence has begun to provide a wide range of
possible external markets that can serve as bases for determining market
value. Over the last several years, providers of wireless telephone services,
which carry the formal designations of Commercial Mobile Radio Services
(CMRS), have emerged as the most successful direct competitor to the
incumbent LECs. Because wireless telephone providers are not considered
“local exchange carriers,” the 1996 Act does not govern the terms under
which they provide interconnection and access to their networks.334
Although Congress has given the FCC the authority to regulate the terms
under which wireless carriers interconnect with each other, the FCC has
declined to do so.335
330
525 U.S. at 428-29 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (citation omitted); accord
Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1693 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting that compelling
incumbents to share the cost-reducing benefits of a successful innovation destroys the incumbent’s
incentives to innovate in the first place).
331
Iowa Utils Bd., 525 U.S.. at 428.
332
Id. at 429.
333
SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 275, 319, 321.
334
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15995 ¶ 1001, 15995-96 ¶¶ 1004, 1006. Although
CMRS providers are under no obligation to provide interconnection or access to their network elements,
the FCC has ruled that CMRS providers are “telecommunications carriers” who are eligible to request
interconnection and access to unbundled network elements from the incumbent LECs. Id. at 15998-16000
¶¶ 1012-13.
335
Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Fourth
Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 13523, 13534 ¶ 28 (2000) (“CMRS Interconnection Order”). This order
culminated protracted regulatory proceedings dating back to 1993, when the FCC issued a notice
requesting comment whether it should require CMRS providers to provide interconnection to other CMRS
providers. Implementation of Sections 3(n) & 332 of Communications Act, Regulatory Treatment of
Mobile Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 8 F.C.C.R. 7988, 8001-02 ¶ 71 (1993). When the FCC
issued the order resulting from this notice, however, it declined to resolve the issue. Implementation of
Sections 3(n) & 332 of Communications Act & Regulatory Treatment of Mobile Servs., Second Report
and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 1411, 1499-1500 ¶¶ 237-238 (1994). Instead, the FCC opted to seek further
comment on the issue in a subsequent proceeding. Equal Access and Interconnection Obligations
Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Serv., Notice of Proposed Rule Making and Notice of Inquiry, 9
F.C.C.R. 5408, 5458-69 ¶¶ 121-143 (1994). In the interim, the FCC indicated that it would entertain
requests for interconnection on a case-by-case basis. Id. at 5458 n.213. When these proceedings also
matured into a formal decision, the FCC again postponed ruling on the issue on the grounds that, although
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As a result, the terms of interconnection between wireless carriers are
determined through arms-length negotiations that can provide precisely the
type of external benchmark needed to determine the market value of
transport and call termination services. Admittedly, interconnection between
wireless carriers does involve somewhat different considerations than
interconnection with incumbent LECs. Direct comparisons are complicated
by the significant differences in utilization rates as well as the emergence of
wireless pricing schemes that do not differentiate between local and long
distance service. The analysis is further obscured by the fact that such
interconnection between wireless carriers is often accomplished indirectly
through the LECs.336 Still, as wireless and other facilities-based competitors
grow, rates charged for interconnection between wireless competitors will
continue to emerge as a market-based reference point that can be used to
resolve most pricing problems. The number of external benchmarks will
only continue to grow as local cable operators and other types of broadband
providers begin to offer local telephone service.
On a more fundamental level, technological convergence raises serious
questions about whether compelling access to local telephone networks
represents sound economic policy. To the extent that substitute networks are
available, it is far from clear that the facilities of the incumbent LEC can
properly be regarded as a monopoly bottleneck.337 Even setting such
considerations aside and conceding the existence of compelled access, the
emergence of alternative facilities capable of providing the same functions
has a dramatic impact on the manner in which such access should be priced.
Simply put, the emergence of comparable transactions provides external
benchmarks that should enable regulatory authorities to establish access rates
based on market prices that are more likely to promote efficiency.

requiring wireless-to-wireless interconnection would appear to promote efficiency, such regulation was
premature. Interconnection & Resale Obligations Pertaining to Commercial Mobile Radio Servs., Second
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 10666, 10681-82 ¶¶ 28-29 (1995). An association of
equipment manufacturers brought suit to compel the FCC to act. Although the D.C. Circuit expressed
dismay over the fact that five years had lapsed while the FCC continued to investigate the issue, the court
nonetheless upheld the FCC’s decision to defer resolution of the issue. Telecomms. Resellers Ass’n v.
FCC, 141 F.3d 1193, 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1998). Final resolution did not occur until issuance of the CMRS
Interconnection Order two years later. 15 F.C.C.R. at 13534 ¶ 28. It thus took seven years before these
proceedings were finally resolved. For an overview of the early history of these somewhat protracted
proceedings, see PETER HUBER, MICHAEL KELLOGG, & JOHN THORNE, FEDERAL TELECOMMUNICATIONS
LAW 953-55 (2d ed. 1999).
336
CMRS Interconnection Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 13533-34 ¶¶ 26-27. Historically, such comparisons
were complicated still further by the FCC’s decision to award one of the two available first-generation
cellular licenses to the incumbent LEC, which in turn produced reasons to question whether in fact
interconnection agreements between wireless carriers in fact represented arms-length transactions. The
deployment of competitive wireless network on a national scale, the subsequent emergence of PCS, and
the impending arrival of third-generation wireless devices should eliminate this problem in the near
future, if it has not done so already.
337
See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389 (holding that the FCC must consider whether a network
element is available from other sources before compelling access to that element under the 1996 Act).
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In the absence of external benchmarks based on actual market
transactions, resort to some cost-based, second-best measure of market value
becomes necessary. As noted earlier, economic theory suggests that cost
based measures should follow ECPR, which sets rates as the sum of the
direct incremental costs of providing an input and the opportunity costs that
the incumbent incurs when the new entrant provides the services instead of
the incumbent.338 TELRIC includes elements designed to reflect the first of
these two components.339 The key problem with the FCC’s analysis is its
refusal to include any factor to reflect opportunity cost. In setting prices
without considering the value of foregone alternatives, TELRIC in essence
ignores the insights of neoclassical economics by basing value solely on cost
without taking any demand-side effects into consideration. As such,
TELRIC is fundamentally inconsistent with the insights of the neoclassical
approach that serves as the foundation for all modern economic theory.
Although the FCC considered and rejected arguments that it should base
access rates on ECPR, its reasons for doing so do not withstand analysis.
The first reason was that it believed that the statutory requirement that prices
be based on “cost” precluded it from considering opportunity cost.340 The
Court specifically rejected this reasoning when it found the term, “cost,” to
be “too protean” to support any such plain language argument.341 If
anything, the FCC’s argument is directly undercut by the fact that it is now
an economic truism that opportunity costs represent a true economic cost
borne by the incumbent LEC.342 Indeed, the Supreme Court in effect
recognized as much when cited “opportunity cost” as an example of a
forward-looking “cost” that fell within the purview of the statute.343
The FCC’s second reason for rejecting ECPR is equally misplaced. The
FCC asserted that because ECPR calculates opportunity cost on the basis of
current retail prices, it simply locks in monopoly rents without providing a
mechanism for moving prices towards competitive levels.344 This argument
suffers from two fundamental flaws. First, it ignores the fact that the
338
See supra Part I.C.3. One of us has elsewhere advanced the argument that, in addition to ECPR,
the rates charged for access to unbundled network elements should also include a nonbypassable end-user
charge to compensate incumbent LECs for costs stranded by deregulatory innovations that caused
investment-backed expectations to fail. See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 334-35. Extended
discussion of these issues fall outside the scope of this Article. For the time being, it suffices to point out
that the argument advanced in this article, while consistent with the imposition of such user charges, does
not require it.
339
See id. at 320.
340
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709.
341
Verizon Communications, Inc. v. FCC, 122 S. Ct. 1646, 1667 (2002).; accord id. (calling the
term, “cost,” “a chameleon” and a “virtually meaningless term” that “say[s] little about the method
employed to determine a particular rate” (internal quotation marks omitted)).
342
See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 322-23, 404-10.
343
Verizon, 122 S. Ct., at 1666 n.17.
344
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15859 ¶ 709; see also Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R.
at 7426 ¶ 123, 7430 ¶ 129 (rejecting the use of “net revenue” test proposed by Alfred Kahn in setting
interconnection rates in the FCC’s Expanded Interconnection proceeding).
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emergence of competition will cause retail prices to drop and that as this
occurs, ECPR will dynamically readjust the opportunity-cost factor to reflect
those changes in retail price. Second, the existence of any monopoly rents in
retail prices is more properly regarded as the result of the failure of rate
regulation at the state level rather than any theoretical flaw in ECPR. Such a
failure would justify improving the manner in which state regulatory
authorities establish retail prices. It does not provide a justification for
incurring the myriad problems that would result from distorting access
prices.345
Although the Supreme Court upheld the FCC’s ratemaking methodology
in Verizon,346 it would be a mistake to construe Court’s action as a specific
endorsement of TELRIC and a rejection of ECPR as a matter of economic
policy. On the contrary, the Court carefully eschewed expressing any
opinion about the relative merits of any particular economic approach to
ratemaking.347 Instead, the Court based its decision on the deferential
standard of review that gives agencies a wide range of discretion in resolving
any interpretive ambiguities that exist in the statutes that they administer so
long as the construction advanced falls within a wide zone of
reasonableness.348 As a result, the Court’s decision does not necessarily
foreclose the possibility that the FCC might justifiably apply a ratemaking
approach based on market prices or ECPR in the future.349
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market-Based Pricing
In addition to the problems with the FCC’s implementation of the 1996
Act as a matter of economic theory, the adoption of a methodology focused
solely on replacement cost also raises serious constitutional problems. The
takings implications of the interconnection and unbundled access provisions
of the local competition provisions have largely escaped significant attention.
Like most forms of rate regulation, for the most part TELRIC simply limits
the prices that can be charged for the use of the incumbent LECs’ network
elements. As such, although courts and the FCC have generally stopped
short of resolving the issue directly until a state regulatory issues an actual

345

See SIDAK & SPULBER, supra note 31, at 351-58, 362-63.
122 S. Ct. at 1666-78.
347
See id. at 1670 (“As a reviewing Court we are, of course, in no position to assess the precise
economic significance of [various economic aspects of the incumbent LECs’ arguments]. Instead it is
enough to recognize that the incumbents’ assumption may well be incorrect.”), 1678 (“We cannot say
whether the passage of time will show competition prompted by TELRIC to be an illusion, but TELRIC
appears to be a reasonable policy for now, and that is all that counts.”).
348
Id. at 1667 (citing Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843-45
(1984)).
349
See Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 426 (Breyer, J., concurring in part & dissenting in part) (noting
that in rejecting ECPR, the FCC “did not claim, nor did its reasoning support the claim, that the use of
such a system would be arbitrary or unreasonable”).
346
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rate order, they have suggested that the principles of confiscatory
ratemaking350 or regulatory takings351 are likely to govern such challenges.
The problem with this analysis is that it focuses on TELRIC as a general
matter without focusing on the unique constitutional implications of the 1996
Act’s physical collocation provisions. As the FCC has itself recognized,
both interconnection and access to unbundled network elements typically
require the network owner to permit requesting carriers to place equipment in
its central office on an indefinite basis. As a matter of first principles, the
physical collocation associated with interconnection and unbundled access
provisions represent the type of permanent physical invasion deemed to
constitute a per se taking under Loretto.352 This conclusion is reinforced
from the D.C. Circuit’s decision in Bell Atlantic holding that the physical
collocation regime upon which the FCC modeled its implementation of the
1996 Act constituted a physical taking.353 This conclusion draws further
support from the D.C. Circuit’s decision overturning the FCC’s Collocation
Order in GTE Service Corp. v. FCC,354 in which the court repeatedly
emphasized its concern that the FCC’s interpretation of the physical
collocation provisions may result in “unnecessary takings” of LEC
property.355
Most instructive of all is the decision of the Court of Federal Claims in
Qwest Corp. v. United States,356 which is one of the few decisions to address
the merits of a takings challenge to the 1996 Act. In that case, a requesting
carrier obtained access to fourteen loops that served one particular customer
and connected those loops to its own switching equipment contained in a
collocation cage located in the incumbent LEC’s central office. The
incumbent LEC brought a takings challenge arguing the compensation that it
received was constitutionally insufficient. The incumbent did circumscribe
its argument in one, somewhat unusual way. It conceded that it was already
receiving adequate compensation for the space occupied by the collocation
cage. As a result, it restricted its takings claim to the loops leased by the new
entrant.357

350
See Verizon, 122 S. Ct. at 1679; MFS Intelenet, 35 F. Supp. 2d at 1236; Local Competition Order,
11 F.C.C.R. at 15871-72 ¶¶ 737-738.
351
See Tex. Off. of Pub. Util. Counsel, 183 F.3d at 429 n.59; Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at
7479-81¶¶ 235-237.
352
See supra notes 147-164 and accompanying text. Even scholars who are skeptical of broader
readings of Loretto accept that regulations that require physical collocation effect per se takings. See
Leonard M. Baynes, Swerving to Avoid the “Takings” and “Ultra Vires” Potholes on the Information
Superhighway: Is the New York Collocations and Telecommunications Policy a Taking Under the New
York Public Service Law?, 18 HASTINGS COMM/ENT L.J. 51, 73-74 (1995); Chen, supra note 46, at 1551.
353
See supra notes 292-294 and accompanying text.
354
205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
355
Id. at 421, 423, 426
356
48 Fed. Cl. 672 (2001).
357
Id. at 689-90, 691, 693.

80

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

The court resolved the case by relying on the distinction between
physical and nonpossessory takings. In particular, the court accepted the
notion that “government-mandated co-location of one party’s equipment on
another party’s premises constitutes a physical taking of the occupied
space.”358 As a result, it acknowledged that requesting carrier’s collocation
cage “is analogous to the rooftop equipment in Loretto” and emphasized that
it would have had little trouble holding that the restriction represented a per
se taking had the incumbent LEC focused on the collocation cage itself.359 In
contrast to the equipment contained in the collocation cage, however, the
leasing of loops by the new entrant by itself simply involved restrictions on
the use of the incumbent LEC’s property and did not require the incumbent
LECs to submit to the permanent physical occupation of its property by any
equipment. As a result, the court concluded that the claim based on the loops
did not constitute a physical taking.360 The court once again emphasized that
in holding that access to the loops did not constitute a physical taking did not
negate its prior conclusion that “the implementation of mandatory access
provisions requiring a telecommunications provider or utility to make space
available on its premises for a competitor to affix its own equipment . . .
constitut[ed] a physical taking under Loretto.”361
The FCC has attempted to avoid this conclusion by asserting that takings
claims involving public utility property are governed by the more permissive
principles embodied in the Supreme Court’s confiscatory ratemaking362 and
regulatory takings363 precedents. The fundamental problem with this
analysis is that ignores the distinction between physical and nonpossessory
takings drawn by the Supreme Court in Loretto and Florida Power and
reaffirmed in Tahoe-Sierra.364 Since the 1996 Act’s physical collocation
mandate unambiguously requires incumbent LECs to permit competing
carriers to place equipment on their property, it constitutes a classic physical
taking under Loretto. Thus, in sharp contrast to what would be true under
the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking or regulatory takings jurisprudence, the
magnitude of the regulation’s economic impact and the public purposes
served by the regulation are of no consequence.
It thus follows that the owners of local telephone networks are entitled to
just compensation for the physical invasion mandated by the 1996 Act. As
discussed above, to the extent that external markets for a particular input
exist, the principles of just compensation require that the incumbent LECs
are entitled to the market value of the inputs that are physically taken.365
358

Id. at 694.
Id. at 691.
Id. at 691, 693.
361
Id. at 693.
362
See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15871-72 ¶¶ 737-738.
363
See Special Access Order, 7 F.C.C.R. at 7479-81¶¶ 235-237.
364
See supra notes 162-163, 169, 202 and accompanying text.
365
See Part II.B.2.a.
359
360
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Although the absence of direct competition in local telephony previously
deprived regulators of any such market-based benchmarks,366 the emergence
of cellular telephony and other forms of wireless communications as direct
competitors to local telephone companies has now created an external basis
for determining the value of the services provided by the local loop.367
Under such circumstances, basing access pricing on replacement cost
contradicts the Court’s established takings jurisprudence. Perhaps sensing
the weakness of its position, the FCC offered the alternative argument that,
assuming that a taking had occurred, fair market value does not properly
include monopoly rents.368 The legal support for this claim, however, is
suspect.369 And even if the FCC’s legal conclusion were somehow proven to
be sound, there is also reason to doubt the factual premises underlying the
argument. The emergence of direct facilities-based competition and the fact
that retail prices for local telephone service are subject to rate regulation
indicate that it is unlikely that there were any monopoly rents included in the
prices set by the open market.
Although we find the conclusion that the physical collocation
requirements of the 1996 Act effect a physical taking inescapable, we
recognize that virtual collocation poses a much closer question. The
Supreme Court specifically reserved this in Loretto, observing that
regulations requiring property owners to install certain types of networkrelated equipment might present a different question. In such a case, the
property owner would own the equipment, which would give it full authority
366
See Leonard M. Baynes, How Much Is the Toll to Access the Information Superhighway? An
Analysis of the Appropriate Measure of Compensation for the Partial Taking of Public Utility Property,
62 TENN. L. REV. 141, 149-50, 163-64 (1994).
367
See supra notes 334-336 and accompanying text.
368
Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15872 ¶ 740; see also Baynes, supra note 366, at 17376.
369
The FCC cites but a single lower court decision as its authority for the proposition that just
compensation does not permit recovery of monopoly rents. See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at
15872 ¶ 740 (citing Lord Mfg. Co. v. United States, 84 F. Supp. 748 (Ct. Cl. 1949)). A perusal of Lord
Mfg. reveals that it does not in fact stand for the proposition for which the FCC cites it. In that case, a
manufacturer of patented rubber and metal mountings critical to allowing aircraft to fly in adverse weather
conditions had developed a dominant market position that allowed it to earn profits ranging from fiftynine to one hundred forty-seven percent. During World War II, the federal government ordered the
manufacturer to sell its products to the government at prices determined by the government to be “fair and
reasonable,” which allowed the manufacturer a profit of only ten and one-half percent. The manufacturer
challenged the action under the Takings Clause. 84 F. Supp. at 751-54. The court conceded that “[i]f
these were ordinary times,” the manufacturer would have been allowed to earn supracompetitive profits.
Id. at 755. “[T]hese were not ordinary times,” however, because the war had in effect caused the free and
untrammeled market necessary for a fair market value determination to disappear. The true holding of
Lord Mfg. is thus that circumstances may exist during which current market price is no longer a good
indicator of fair market value, which is defined as the price to which a willing seller and a willing buyer
would agree after ample time to find a purchaser. See also BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531,
537-38 (1994) (discussing how transient exigencies can force prices below or above fair market value).
Lord Mfg. assuredly does not stand for the proposition that monopoly profits are not properly considered
part of fair market value. On the contrary, in the language quoted above, the Court of Claims explicitly
recognized that the opposite was true. See also City of Tucson v. El Rio Water Co., 415 P.2d 872, 875
(Ariz. 1966) (recognizing that monopoly profits are properly regarded as part of fair market value).
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over the placement, manner, use, and possibly the disposition of the
equipment outside of the mandate of the specific regulation in question. In
addition, the property owner would have the latitude to decide how to
comply with the applicable regulations and therefore “could minimize, the
physical, esthetic, and other effects of the installation.”370 The FCC followed
this reasoning in its Expanded Interconnection proceeding. Without
conceding that that mandatory physical collocation would constitute a per se
taking, the FCC argued that offering the LECs virtual collocation as an
option eliminated any remaining constitutional infirmities.371
Unfortunately, the courts have never had the opportunity to address
whether virtual collocation effects a physical taking, since before the courts
could address the issue, the virtual collocation provisions of the Expanded
Interconnection proceeding were rendered moot by the physical collocation
provisions contained in the 1996 Act.372 The 1996 Act, however, obviated
any need to resolve whether a bare virtual collocation requirement
constituted a physical taking, since section 251(c)(6) clearly gives requesting
carriers the right to physically collocate their equipment in most
circumstances.373 As a result, it is directly analogous to the type of regime
found to constitute a physical taking in Loretto, Qwest, and Bell Atlantic.
Language in the D.C. Circuit’s Bell Atlantic opinion, moreover, suggests
that virtual collocation poses the same takings concerns as physical
collocation. Both virtual and physical collocation allow CAPs to physically
connect their networks to the LECs’ networks. Requiring a physical
interconnection is enough to constitute a physical taking, regardless of who
owns the property on which the interconnection occurs.374 Indeed, a
subsequent court drew largely the same conclusion when it held that that an
administrative order requiring an incumbent LEC to reconfigure the wires it
was using to provide telephone service to a multi-building complex in order
to accommodate an competitive service provider constituted a physical
taking.375 The fact that the owner of the apartment complex rather than the
LEC owned the land on which the LEC was obligated to build its wires
played no role in the decision.

370

Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 440 n.19 (1982); see also GTE
Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 419 (D.C. Cir. 2000) (“Virtual collocation therefore minimizes the
takings problem, because competitors do not have physical access to a LEC’s property.”).
371
Expanded Interconnection with Local Tel. Co. Facilities, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 9
F.C.C.R. 5154, 5163 ¶¶ 22-23 (1994); see also Baynes, supra note 352, at 74-75.
372
See supra note 296 and accompanying text.
373
See supra notes 307-308 and accompanying text.
374
24 F.3d at 1446.
375
GTE Southwest Inc. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 10 S.W.3d 7, 9, 11 (Tex. Ct. App. 2000).
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B. Access to Networks of Utility Poles
The analysis we have developed helps illuminate the economic and
constitutional considerations underlying the second emerging policy problem
that we would like to address: compelled access to networks of utility poles.
This subpart will describe the manner in which regulations requiring such
access have been implemented and then apply the analytical framework that
we have developed to evaluate that regime from the standpoint of both
economic policy and constitutional law. As was the case in the first policy
problem we address, we conclude that the current manner in which the
government has compelled access to networks of utility poles conflict with
basic economic theory as well as with the Supreme Court’s takings
jurisprudence. As a result, we argue that the extant pricing regime should be
replaced by an approach that bases access rates on market prices.
1. Regulatory Framework
As discussed earlier, in much of the country, cable television systems
depended upon networks of utility poles to establish the wireline connections
to individual homes and businesses needed to provide their services.376
Congress became concerned that the electric and telephone companies who
owned the poles were charging monopoly prices that tended to retard cable’s
deployment. As a result, it enacted legislation known as the Pole
Attachments Act of 1978 that gave the FCC the power to regulate the rates
charged for pole attachments by cable television systems in any state that did
not already regulate such agreements.377 As originally enacted, the Pole
Attachments Act required that the rates, terms, and conditions for pole
attachment be just and reasonable378 and established methodologies for
determining the minimum and maximum rates that could be charged.379 As
implemented by the FCC, the so-called “Cable Formula” allowed the pole
owner to recover approximately 7.4 percent of the total costs of the pole
from each attaching entity.380 As discussed earlier, the Supreme Court held
376
See supra notes 161-162 and accompanying text; Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. FCC, 122
S. Ct. 782, 784 (2002).
377
47 U.S.C. § 224(b)(1).
378
Id.
379
The statute required that at a minimum the rates established by the FCC allow the utilities to
recover “the additional costs of providing pole attachments.” Id. § 224(d)(1). The maximum rate was set
by multiplying percentage of the total “usable space” occupied by the attachment by the sum of the
operating expenses and actual capital costs attributable to the pole.” Id. The resulting formula is:
Space Occupied
Maximum
Net Cost of a
Carrying
=
x
x
Rate
Bare Pole
Charge Rate
Total Usable Space

Amendments of Comm’n’s Rules & Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Consolidated Partial
Order on Reconsideration, 16 F.C.C.R. 12103, 12131 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Consol. Reconsideration Order”).
380
The FCC established the standard presumptions that the total amount of usable space is limited to
thirteen and one-half feet and that each attaching entity occupies one foot of usable space. See 47 C.F.R.
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in Florida Power that the statute as originally enacted did not constitute a per
se taking under Loretto. Because the Act did not require that any utility enter
into such agreement, it represented nothing more than a form of rate
regulation, which violated the Takings Clause only if confiscatory.381
A provision of the Telecommunications Act of 1996 modified the Pole
Attachments Act. As the Supreme Court’s decision in National Cable &
Telecommunications Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co.382 confirmed, one of the key
changes implemented by the 1996 amendments was to broaden the scope of
the regulatory scheme to cover telecommunications carriers, including
wireless telephony providers, as well as cable television systems. Two other
features of the 1996 amendments merit more extended discussion. First, the
amendments made access to poles compulsory rather than voluntary.383
Second, the amendments established a new pricing mechanism to govern
attachments by telecommunications carriers that differed from the regime
governing attachments by cable television systems.384
a. The Shift to Compulsory Access — The most important feature of the
1996 amendments for our purposes is the transformation of Pole
Attachments Act into a compulsory access provision. As noted previously,
prior to the 1996 amendments, the fact that Pole Attachments Act did not
compel any utility to allow any other entity access to its network of utility
poles played a critical role in the Supreme Court’s refusal in Florida Power
to treat the Pole Attachments Act as a per se taking under Loretto.385
Although the Court explicitly declined to address what would follow if the
statute were modified to compel access to utility poles, the Court’s reasoning
strongly suggested that such a change would bring the Pole Attachments Act
squarely within the ambit of its physical takings jurisprudence.386
The Eleventh Circuit followed the reasoning of Florida Power to its
logical conclusion when it held in Gulf Power Co. v. FCC (“Gulf Power
I”)387 that the 1996 amendments turned the Pole Attachments Act into a per
se taking under Loretto. Reaffirming the distinction between physical and
nonpossessory takings, the Eleventh Circuit held that the Court’s
confiscatory ratemaking jurisprudence had no application to cases involving
the permanent physical occupation of property. Although the Gulf Power I
court found that a taking had occurred, it anticipated the Supreme Court’s
conclusion in Verizon and held that the logically subsequent question
§§1.1404(l), 1.1402(c). As a result, the pole owner could recover 1/13.5 of the total costs of the pole from
each attaching entity, an amount approximately equal to 7.4 percent.
381
See also supra Part II.A.3 (offering additional analysis of Florida Power).
382
122 S. Ct. 782, 785 (2002).
383
47 U.S.C. § 224(f)(1). The statute created exceptions for situations in which there is insufficient
capacity or when refusal to provide access is justified by safety, reliability, or other engineering concerns.
Id. § 224(f)(2).
384
Id. § 224(e).
385
See supra notes 167-169 and accompanying text.
386
See supra note 172 and accompanying text.
387
187 F.3d 1324, 1328-29 (11th Cir. 1999).

85

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art30

whether the statute provided for just compensation was not yet ripe for
judicial resolution.388 The Eleventh Circuit reaffirmed these conclusions
when rejecting a facial challenge to the regulations implementing the 1996
amendments the following year in Gulf Power II.389 Although the Supreme
Court later vacated this subsequent decision,390 its action did not call into
question the reasoning of Gulf Power II on this point and did not weaken the
precedential effect of Gulf Power I. In addition, the Court’s reasoning did
not raise any questions about the propriety of the Eleventh Circuit’s
resolution of the takings issues.
b. The Compensation Regime — The 1996 amendments also provided
for a different basis for compensation for telecommunications carriers than
for cable television systems, commonly known as the “Telecom Formula.”391
Although the details of the various formulas are somewhat involved,392 for
388
Id. at 1338. In so holding, however, the court did express some skepticism about whether it
would ultimately be persuaded by the utility’s takings argument. Id. This dicta should carry little weight,
since it attempted to employ the Court’s confiscatory ratemaking precedents to dispose of a case involving
a physical taking without betraying any awareness of the Court’s frequent admonitions underscoring the
separateness of these two lines of jurisprudence. See supra notes 162-163, 169, 202 and accompanying
text.
389
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 208 F.3d 1263, 1272-73 (11th Cir. 2000) (“Gulf Power II”), rev’d on
other grounds sub nom. Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002).
390
See Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782 (2002).
391
47 U.S.C. § 224(e). The separate mythology governing telecommunications carriers became
effective after February 8, 2001, after which point the Telecom Formula began to phased in over a period
of five years. Until that date, the Cable Formula governed pole attachments by telecommunications
carriers. Amendment of Rules and Policies Governing Pole Attachments, Report and Order, 15 F.C.C.R.
6453, 6457-58 ¶ 5 (2000) (“Fee Order”).
392
In contrast to the methodology governing attachments by cable television systems (known as the
“Cable Formula”), which established uniform rates of compensation for all portions of the pole, the
methodology governing attachments by telecommunications carriers (known as the “Telecom Formula”)
allowed for different rates of recovery for the “usable” and “unusable” portions of the pole. Although
rates associated with usable portions of the pole follow the approach of the Cable Formula and allocate
costs in accordance with the percentage of usable space occupied, 47 U.S.C. § 224(e)(3), recovery rates
associated with the unusable portion of the pole are allocated in accordance with the number of attaching
entities. Id. § 224(e)(2). Specifically, one-third of the costs of the unusable space would be borne by the
pole owner, with the remaining two-thirds divided among all attaching entities (with the pole owner being
considered one of the attaching entities). Id. § 224(e)(3); Implementation of Section 703(e) of
Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report and Order, 13 F.C.C.R. 6777, 6799-6800 ¶ 43 (1998). The FCC
originally established two different formulas to calculate each part separately. For simplicity, they
eventually combined the calculation into a single formula. The combined formula is written as follows:

  Space 
Unusable Space
2


  Occupied  +  ×
3
No.
of
Attaching
Entities

  × Net Cost of a Bare Pole ×
Maximum
= 
Rate


Pole Height





Carrying
Charge
Rate

Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12131-32 ¶ 55. If the standard presumptions are
applied, the formula is further simplified as follows:
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our purposes it suffices to note that the Cable Formula and the Telecom
Formula can lead to significant differences in compensation.393 For example,
in recent litigation Alabama Power has asserted that while application of the
Cable Formula leads to an annual compensation rate of $6.30 per pole,
application of the Telecom Formula would result in an annual compensation
rate of $20.41 per pole.394
FIGURE 2
COMPARISON OF RECOVERY RATES UNDER THE POLE ATTACHMENTS ACT
Number of
Percentage of Pole Costs Recoverable
Attaching Entities
Cable Formula
Telecom Formula
1
7.4%
24.0%
2
14.8%
33.8%
3
22.2%
40.0%
4
29.6%
44.8%
5
37.0%
48.9%
6
44.4%
52.6%
7
51.9%
56.0%
8
59.3%
59.3%
It is also noteworthy that both the Cable and the Telecom Formulas are
based on historical cost rather than forward-looking cost. The FCC orders
implementing the 1996 amendments reasoned that that the Supreme Court
upheld the use of such an approach in Florida Power. The FCC further
argued that the policies underlying the Pole Attachments Act, the static
nature of the technology underlying utility poles, and the fact that utility pole
networks were in fact impossible to duplicate justified adopting a
methodology that was less focused on stimulating competitive entry. In
addition, the FCC emphasized the administrative convenience of maintaining
the previous regime.395
The FCC declined to resolve whether basing its methodology on
historical costs violated the Takings Clause on the grounds that such asapplied takings challenges were not ripe until the methodology was
embodied in a specific rate order. Until that occurred, the only type of
challenge that could be raised was a facial challenge, and the FCC rejected
that challenge because it could not conclude that its methodology would
Id. at 12132 ¶ 56. The FCC subsequently established a rebuttable presumption that the average
number of attaching entities in nonurbanized areas was three and that the average number of attachers in
an urbanized area was five. Id. at 12139-40 ¶¶ 71-72.
393
Because the Telecom Formula allows for more generous rates for unusable space, it in effect
allows for greater recovery than the Cable Formula for any reasonable number of attaching entities.
394
Brief of Alabama Power Company and Gulf Power Company, Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, Nos. 0014763-I & 00-15068-D, at 23 (11th Cir. filed Mar. 5, 2001).
395
Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12116-17 ¶¶ 20-22, 12119 ¶ 25; Fee Order, 15
F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9.
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deny just compensation in all cases.396 The FCC reiterated these principles
when applying the approach established by its general orders in particular
cases.397 Because these cases arose out of actual rate orders, the FCC
addressed the takings issue directly. Citing Florida Power, the FCC ruled
that the constitutionality of its actions turned solely on whether the rates
established were confiscatory. Even assuming that the 1996 amendments
constituted a taking for which just compensation must be paid, it was
impossible to apply any of the three conventional methodologies for
determining fair market value.398 Appeals of these decisions are currently
pending before the Eleventh Circuit.399
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market Value
Basic economic theory indicates that the most efficient way to
implement the Pole Attachments Act would be to base access rates on
market-based prices. Using external benchmarks to set access rates would
promote allocative efficiency, since market-based pricing provides those who
obtain access with the signals they need to make sure that they purchase
optimal quantity and overall mix of inputs and tends to help inputs find their
way into the hands to those buyers who obtain the greatest benefit from
them. Reliance on market prices also promotes dynamic efficiency by
providing the appropriate incentives for investment and innovation.
Basing access rates on the price that would be paid for access on the
open market thus represents the best way to promote economic efficiency.
Although it is arguable that such external benchmarks once did not exist,400
technological convergence and the shift from output regulation to input
regulation as well as improvements in technology have made it possible for
regulatory authorities to infer market prices from two different types of
transactions. First, regulators may consider the revenue that could be earned
from other attaching entities. Second, they may infer market value from the
price of any substitute technologies of which an attaching entity can avail
itself.
396
Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 1215-16 ¶ 18; Local Competition Order, 11
F.C.C.R. at 16087-88 ¶ 1192.
397
See Ala. Cable Telecomms. Ass’n v. Ala. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 12209 (2001); Teleport
Communications Atlanta, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 20238, 20240-41 ¶ 7 (2001). The
FCC subsequently ordered that a series of identical complaints against Georgia Power be held in abeyance
pending attempts to negotiate a mutually acceptable rate using the information provided by the FCC’s
opinion in this opinion. See Knology, Inc. v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16
F.C.C.R. 20413 (2001); City of Sanderville v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16
F.C.C.R. 20417 (2001); City of Dublin v. Ga. Power Co., Order Granting Temporary Stay, 16 F.C.C.R.
20421 (2001).
398
Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12229-35 ¶¶ 46-57.
399
Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, Nos. 00-14763-I & 00-15068-D (11th Cir. filed Sept. 13, 2000); Ga.
Power Co. v. FCC, No. 02-10222-B (11th Cir. filed Jan. 11, 2002).
400
Baynes, supra note 366, at 177.

88

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

a. Unregulated Pole Attachments — The years since the enactment of
the Pole Attachments Act have witnessed periods during which the rates for
certain types of pole attachment were determined through arms-length
transactions. For example, the Pole Attachments Act as originally enacted
only extended to cable television systems. It was not until 1996 that it was
extended to cover telecommunications carriers as well. As a result, pole
attachment agreements negotiated by local telephone companies seeking
access to utility poles owned by electric companies were unregulated by the
federal government prior to 1996. Indeed, such agreements were necessarily
quite common, since electric companies owned the majority of utility
poles.401 Thus, until 1996 the terms of pole attachment agreements obtained
by local telephone companies in states that did not regulate such contracts
necessarily represented market-based transactions that regulatory authorities
could use to establish efficient pricing. Proceedings before the FCC suggest
that these rates were substantially higher than those authorized under the
Pole Attachments Act.402
In addition, it is possible that some arms-length transactions might have
been negotiated during regulatory gaps following judicial challenges to the
Pole Attachments Act. For example, it appears that uncertainty about the
constitutionality of the Cable and Telecom Formulas in the aftermath of Gulf
Power I led the FCC to make statements that many parties believed indicated
that it would not require that pole attachment rates comply with the Cable
and Telecom Formulas until after the courts had made a final determination
of what constituted just compensation.403 Until the FCC subsequently
disavowed that position,404 the parties negotiating pole attachment
agreements may well have believed that such agreements were temporarily
unregulated and negotiated arms-length transactions during that time.405
Interestingly, the fact that such market benchmarks are no longer
available underscores the extent to which the absence of a well-established
market is the direct result of state and federal regulation.406 The absence of a
market, however, does not imply that a product or service would lack market
value, only that the market value has yet to be determined.
401

See S. REP. NO. 95-580, at 21 (1977).
Compare Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12224 ¶ 35 (reporting that joint use agreements between
local telephone companies and electric companies incorporated rates ranging between $26.29-$30 per
pole), with Brief of Alabama Power Company and Gulf Power Company, Ala. Power Co. v. FCC, Nos.
00-14763-I & 00-15068-D, at 23 (11th Cir. filed Mar. 5, 2001) (arguing that the Cable Formula and the
Telecom Formula allowed for rates of $6.30 and $20.41 respectively).
403
See Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12221-23 ¶ 23.
404
See id. at 12221-23 ¶¶ 29-31.
405
The Eleventh Circuit’s decision in Gulf Power II holding that the Pole Attachments Act did not
cover Internet services could have created a window during which arms-length transactions could have
been negotiated between broadband providers and pole owners. Apparently, the Eleventh Circuit
immediately stayed the mandate of Gulf Power II pending Supreme Court review. See Ga. Power, 16
F.C.C.R. at 12213 ¶ 9; Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12214-15 ¶¶ 11-12.
406
For a discussion of the problems with allowing other features of a regulatory regime to render a
particular restriction constitutional, see Yoo, supra note 31, at _.
402
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b. Alternative Network Technologies — Regulatory authorities may
also infer market prices from the rates charged for access to alternative
technologies that provide the same functionality as networks of utility poles.
This is because, according to basic economic theory, the prices for
substitutes for a particular good represent useful proxies for determining
market value of that good.
Attachments by Wireless Carriers—For example, wireless carriers who
wish to attach their equipment to utility poles have the option of attaching
their equipment to a wide variety of alternative facilities. In fact, tall
buildings, communications towers, and indeed any location that is
sufficiently high can provide a direct substitute for the pole owner’s
facilities. It is for this reason that the Supreme Court has questioned whether
attachments by wireless carriers truly fall within the economic rationale of
the Pole Attachments Act, which is directed towards preventing monopoly
pricing in bottleneck facilities.407 In addition to raising questions whether
access represents good economic policy, the existence of substitutes also
provides an external benchmark for setting rates in the event that policy
makers nonetheless decide to impose access requirements. Given that
surveys suggest that the rental rates charged to wireless companies for the
placement of attachments on communications towers exceed the rates
allowed by the Pole Attachments by several hundred percent,408 there is
reason to question whether the cost-based rates currently in place are
effectively promoting either allocative or dynamic efficiency.
Multichannel Video Programming Distributors (MVPDs)—In addition,
the emergence of viable spectrum-based technologies for delivering video
programming to the home is making it possible to estimate the value of
access to networks of utility poles by cable television systems. Although
technologies that provide multichannel video programming distribution via
spectrum, up until recently none has been able to provide effective
competition with cable television.409 It is only in the last few years that
digital broadcast satellite systems (DBS) have emerged as a viable
competitor to cable television. DBS penetration has approaching the levels
407
Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Gulf Power Co., 122 S. Ct. 782, 790 (2002). The Court
nonetheless held that the plain language of the statute included wireless carriers within its scope. Even if
some ambiguity existed, the Court would defer to the FCC’s construction of the statute. Id.
408
Fryer’s
TowerSource,
The
TowerSource/Tower
Summit
Survey,
at
http:://www.towersource.com/survey.html (last visited May 16, 2002) (reporting survey indicating that as
of October 31, 2000, communications towers receive an average annual rent of over $12,000 from each
attaching entity).
409
Early spectrum-based MVPD technologies include multichannel multipoint distribution services
(MMDS), which employ microwave transmission facilities to provide multichannel programming;
satellite master antenna television systems (SMATV), which establish private cable systems that service
individual apartment buildings; home satellite dishes (HSD), comprised of the large, C-band satellite
dishes that were the first to be deployed. Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for
Delivery of Video Programming, Eighth Annual Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 1244, 1277-82 ¶¶ 67-77 (2002)
(“Eighth Annual Report on Video Programming Delivery”).
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that, under current law, would represent sufficient competition to justify
eliminating rate regulation of basic cable services.410 Recent empirical
studies have confirmed that consumers are beginning to regard DBS as a
substitute for cable.411
The value of the transmission service provided by DBS can thus provide
an external benchmark that can be used in determining the market value of
access to networks of public utility poles. There are a number of factors that
will complicate any direct comparison. The geographic structure of the two
media is, of course, quite different, since DBS, by its very nature, is
necessarily national in scope, while cable television service is necessarily
limited to serving specific localities. In addition, the quality of the various
services differs somewhat. That said, the existence of these substitutes can
provide useful guidance as to the value of the services being provided under
a regime of compelled access.
Broadband—Furthermore, a wide array of alternative technologies are
emerging through which broadband providers can reach consumers without
using pole attachments.412 Although cable modem and digital subscriber line
(DSL) providers have taken the early lead in the broadband race, there are a
number of alternative broadband technologies that are in various stages of
deployment.413 DBS providers are already offering satellite-based broadband
technologies that are beginning to vie directly with wireline broadband
services.414 Again, by its very nature, DBS is necessarily national in scope,
while cable television service is necessarily limited to serving specific
localities. In addition, the quality of the various services differs somewhat.
Although these differences can make direct comparisons difficult to make,
they do not completely vitiate the usefulness of these substitutes in helping to
determine the value of the services being provided through utility pole
networks. Other providers are deploying spectrum-based technologies
whose geographic footprints are similar to that of cable operators. For
example, providers of Personal Communications Services (PCS) are already
providing mobile wireless broadband services, and other companies are
preparing to use Multipoint Distribution Service (MDS) to provide fixed
wireless broadband services.415
Digital television broadcasters are
410

See Yoo, supra note 9, at 228-30.
See Implementation of Section 3 of Cable Television Consumer Protection & Competition Act of
1992, Report on Cable Industry Prices, 16 F.C.C.R. 4346, 4363 ¶ 48, 4364-65 ¶ 53 (2001).
412
See generally Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities,
Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3037-38 ¶¶ 36-37 (2002); Yoo, supra note 9, at 25358.
413
Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in Reasonable
& Timely Fashion & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of
Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44, 2865 ¶ 48 (2002) (“Third § 706
Report”).
414
Id. at 2869 ¶ 60, 2879-80 ¶ 85, app. B at 2926-27 ¶¶ 45-49.
415
Id. at 2867-69 ¶¶ 55-59, 2901 ¶ 146, app. B at 2921-26¶¶ 31-44; Inquiry Concerning Deployment
of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in Reasonable & Timely Fashion & Possible Steps to
411
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considering proposals to use part of the increased efficiency provided by
digital transmission to provide broadband services.416 And finally, the
promise of third generation wireless devices (3G) hangs over the entire
competitive arena.417
Each of these technologies provide network
transmission services on a geographic scale that is much more comparable to
utility poles than DBS.
The growth of direct facilities-based competitors to utility poles raises
serious questions about whether compelling access represents sound
economic policy. This is because access harms dynamic efficiency both by
forcing the pole owner to share any benefits that result from investments in
its own facilities and by rescuing those who need access to such facilities
from having to invest in alternative networks capable of providing similar
functions. Thus access both attenuates the pole owner’s incentives to invest
its own facilities as well as deprives the owner’s of substitute facilities of
their natural strategic partners. In so doing, access requirements can forestall
the emergence of alternative facilities-based competition to utility poles,
which represents the only viable solution to any bottleneck problem.
If access is to be compelled, however, the best way to mitigate these
effects is through the establishment of access rates that mimic market-based
pricing. Doing so not only encourages existing participants to employ
appropriate levels of network inputs, it also provides appropriate signals to
those deciding on whether to enter particular markets and those deciding
whether to invest in network facilities. Granting access to utility poles at
submarket rates, in contrast, threatens to make those alternative transmission
technologies appear artificially unattractive. Regulation threatens to cause
investment in those technologies to fall below efficient levels.
Finally, with respect to broadband, it is possible that the rates allowed
under the Telecom Formula can serve as a reference point for market-based
pricing for cable television systems. Admittedly, the prices determined by
the Telecom formula are not established in open markets. Nonetheless, the
fact that application of the Cable Formula will typically lead to a significant
shortfall compared to the Telecom Formula418 provides good reason to
question whether the rates established under the Cable Formula can properly
be regarded as fair market value. Indeed, the net result impairs allocative
efficiency by establishing significantly different cost structures for cable
modem service and DSL and impedes dynamic efficiency by distorting the
Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706 of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report, 15
F.C.C.R. 20913, 20932-37 ¶¶ 42-55 (2000) (“Second § 706 Report”); Eighth Annual Report on Video
Programming Delivery, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2873-74 ¶¶ 69-71.
416
Advanced Television Sys., Fifth Report and Order, 12 F.C.C.R. 12809, 12820-21 ¶ 29 (1997)
(authorizing digital television stations to provide “ancillary and supplementary services,” including data
transmission); Annual Assessment of Status of Competition in Market for Delivery of Video
Programming, Seventh Annual Report 16 F.C.C.R. 6005, 6052 ¶ 102 (2001).
417
Third § 706 Report, 17 F.C.C.R. at 2878 ¶ 80, 2900 ¶¶ 141-143, 2901-02 ¶ 147.
418
See supra notes 393-394 and accompanying text.
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investment and entry decisions of these two types of providers. Allowing
such a significant differential to persist allows the government far too great a
role in determining which of these platforms will eventually emerge as the
technological winner.
c. ECPR as a Second-Best Valuation Method — The growing
availability of alternative telecommunications networks is making it
increasingly possible for regulatory authorities to base access pricing on
actual transactions for comparable services. We acknowledge, however, that
many of these technologies are not yet fully deployed and that differences in
utilization levels and geographic scope may further limit the current
usefulness of transactions involving these technologies as external
benchmarks. If that is the case, the appropriate step would be for regulators
to base rates on ECPR, which requires that rates be set equal to the sum of
the direct incremental costs and the opportunity costs associated with
providing access.419
The methodologies currently employed to set rates for pole attachments
deviates from ECPR in two significant ways. First, the current approach to
pole attachments calculates direct incremental costs on the basis of historical
cost rather than forward-looking cost. The FCC has itself acknowledged that
reliance on forward-looking costs would better promote allocative efficiency.
As the FCC observed, “a firm compares forward-looking costs with existing
market prices, in making decisions about entry, expansion, and price”; as a
result, ratemaking methodologies based on forward-looking cost help “to
ensure the efficient use of telecommunications network facilities, and to
encourage new entrants to make economically rational decisions about
whether or how to enter a local telecommunications market.”420 In addition,
“[a] forward looking cost pricing methodology reflects the cost of replacing
the functions of an asset using the most efficient technology available so as
to appropriately capture the technological changes that are occurring.”421
Use of forward-looking costs would also promote dynamic efficiency, since
setting prices on the basis of forward-looking economic costs would “giv[e]
the appropriate signal for new entrants to invest in network facilities.”422
Despite its acknowledged benefits that would result from applying a
methodology based on forward-looking cost, the FCC nonetheless offered
several justifications for continuing to rely on historical cost. For example,
the FCC reasoned that the Pole Attachments Act was designed to stem
anticompetitive pricing and not to stimulate competitive entry.423 The FCC
419

See supra Part I.C.2.
Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12103, 12116 ¶ 20.
421
Id. at 12118-19 ¶ 24.
422
Id. at 12119 ¶ 25 (citing Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6453, 6460-61 ¶ 9); accord id. at 12118-19
¶ 24 (noting that methodologies based on forward-looking costs give new entrants “the proper cost
signals to decide whether to construct their own networks or to use the incumbent’s”).
423
Id. at 12116-12117 ¶¶ 20-21; see also Baynes, supra note 366, at 177.
420
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also suggested that continued application of a historical cost methodology
was justified in part by the fact that the technology underlying utility poles
was relatively static.424 In addition, the FCC pointed out that investment
incentives are less important in the pole attachment context, since local
zoning and other right of way restrictions prevent the construction of
duplicative networks of poles.425
The problem with the FCC’s reasoning is that it fails to accord sufficient
weight to the arrival of alternative technologies that compete directly with
utility pole networks. In terms of static efficiency, the FCC’s reliance on the
need to control monopoly pricing ignores the fact that the emergence of
substitute facilities will generally cause any monopoly rents to dissipate. In
focusing too narrowly on the network of utility poles as a universe unto
itself, the FCC’s approach ignores the fact that substitute facilities, such as
digital broadcast satellite (DBS) systems and to a lesser extent wireless cable
systems, exist that can support transmission of both multichannel video
program distribution. In addition, wireless telephony has emerged as a
viable alternative to wireline communications. Over time, the growing
importance of these substitute media grow in importance will erode any
monopoly power possessed by utility pole owners, if it has not done so
already. The most dramatic illustration of this point exists with respect to
wireless providers, which the FCC and Supreme Court have concluded fall
within the ambit of the Pole Attachments Act.426 In fact, wireless providers
have readily available an extensive array of alternative places in which to
locate their equipment, including communications towers and rooftop
placements, that eliminates any supposed monopoly power possessed by
utility pole owners. In forcing pole owners to provide access to wireless
carriers at rates below those that they would reach through arms-length
negotiations, current regulatory policy is interfering with allocative
efficiency.
More importantly, the FCC’s reasoning ignores the impact that pricing of
access to utility poles has on dynamic efficiency by disregarding the impact
that the price of access to utility poles can have on the levels of investment in
alternative technologies. For example, it is true that because reconstructing
the existing network is very costly and not desirable, high access prices to
utility poles may not spur any additional investment in duplicate networks of
poles. The price of access to poles does, however, have a direct impact on
the level of investment in communications towers and other spectrum-based
technologies that operate as substitutes for utility poles. This is true even if
the technology underlying utility poles remains relatively static, since the
dramatic changes in substitute technologies will influence the economics of
424

Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12118-19 ¶ 24.
Id.; see also Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9.
426
See supra note 382 and accompanying text.
425
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distributing telecommunications services to individual residences and
businesses even if the technology underlying utility poles does not change. It
is only by taking an artificially truncated view of the scope of the relevant
technologies that makes these considerations seem unimportant.
This effect will be particularly dramatic with respect to broadband
technologies. As noted earlier, companies are in the process of deploying a
wide range of broadband technologies, including PCS, fixed wireless
broadband systems, 3G wireless devices, and ancillary and supplementary
services provided via spectrum assigned to digital television broadcasting.427
The manner in which access to pole attachments are priced will have a direct
and dramatic impact on the timing and level of investment in deploying these
new technologies.
The second way in which the current methodology used to set rates for
pole attachments deviates from ECPR is the absence of any element that
reflects opportunity cost. This omission reflects the FCC’s failure to
understand that, since networks are a capital asset that is not consumed, the
price for using of the assets is properly based is the value of the services
created with those assets and not the costs used to construct them. In
addition, focusing solely on historical costs fails to reflect the contribution of
the demand-side of the economic equation that has become a fundamental
consideration ever since neoclassical theory emerged as the consensus
economic paradigm. In addition, opportunity costs would be relatively easy
to implement in this context, since the all of the relevant markets—wireless
telephony, MVPDs, and broadband—are or are becoming extremely
competitive.428
Together these arguments underscore the extent to which access
regulations represent something of an anomaly in competition policy.429
Rather than breaking up a monopoly position, compelled access simply
forces a monopolist to share an input, which has the effect of rescuing other
firms from having to invest in developing an alternative source of supply of
that input. In effect, then, compelled access cuts off emerging alternative
network technologies from their natural strategic partners.
As a
consequence, it preempts the development of a viable alternative to the
bottleneck facility, which represents the only viable long-term solution to the
monopoly problem. This is particularly problematic in technologically
dynamic industries such as wireless telephony, video distribution, and the
Internet, in which the prospects of developing new ways either to circumvent
or to compete directly with the bottleneck are the greatest.
427
See supra notes 412-417 and accompanying text. One of the parties in Alabama Power has also
offered expert testimony asserting that railroad and highway rights of way have emerged as still another
way in which broadband providers can bypass the network of utility poles. See 16 F.C.C.R. at 12224
¶ 34.
428
See Yoo, supra note 9, at 227-30, 253-58; supra notes 412-417 and accompanying text.
429
See supra note 25 and accompanying text.
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Indeed, access requirements applied in industries characterized by high
fixed costs can represent a form of regulatory opportunism. Firms deciding
whether to enter such industries ex ante will, of course, do so only if they can
expect to recover their fixed cost investments. Economists have long
recognized that once fixed costs are sunk, firms remain vulnerable to ex post
opportunistic behavior that can push them down towards marginal cost
pricing, since once costs are sunk, they are no longer taken into account.
Such opportunism is mitigated in competitive markets by the law of
contracts, the desire to maintain business relationships, and market reputation
effects. To the extent that regulators access requirements push prices below
the levels needed to guarantee full investment, they remain problematic.
The FCC’s attempts to evade this logic are unpersuasive. In arguing that
the relatively static nature of utility pole technology and the practical
impossibility of replacing the network renders investment incentives less
important, the FCC focuses too narrowly on utility poles as a distinct
technological universe and fails to give appropriate significance to the
ongoing emergence of substitute technologies. The relevant investment
incentives go as much to stimulating investment in alternative networks as it
does to stimulating investment in alternative sets of poles. Pricing access to
networks of poles below market for cable television, for example, threatens
to reduce the incentives for television networks to invest in DBS and other
alternatives to cable television below efficient levels. Similarly, allowing
broadband providers to obtain transmission via utility poles threatens to
deprive non-wireline broadband technologies of the support that they need to
finance their deployment.
In the end, the only justification for the FCC’s position is administrative
convenience. The FCC argued that the historical cost approach had
“provided a stable and certain regulatory framework, that may be applied
‘simply and expeditiously’ requiring ‘a minimum of staff paperwork and
procedures consistent with fair and efficient regulation’ ” for over two
decades, and Congress had not given any indication that it wanted the FCC
to deviate from it.430 The FCC further argued that switching to a
methodology based on forward-looking cost would cause significant
disruption and would force the FCC to undertake extensive proceedings to
establish the new approach.431
The alleged simplicity of historical costs is far from an argument for
accuracy. As Justice Breyer has acknowledged, although continued reliance
on historical costs may provide some administrative advantages, “[w]hen the
economic problems created by the use of historical cost valuation become
serious, special modifications must be made in the process.”432 Specifically,
430
Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9 (quoting S. REP. NO. 95-580, at 21 (1977)); Consol.
Reconsideration Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12117 ¶ 22, 12119 ¶ 25 (same).
431
Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9.
432
BREYER, supra note 32, at 40.
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in making this evaluation, the proper inquiry for the FCC is whether the
administrative advantages of retaining the existing regulatory regime
outweigh the long-term benefits of efficient pricing in current transactions as
well as in fostering the emergence of direct facilities-based competition to
utility poles, which remains the only solution to the problems of bottleneck
control that is truly viable in the long run. Under such circumstances, the
FCC should be very careful not to let what would amount to transient, shortterm inconvenience exert too great an influence over the substantial benefits
that would accrue in the long run.433 Indeed, allowing the FCC to adhere to
outmoded methodologies in the name of administrative convenience would
ignore the fact that the shift from rate regulation to access regulation was
intended to revolutionize the approach to utility regulation. Maintaining the
status quo runs the risk of causing cause all of the benefits resulting from the
transformation of regulatory policy to come to naught.
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market Value
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides another
consideration cutting against the FCC’s decision to base pole attachment
rates on historical cost. As the FCC concedes, the 1996 amendments are
“not reasonably susceptible of a reading that gives the pole owner the choice
of whether to grant telecommunications carriers or cable television systems
access.”434 As the Eleventh Circuit recognized in Gulf Power I, by
transforming the Pole Attachments Act from a rate regulation scheme into a
compulsory access requirement, the 1996 amendments brought the entire
scheme squarely within the ambit of Loretto.435 It makes no difference that
the pole owners may have originally taken the property in question with the
understanding that they would have to put it to a public use.436 Nor did the
fact that the utilities knew that its property would be subject to extensive
regulation for the public use justify forcing the utilities to subject themselves
to physical invasions without just compensation. On the contrary, the court
concluded that such an argument had things “backwards,” in that “[a]
433
For other examples in which the FCC has inhibited the emergence of competition by permitting
itself to be unduly swayed by one-time costs associated with regulatory change, see Yoo, supra note 31, at
_.
434
See Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 16087 ¶ 1191.
435
See supra notes 387-389 and accompanying text.
436
Gulf Power Co. v. FCC, 187 F.3d 1324, 1329-30 (11th Cir. 1999) (“Gulf Power I”) (citing W.
Union Tel. Co. v. Pa. R.R., 195 U.S. 540, 573 (1904) (noting that even though “[t]he right of way of a
railroad is property devoted to a public use,” “it has been recognized . . . that a railroad right of way is so
far private property as to be entitled to that provision of the Constitution which forbids its taking, except
under the power of eminent domain and upon payment of [just] compensation”); and United Rys. & Elec.
Co. v. West, 280 U.S. 234, 249 (1930) (noting that “the property of a public utility, although devoted to
the public service and impressed with a public interest, is still private property and neither the corpus of
that property nor the use thereof constitutionally can be taken for a compulsory price which falls below
the measure of just compensation”), overruled on other grounds by FPC v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 320
U.S. 591 (1944).
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property owner is entitled to expect that the property it acquired via eminent
domain . . . came with the right that all property has—not to be subject to
government-coerced, permanent, physical occupation without just
compensation.”437
The FCC contended that this argument was foreclosed by Florida
Power, which they construed as establishing the constitutional sufficiency of
the compensation provided by the existing approach to setting pole
attachment rates.438 Indeed, the FCC maintained that Florida Power
definitively established that the proper standard for resolving takings
challenges to all pole attachments was the confiscatory ratemaking standard
as elaborated in Duquesne Light and Hope Natural Gas.439 The FCC’s
position ignores the sharp distinction between physical and nonpossessory
takings drawn by the Supreme Court.440 In the words of the Eleventh
Circuit:
Characterizing the mandatory access provision as a
regulatory condition, even one allegedly designed to foster
competition, cannot change the fact that it effects a taking by
requiring a utility to submit to a permanent, physical
occupation of its property. However laudatory its motive,
Congress’ power to regulate utilities does not extend to
taking without just compensation the right of a utility to
exclude unwanted occupiers of its property.441
Indeed, the Supreme Court underscored this precise point when it explicitly
recognized that “ ‘[a] permanent physical occupation authorized by
government is a taking without regard to the public interest that it may
serve.’ ”442
More specifically, the FCC’s conclusion was inconsistent with the
binding precedents holding that the principles of confiscatory ratemaking had
no application in determining whether a physical taking had occurred. As
the Eleventh Circuit reasoned, “Duquesne’s discussion of utilities was not in
the context of a takings case dealing with the permanent occupation of
property. Nothing in Duquesne suggests a utility’s property is less subject to
protection against permanent, physical occupation than anyone else’s
property. It is not.”443 Nor could the 1996 amendments be upheld under a
regulatory taking analysis. “[A]lthough property is subject to broad
437

Id. at 1330.
Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R.. at 12229-30 ¶¶ 45-46; see also Consol. Reconsideration Order, 16
F.C.C.R. at 12217 ¶ 18; Fee Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 6460-61 ¶ 9.
439
Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R.. at 12230-31 ¶¶ 47-48.
440
See supra notes 162-163, 169, 202 and accompanying text.
441
Gulf Power I, 187 F.3d at 1331.
442
Id. (quoting Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419, 426 (1982)).
443
Id.
438
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regulatory power, a regulation becomes a taking when the government
authorizes permanent, physical occupation by a third party.444 Since the
1996 Act effects a per se taking, the government is obligated to ensure that
the pole owners receive compensation that reflects the earning potential of
the property taken, and fair market value represents the accepted basis for
determining what that earning potential is.445
In apparent recognition of the weakness of its position, the FCC
entertained the possibility that the Takings Clause required that pole owners
receive market value as compensation for access to their poles. Even so, the
FCC concluded that “the unusual nature of pole attachments, and the nature
of the property interest conveyed,” made it impossible to apply the standard
techniques for determining market value.446 Specifically, the absence of
viable alternatives to the networks of utility poles made it impossible base
market value on comparable sales, since the actual market transactions that
existed either included monopoly rents or involved property rights that were
“too different to draw any meaningful conclusions.”447 In addition, the FCC
found the income capitalization approach too speculative, since access to
utility poles represented only one of many inputs needed to provide cable
television and telecommunications services, a fact that made it virtually
impossible to determine how much of the income earned to attribute to any
one particular input.448 Finally, the FCC rejected the replacement cost
approach in part on the grounds that access did not completely destroy the
pole owner’s property interests, but instead simply imposed an occupation
that was “restricted in duration, primacy, exclusivity, and physical manner of
use.”449 The FCC also reasoned that the replacement cost approach should
not be used because it is infeasible to replace the existing network of utility
poles.
None of the FCC’s arguments are convincing. As discussed earlier, the
emergence of substitute network technologies has made it possible to
establish access rates that are a reflection of actual market transactions.
Indeed, in the context of attachments by wireless carriers, it is possible to
compare what amount to identical transactions. The FCC’s objection to the
income capitalization approach ignores the fact that the Supreme Court has
sanctioned its use under circumstances in which an asset was simply one of
many inputs in a productive process.450 Furthermore, the grounds offered by
the FCC for rejecting the replacement cost approach are factually incorrect in
one important respect. The access requirement is not limited in the manner
444

Id. at 1328 (citing Loretto, 458 U.S. at 439-40).
See supra notes 212-220 and accompanying text.
446
Ala. Power, 16 F.C.C.R. at 12233 ¶ 53.
447
Id. at 12234 ¶ 55.
448
Id. at 12234 ¶ 56.
449
Id. at 12234-35 ¶ 57.
450
See supra notes 154-155 and accompanying text.
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in which the FCC envisions. It in fact authorizes occupations that are
indefinite, not temporary, and that in effect deprive the pole owner of the
right to possess, use, and dispose of the property occupied. Thus, the
Supreme Court has recognized that access requirements do in fact
completely destroy all of the property owner’s interests with respect to that
particular portion of the property occupied.451 The fact that replicating a
network of utility poles was infeasible might have been relevant had no
technological alternatives existed. Under such circumstances, investment
incentives might well be largely irrelevant. In this case, however, numerous
alternative technologies exist that can perform the same functions as utility
poles. Thus, the fact that direct replication of utility poles is impossible does
not justify the disruption of investment signals that occurs when access rates
are based on historical cost.
In short, the only way the FCC could justify its position is by making
two fundamental analytical errors. First, it ignored the fundamental change
in the takings analysis required by the shift to access regulation recognized in
Gulf Power I and II. Second, it ignored the fundamental change in the just
compensation analysis required by the emergence of facilities-based
competition to networks of utility poles. To date, courts have properly
declined to address the merits of the just compensation argument, since all of
the challenges to date have occurred in facial challenges to the regulatory
scheme rather than in the context of an actual rate. It thus remains to be seen
whether the principles we advance will emerge in the judicial challenges
currently pending before the Eleventh Circuit.452
C. Access to Broadband Networks
The Internet has emerged as a significant development of the last several
years and has exerted an ever-growing influence on telecommunications
media, competing variously as a substitute for telephones, fax, television,
radio, postal services, and private data transmission networks. Initially, the
vast majority of U.S. households received Internet service through
“narrowband” technologies employing an analog modem attached to a
conventional telephone line.
Although conventional telephone-based
connections permit theoretical connection speeds of 56.6 thousand bits per
second (kbps), in practice typical connection speeds fall in the neighborhood
of thirty kbps.453
More and more, however, U.S. consumers have been turning to
“broadband” technologies that allow subscribers to achieve actual speeds in
451

See Loretto, 458 U.S. at 435-36.
See supra note 399 and accompanying text.
453
Although most conventional modems are technically capable of carrying up to 56.6 kbps, the
physical characteristics of the telephone lines that those modems use to connect to the Internet limit
speeds to the 30-40 kbps range.
452
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excess of one million bits per second (1 Mbps).454 Broadband transmission
facilities provide advantages for customers seeking telecommunications and
Internet access services including speeds of up to 100 times faster than
standard dial-up services. Moreover, broadband services will permit
bandwidth-intensive multimedia content with enriched entertainment
features such as video and interactive computer games. The high-bandwidth
system will further allow “always on” service without the inconvenience of
repeatedly logging on to connect to the Internet. The FCC estimated in 2000
that over one-third of all U.S. households would subscribe to some form of
broadband service in a matter of a few years.455 Econometric studies indicate
that broadband is not simply a substitute for dial-up service, but instead
constitutes a separate market.456 The FCC declared that the widespread
deployment of broadband infrastructure was a central communications policy
objective.457
There is one key difference between narrowband and broadband
connections to the Internet that has emerged as the flash point for these
policy debates. In the narrowband world, customers can use their telephone
lines to connect to any one of a large number of Internet service providers
(ISPs). Broadband providers, in contrast, typically require their customers to
employ a proprietary ISP.458 Policy makers and commentators have begun to
explore whether they should compel broadband providers to allow
unaffiliated ISPs to employ their transmission networks. Thus, of all the
issues surrounding broadband deployment, the controversy over this issue
has made access to broadband networks “among the most compelling issues
in the communications industry.”459
This subpart explores the manner in which any such access requirement
should be implemented. It begins by reviewing the existing regulatory
454

Most DSL and cable modem users can expect speed somewhere in the neighborhood of 1.5
Mbps. Theoretical speeds are much higher. See Speta, supra note 87, at 52, 56 (noting that ADSL and
cable modems have a theoretical maximum of 10 Mbps and 27 Mbps respectively).
455
Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in a
Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706
of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Second Report, 15 F.C.C.R. 20,913, 20,983 ¶ 186 (2000) (“Second § 706
Report”).
456
Jerry A. Hausman et al., Cable Modems and DSL: Broadband Internet Access for Residential
Customers, 91 AM. ECON. REV. 302, 303-04 (2001).
457
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3020-21 ¶ 1 (2002).
458
For example, before its collapse, Excite@Home, which was the largest ISP serving cable modem
subscribers, was owned by such major cable modem providers as AT&T, Comcast, Cox Communications,
Cablevision Systems, and Shaw Cablesystems, and was the exclusive ISP for those systems. Time
Warner, which is the second largest high-speed broadband provider, has previously required all of its
users to use a proprietary ISP called “RoadRunner.” See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control
of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp.,
Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9863 ¶ 107 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne
Merger”).
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regimes governing the two principal broadband technologies: digital
subscriber lines (DSL) and cable modem systems. It then explores the
proper manner in which access to such systems should be priced. We
conclude that economic and constitutional considerations both indicate that
such access should be priced at market value.
1. Regulatory Framework
a. Digital Subscriber Lines (DSL) — As noted earlier, DSL represents
one of the two principal current technologies for delivering broadband
services to residential customers. DSL takes advantage of the fact that
conventional voice communications only occupy the lower transmission
frequencies (typically those ranging from 300 to 3400 hertz). It is thus
possible to use the higher frequencies (i.e., those above 20,000 hertz) to
convey data communications through the same telephone line without
interfering with voice communications. Although there are numerous types
of DSL technology,460 for simplicity, we shall use the term “DSL” as the
generic reference to all of the various DSL technologies.
Several technical changes must be made to a local telephone network
before it can be used for DSL. First, the loops used for DSL must be
“conditioned.” This is because it is not uncommon for incumbent LECs to
have added devices to their loops, such as bridge taps, low-pass filters, and
range extenders, which designed to improve the performance and
functionality of their networks for transmitting voice calls. Unfortunately,
these devices also cause the quality, and in particular the speed, of DSL
service to degrade. Thus, before loops can be used for DSL, all devices that
have accumulated on the loop must be removed. In addition, if a single
telephone line is to be used for both voice and data traffic, the carrier must
install equipment in its central office that can separate voice traffic from data
traffic. This typically involves the installation of a device known as a digital
subscriber line access multiplexer (DSLAM) in the incumbent LEC’s central
office. The relevant loops are connected to the DSLAM, which routes voice
460
The most popular form of DSL is asymmetric DSL (“ADSL”), in which download transmission
rates are higher than upload rates. Other forms include high bit-rate DSL (“HDSL”), which has the same
data transmission capacity in each direction and provides the same capacity as a T1 line; very-high-speed
DSL (“VDSL”), which is the fastest DSL technology, fast enough to deliver digital video programming,
but is expensive to deploy and cannot function over sustained distances; Rate-Adaptive DSL (“RADSL”),
which allows software to adjust the rate of data transmission. See LATHEN, supra note 459, at 20-21 &
tbl.2. The newest form is G.SHDSL, which is a new standard recently announced by the International
Telecommunications Union that allows for a symmetric, multi-rate service capable of reaching speeds up
to 2.3 Mbps in both directions as well as deployment nearly twice as far form the central office as other
forms of DSL. Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in
Reasonable & Timely Fashion & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706
of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Report, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2879 ¶ 83 (2002) (“Third § 706 Report”).
The FCC refers to these various technologies as “xDSL,” with the “x” serving as a generic placeholder for
the designation of the particular type of DSL involved.
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FIGURE 3
TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF LOCAL TELEPHONE NETWORK PROVIDING
DSL SERVICE
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communications into a conventional circuit-switched network and routes
data communications into a packet-switched network.
This scenario changes somewhat in situations in which incumbent LECs
have deployed fiber optics to increase the efficiency of their networks
through a technology known as digital loop carriers (DLCs).461 Instead of
using a all-copper loop to transmit analog signals between the central office
and the customer’s premises, DLC systems use fiber optics to establish a
digital connection between the central office and a satellite facility known as
a remote terminal, where the transmission is converted into an analog format
and distributed to the customer’s premises through a copper subloop.462 The
improved efficiency and range provided by the fiber optic connection greatly
enhances the performance and quality of voice transmissions. DLCs,
however, can impede the deployment of DSL. This is because DSL depends
on the ability to send and receive signals in an analog format through an allcopper connection. Since the portion of the DLC system between the central
office and the remote terminal employs digital transmissions through a fiber
optic connection, carriers who wish to provide DSL services on a network
that employs DLCs must either deploy DSLAMs in remote terminals or find
an alternative copper loop running between the customer and the central
office.

461
See William P. Rogerson, The Regulation of Broadband Telecommunications, the Principle of
Regulating Narrowly Defined Input Bottlenecks, and Incentives for Investment and Innovation, 2000 U.
CHI. LEGAL F. 119, 125, 141-42 (2000).
462
For simplicity, Figure 4 omits the fact that remote terminals are actually deployed in a ring
configuration.
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FIGURE 4
CONFIGURATION OF DSL SERVICE PROVIDED THROUGH DIGITAL LOOP
CARRIERS
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Policy makers have created two different sets of regulations that provide
for some degree of access to elements of a LEC’s DSL network. The first
has its origins in a series of FCC proceedings known as the Computer
Inquiries.463
The second was created by the section of the
Telecommunications Act of 1996 requiring incumbent LECs to provide
unbundled access to certain network elements.464
The Structural and Nonstructural Safeguards Enacted by the Computer
Inquiries — The first regulatory regime implemented by the FCC to govern
broadband services provided by local telephone companies is the one created
during the FCC’s Computer Inquiries. Telecommunications companies
began to do more than just provide customers with a pure transmission path,
a function that came to be known as “basic services.”465 Instead, companies
began to offer what became known as “enhanced services,” which used
computer processing to modify the information provided by the customer
before routing it to its final destination.466 Common contemporary examples
463
See generally Robert Cannon, Where Internet Service Providers and Telephone Companies
Compete: A Guide to the Computer Inquiries, Enhanced Service Providers and Information Service
Providers, 9 COMMLAW CONSPECTUS 49 (2001).
464
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
465
The regulations define “basic telecommunications services” as “the offering of a pure
transmission capability over a communications path that is virtually transparent in terms of its interaction
with customer supplied information.” Amendment of Section 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations
(Second Computer Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 419-20 ¶¶ 95-96 (1980) (“Computer II Final
Decision”), aff’d sub nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir.
1982), cert. denied, 461 U.S. 938 (1983).
466
The regulations define “enhanced services” as “services, offered over common carrier
transmission facilities used in interstate communications, which employ computer processing applications
that act on the format, content, code, protocol or similar aspects of the subscriber's transmitted
information; provide the subscriber additional, different, or restructured information; or involve subscriber
interaction with stored information.” 47 C.F.R. § 64.702(a).
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include voice mail, electronic mail, electronic store-and-forward, fax storeand-forward, and gateways to online databases such as Westlaw, Lexis, and
the Internet. Although the LECs were in a position to offer both the
additional functionality provided by the computer processing and the
transmission of those services to the end users as a single, integrated product,
other enhanced service providers (ESPs) could not offer the
telecommunications services to deliver the modified information to the end
users. These “pure ESPs” instead depended on the incumbent to provide
such transmission services.
Policy makers soon became concerned that the incumbent LECs who
were formally part of the Bell network (known as the Bell Operating
Companies or “BOCs”)467 would be able to use their monopoly control over
basic services to favor their own, proprietary enhanced services over those
offered by unaffiliated ESPs in much the same manner that AT&T had
favored its own long distance offerings prior to its breakup. The FCC’s
response in its First and Second Computer Inquiries (“Computer I and II”)
was to require that BOCs wishing to provide enhanced services do so
through a separate corporate subsidiary.468 The order that memorialized the
467
The regulatory regime established by Computer III applied only to those LECs who were
originally part of the Bell system. The FCC initially applied the Computer III rules to both AT&T and the
BOCs. Amendment of Sections 64.702 of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer
Inquiry), Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958 (1986) (“Computer III Phase I Order”). The FCC
eventually relieved AT&T of most Computer III requirements. See, e.g., Amendment of Sections 64.702
of the Commission's Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry), Memorandum Opinion and Order
on Reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (“Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order”);
Competition in Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Report and Order, 67 F.C.C.R. 5880 (1991);
Competition in Interstate Interexchange Marketplace, Memorandum Opinion and Order on
Reconsideration, 10 F.C.C.R. 4562 (1995). But see Filing & Review of Open Network Architecture
Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 2449 (1988) (“AT&T ONA Order”) (ruling that
AT&T remains subject to a modified ONA plan the FCC approved in 1988). The FCC later extended
some ONA requirements to GTE. Application of Open Network Architecture & Nondiscrimination
Safeguards to GTE Corp., Report and Order, 9 F.C.C.R. 4922 (1994) (“GTE ONA Order”). The FCC
never imposed CEI requirements on GTE. See Computer III Further Remand Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 6049
n.30.
468
In its First Computer Inquiry, the FCC drew a distinction between “communications services”
and “data processing services.” Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of
Computer & Communication Servs. & Facilities, Tentative Decision of the Commission, 28 F.C.C.2d
291, 295 ¶ 15(a) (1970). The FCC also required common carriers aside from AT&T who wished to
furnish data processing services do so through a separate corporate subsidiary. Regulatory & Policy
Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer & Communication Servs. & Facilities, Final
Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270-74 ¶¶ 11-22, 391 n.2 (1970), aff’d sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp.
v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973). AT&T was precluded from offering data processing services
altogether by the 1956 consent decree that terminated antitrust litigation against it. Id. at 282 ¶ 39 & n.13.
The FCC redefined the relevant regulatory categories in its Computer II to distinguish between
“basic services,” which it defined to be pure transmission capability with little or no interaction with
customer supplied information, and “enhanced services,” which it defined to be communications services
which employ computer processing that interacts with information provided by the customer. Computer
II Final Decision, 77 F.C.C.2d at 387 ¶¶ 5-7. The FCC ruled that the 1956 consent decree did not
preclude AT&T from providing enhanced services, but required AT&T to do so through a separate
corporate subsidiary. Id. at 475-86 ¶¶ 233-60. Following divestiture, the FCC extended the separate
subsidiary requirement to the BOCs. Policy & Rules Concerning Furnishing of Customer Premises
Equip., Enhanced Servs. & Cellular Communications Equip. by Bell Operating Cos., Report and Order,
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breakup of AT&T similarly prohibited the BOCs for providing “information
services,”469 a category determined by the courts and the FCC to be
coterminous with “enhanced services,”470 and ordered the BOCs to
nondiscriminatory access to all information service providers.471
The FCC eventually concluded in its Third Computer Inquiry
(“Computer III”), however, that the costs of the separate subsidiary
requirement outweighed the benefits and that nonstructural safeguards would
protect against anticompetitive activity just as effectively.472 Consequently,
it created a two-phase system of nonstructural restrictions that would allow
the BOCs to avoid the separate subsidiary requirement and provide enhanced
services on an integrated basis. The first phase, known as comparably
efficient interconnection (CEI), required LECs who wished to provide
enhanced services without establishing a separate corporate entity to provide
unaffiliated ESPs with access to the same basic services employed by the
LEC in providing its own enhanced service offerings.473 The second phase,
known as open network architecture (ONA), in essence required unbundled
access to all of the LEC’s network elements. ONA is substantially broader
than CEI in that it is not limited to LECs who are offering advanced
services.474 It also requires the LECs to provide access to all of its network
elements and not just those that the LECs were using to provide its own
enhanced services.475
95 F.C.C.2d 1117, 1120 ¶ 3 (1984) (“BOC Separation Order”), aff’d sub nom. Ill. Bell Tel. Co. v. FCC,
740 F.2d 4765 (7th Cir. 1984). Carriers not associated with the Bell system were not subject to the
separate subsidiary requirement.
469
United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 189-90 (D.D.C. 1982) (“MFJ”), aff’d
mem. sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The MFJ defined information services
as “the offering of a capability for generating, acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving,
utilizing or making available information which may be conveyed via telecommunications.” Id. at 179,
229. Although the MFJ absolutely prohibited the BOCs from offering information services, the MFJ did
allow AT&T to offer most information services after the local telephone companies had been divested.
The only exception was electronic publishing, from which AT&T was to be barred for seven years. Id. at
178-85.
470
Id. at 178 n.198; Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 21955-56 ¶ 102. As a result,
the FCC has used the terms interchangeably. See, e.g., Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell
Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 6040,
n.4, 6040, 6042 n.4, 6066 ¶ 40 (1998) (“Computer III Further Remand Notice”); Computer III Further
Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R.
4289, 4291 n.3 (1999).
471
MFJ, 552 F. Supp. at 141 n.40, 195-97.
472
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1002-11 ¶¶ 79-97 (1986) (“Phase I Order”), on reconsideration, 2
F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (Memorandum Opinion and Order) (“Phase I Reconsideration”), vacated and
remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990S).
473
Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1035-42 ¶¶ 147-166.
474
Ameritech’s Comparably Efficient Interconnection Plan for Elec. Vaulting Serv., Order, 13
F.C.C.R. 80, 85 n.18 (1997); BOC’s Joint Petition, 10 F.C.C.R. at 13763 ¶ 26.
475
Amendment of Sections 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Third Computer Inquiry),
Report and Order, 104 F.C.C.2d 958, 1064-66 ¶¶ 214-217 (1986) (“Computer III Phase I Order”), on
reconsideration, 2 F.C.C.R. 3035 (1987) (“Computer III Phase I Reconsideration Order”), vacated and
remanded sub nom. California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217 (9th Cir. 1990). As originally conceived, ONA
appeared to offer their networks to unaffiliated ESPs on an element-by-element basis. The FCC
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In requiring LECs to provide unbundled access to elements of their
networks, the FCC refused to require physical collocation under either CEI
or ONA.476 Instead, the FCC simply mandated that the LECs minimize
transmission costs. Although the FCC recognized that collocation would
often represent the most efficient form of equal access available, when space
was extremely limited other means might well prove to be more cost
effective.477
During 1992 and 1993, the FCC lifted the structural separation
requirement as soon as individual BOCs had shown that the plans that they
had filed met the various ONA requirements.478 A series of judicial
challenges has failed to resolve the legality of the FCC’s Computer III
regime.479 In the meantime, the FCC has continued to require the BOCs and

eventually stopped short of such “fundamental unbundling,” instead approving a “common ONA model”
that did not require the LECS to disaggregate its network into individual facilities and instead allowed the
LECs to provide access of somewhat larger aggregations of network elements. BOC ONA Order, 4
F.C.C.R. at 13 ¶¶ 5-8, 41 ¶ 69.
476
See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037 ¶¶ 151-153, 1042 ¶ 164 (ruling that CEI
did not require mandatory collocation); id. at 1066 ¶ 218 (extending the same principles to ONA); accord
Filing and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1,
41 ¶ 69 (1988) (“BOC ONA Order”) (recognizing that the Computer III Phase I Order did not order
“mandated interconnection on carriers’ premises of faculties owned by others”), on reconsideration, 5
F.C.C.R. 3084, 3092 ¶¶ 69-72 (1990), aff’d sub nom. California v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993)
(“California II”).
477
See Computer III Phase I Order, 104 F.C.C.2d at 1037 ¶¶ 151-153, 1042 ¶ 164 (ruling that CEI
did not require mandatory collocation); id. at 1066 ¶ 218 (extending the same principles to ONA). The
FCC has reaffirmed this decision on numerous occasions. See, e.g., Application of Open Network
Architecture and Nondiscrimination Safeguards to GTE Corp., Memorandum Opinion and Order, 11
F.C.C.R. 1388, 1414 ¶ 57 (1995); Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards &
Tier 1 Local Exchange Co. Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7600-01 ¶ 64 (1991); Filing
and Review of Open Network Architecture Plans, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 4 F.C.C.R. 1, 94
¶¶ 181-183 (1988), on reconsideration, 5 F.C.C.R. 3084, 3092 ¶¶ 69-72 (1990), aff’d sub nom. California
v. FCC, 4 F.3d 1505 (9th Cir. 1993) (“California II”).
478
See Computer III Further Remand Notice, 10 F.C.C.R. at 8366 n.22 (citing cases).
479
The Ninth Circuit initially overturned the Computer III regime as arbitrary and capricious on the
grounds that the FCC had not adequately justified its decision to rely on nonstructural safeguards. See
California I, 905 F.2d at 1230-39. In response, the FCC strengthened ONA by imposing mandatory price
cap regulation on the BOCs and by establishing new cost accounting rules that would make
anticompetitive activity easier to detect. The FCC also reaffirmed its conclusion that nonstructural rather
than structural safeguards should govern BOC participation in the information services industry.
Computer III Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Safeguards & Tier 1 Local Exchange Co.
Safeguards, Report and Order, 6 F.C.C.R. 7571, 7578-88 ¶¶ 14-41, 7617-25 ¶¶ 98-109 (1996), vacated
and remanded in part sub nom. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California III”), cert.
denied, 514 U.S. 1050 (1995). As noted earlier, the FCC also simultaneously weakened ONA somewhat
by shifting from a “fundamental unbundling” approach in which ISPs could obtain access to the BOCs’
networks on an element-by-element basis to a less granular approach to unbundling in which unbundling
was defined in terms of network services rather than facilities. See supra note 475. The Ninth Circuit
again partially vacated the FCC’s ONA regime on the grounds that the FCC had failed to explain its shift
away from fundamental unbundling. California v. FCC, 39 F.3d 919, 925-30 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California
III”). The FCC has issued a series of notices attempting to address the concerns raised by the Ninth
Circuit. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced
Servs., Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360 (1995); Computer III Further Remand
Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking,
14 F.C.C.R. 6040 (1998) (“Computer III Further Remand Notice”). These proceedings, however, have
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GTE to comply with the ONA plans already filed with and approved by the
FCC.480 Furthermore, courts rejected the FCC’s attempt to preclude states
from imposing more stringent access requirements on the LECs.481 States
were free to impose more stringent requirements over enhanced services that
were provided intrastate. As will be discussed in greater detail later, certain
states, such as Oregon, enacted their own ONA regimes that did mandate
physical collocation.482
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 — As noted earlier, the 1996 Act
requires incumbent LECs to interconnect with other telecommunications
carriers on just and reasonable terms and to provide other
telecommunications carriers with access to all of its network elements on an
unbundled basis.483 In a series of orders, the FCC has determined that these
statutory obligations apply to many of the elements needed to provide DSL
service. Specifically, the FCC initially ruled that the interconnection
obligations of the 1996 Act apply to facilities and equipment used to provide
data services as well as voice services484 and declined to use its forbearance
authority to exempt advanced services from those requirements.485 In
addition, the FCC concluded that the high frequency portion of the loop used
to carry DSL is a network element subject to unbundled access,486 as well as
most attached electronics.487 As with all network elements subject to the
1996 Act’s unbundled access requirement, the FCC ruled that access to DSL
yet to be completed. See Computer III Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of
Enhanced Servs., Report and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 4289, 4292 n.6 (1999).
480
Bell Operating Cos.’ Joint Petition for Waiver of Computer II Rules, Memorandum Opinion and
Order, 10 F.C.C.R. 1724 (Common Carrier Bur. 1995) (“Interim Waiver Order”); accord Computer III
Further Remand Proceedings: Bell Operating Co. Provision of Enhanced Servs., Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 10 F.C.C.R. 8360, 8369 ¶ 11 (1995).
481
California v. FCC, 905 F.2d 1217, 1239-45 (9th Cir. 1990) (“California I”).
482
See, e.g., OR. ADMIN. R. 860-035-0110; infra notes 551 and accompanying text.
483
See supra notes 11, 35, 304-310 and accompanying text. The 1996 Act also initially prohibited
BOCs from offering in-region alarm monitoring services, 47 U.S.C. § 275(a)(1), and temporarily required
the BOCs to offer information services and electronic publishing through a separate subsidiary. Id.
§§ 272(a)(2)(C), 274(a). These restrictions have since expired. Id. §§ 272(f)(2), 274(g)(2), 275(a)(1).
484
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Memorandum
Opinion and Order, and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 24012, 24034-35 ¶¶ 46-47 (1998)
(“Advanced Servs. Order”), remanded sub nom. US West Communications, Inc. v. FCC, No. 98-1410
(D.C. Cir. Aug. 25, 1999) (unpublished disposition available at 1999 WL 728555).
485
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Memorandum
Opinion and Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 13 F.C.C.R. 15280 (1998).
486
Advanced Servs. Order, 13 F.C.C.R.. at 24036-38 ¶¶ 52-54; Deployment of Wireline Servs.
Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Third Report and Order in CC Docket No. 98-147 and Fourth
Report and Order in CC Docket No. 96-98, 14 F.C.C.R. 20912 (2000) (“Line Sharing Order”); 47 C.F.R.
§ 51.319(h). The FCC later clarified In addition, incumbent LECs must condition (i.e., remove equipment
from) loops upon request. 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)(3), (h)(5); Implementation of Local Competition
Provisions of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Third Report and Order and Fourth Further Notice of Proposed
Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 3696, 3775 ¶ 172, 3783-84 ¶¶ 190-194 (1999) (“UNE Remand Order”). The
D.C. Circuit affirmed that incumbent LECs’ DSL-based advanced services are subject to 47 U.S.C.
§ 251(c). WorldCom, Inc. v. FCC, 246 F.3d 690, 693-95 (D.C. Cir. 2001). The court did vacate and
remand the order so that the FCC could determine whether DSL-based advanced services constituted
“exchange access” or “telephone exchange service.” Id. at 695-96.
487
UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3776-77 ¶ 175.
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components would be governed by the forward-looking incremental cost
approach embodied in TELRIC.488
The FCC stopped short of mandating unbundled access to the packet
switching technology owned by the incumbent LEC, including DSLAMs.
While unbundled access to routing and switching capability was appropriate
in the circuit switched market, in which the higher utilization rates enjoyed
by the incumbent LECs allowed them to achieve significant economies of
scale, incumbent LECs did not maintain a monopoly position in packet
switching. In addition, the FCC recognized that investments in facilities
used to provide service to nascent markets such as broadband carried
significantly greater risks than those in established markets. Therefore,
despite the fact that the failure to mandate unbundled access in effect
required new entrants to incur the costs associated with collocating their own
equipment, the potential adverse effect on investment incentives led the FCC
to refuse to mandate unbundled access to DSLAMs and other related
technology.489
The FCC did allow for one exception to this ruling. The FCC ruled that
incumbent LECs that employ DLCs must provide unbundled access to
packet switching equipment when the incumbent LEC has placed a DSLAM
in a remote terminal without allowing other carriers to do the same through
physical collocation.490 In addition, although incumbent LECs need not
provide unbundled access to its own DSLAMs, they must allow requesting
carriers to collocate DSLAMs and other equipment needed to route data
communications into the requesting carrier’s packet switched network.491
The FCC’s conclusions with respect to collocation largely paralleled its
conclusions with respect to interconnection and unbundled access.
Transmission and termination equipment, including multiplexers, could be
collocated on LEC premises. New entrants were not permitted, however, to
collocate packet switches and other equipment used solely to provide
488

Line Sharing Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 20973 ¶ 132, 20974-81 ¶¶ 135-157.
UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3835-37 ¶¶ 306-309, 3839-40 ¶¶ 314-317; see also Local
Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15713 ¶ 427.
490
The regulations also require that no spare copper loops capable of providing DSL service be
available. UNE Remand Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 3838 ¶ 313; 47 C.F.R. § 51.319(a)(5).
491
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Fourth Report and
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 15435, 15460-63 ¶¶ 45-51 (2001) (“Collocation Remand Order”), petition for review
pending sub nom. Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, No. 01-1371 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2001). The FCC
originally ruled that new entrants were also entitled to physically collocate any equipment that was “used
or useful” for interconnection or access to unbundled network elements, regardless of other functionalities
inherent in such equipment. Collocation Order, 14 F.C.C.R. at 4776 ¶ 28; Local Competition Order, 11
F.C.C.R. at 15794 ¶ 579. The D.C. Circuit struck this ruling down as a violation of the statutory
requirement limiting collocation to equipment that is “necessary” for interconnection or unbundled access.
GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416, 424 (D.C. Cir. 2000). On remand, the FCC limited collocation to
equipment whose primary purpose and function is to provide the requesting carrier with “equal in quality”
interconnection or “nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element. Collocation Remand
Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44. Stand-alone switching and routing equipment fell within this
standard. Id. at 15460-63 ¶ 45-51. The new collocation provisions would not extend to computer servers,
databases, and other equipment used to support a requesting carrier’s network. Id. at 15463-64 ¶ 53.
489

109

http://law.bepress.com/nwwps-plltp/art30

enhanced services, since such equipment was unrelated to the transmission
and termination of telephone exchange service and exchange access.492 The
FCC later clarified the manner in which these rules applied to multifunction
equipment by explaining that incumbent LECs must permit collocation of
any equipment that was “used” or “useful for interconnection or access to
unbundled network elements, regardless of any other functionalities that may
be offered by that equipment.493 As a result, competitors had the right to
collocate such equipment as DSLAMs, routers, ATM multiplexers, and
remote switching modules, which are designed both to terminate and switch
broadband traffic.494
The D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC’s decision permitting the
collocation of multifunction equipment.495 Invoking the Supreme Court’s
admonition that the term “necessary” must be construed according to its
ordinary meaning, which is limited to what is required to achieve a desired
goal and is not so broad as to apply to anything that simply increases the
costs faced by the requesting carrier,496 the court reasoned that the FCC’s
decision to mandate collocation of any equipment “used” or “useful” for
interconnection or access to unbundled network elements conflicted with the
statutory requirement that collocation be limited to equipment that was
“necessary to achieve reasonable collocation.”497
A subsequent D.C. Circuit decision also struck down the FCC’s decision
requiring unbundled access to the high frequency portion of local loops.498
The court based this decision on the FCC’s own findings recognizing that
DSL faced robust competition from cable modem providers and (to a lesser
extent) satellite broadband providers. In fact, cable modems had established
the early lead, having captured fifty-four percent of the market for highspeed lines, with DSL having captured only twenty-eight percent.499 At this
point of the race, however, “ ‘no competitor has a large embedded base of
paying residential customers,’ ” and as a result the “ ‘record does not indicate

492

Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15794-96 ¶¶ 580-581.
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and
Order and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4776-79 ¶¶ 28-31 (1999) (“Collocation
Order”).
494
Id. at 4776-77 ¶¶ 27-28.
495
GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 205 F.3d 416 (D.C. Cir. 2000). For an earlier discussion of this case,
see supra notes 315, 354, 370 and accompanying text.
496
AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 389-90 (1999).
497
Id. at 422-24. In so holding, the D.C. Circuit invoked the Supreme Court’s admonition that the
term “necessary” must be construed according to its ordinary meaning, which is limited to what is
required to achieve a desired goal and is not so broad as to apply to anything that simply increases the
costs faced by the requesting carrier. Id. at 423 (citing Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 389-90).
498
United States Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 290 F.3d 415, 428-29 (D.C. Cir. 2002).
499
Id. at 428-29 (citing Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All
Ams. in Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to
Section 706 of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 2844, 2864 ¶ 44,
2865 ¶ 48 (2002)).
493
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that the consumer market is inherently a natural monopoly’ ”500 Drawing
guidance from Justice Breyer’s observation that mandatory unbundling
creates disincentives in both innovation and investment and requires network
owners to become embroiled in the tangled management inherent whenever a
system of well defined property rights is into a common resource subject to
shared use,501 the D.C. Circuit concluded that compelling access to the high
frequency portions of loops exceeded the “necessary” and “impair”
requirements of the 1996 Act.502
The FCC has revised its rules to limit collocation of multifunction
equipment to equipment whose primary purpose is to provide the requesting
carrier either with interconnection that is “equal in quality” to the that
provided by the incumbent LEC for its own services or with
“nondiscriminatory access” to an unbundled network element.503 The FCC
asserted that even if the collocation effected a per se taking, any issues
relating to just compensation are more properly addressed after the
methodology in question had been implemented in an actual rate order.504 A
judicial challenge to the revised collocation rules is pending before the D.C.
Circuit.505
Reconciling the Two Regimes — Although some commentators have
suggested that the Telecommunications Act of 1996 superseded the
Computer III regime,506 both regimes continue to govern in slightly different
spheres. For example, the range of entities that must provide access under
the 1996 Act is broader than the range of entities that must provide access
under Computer III, since the relevant provisions of the 1996 Act cover all
incumbent LECs whereas ONA applies only to BOCs and GTE.507 In
addition, the range of entities that may request access under the 1996 Act is
somewhat narrower than those entitled to access under Computer III.
Because the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the 1996
Act only extend to “telecommunications carriers,”508 which are defined to
include only those who offer pure transport services to the public without
500
Id. (quoting Inquiry Concerning Deployment of Advanced Telecomms. Capability to All Ams. in
Reasonable & Timely Fashion, & Possible Steps to Accelerate Such Deployment Pursuant to Section 706
of Telecomms. Act of 1996, Report, 14 F.C.C.R. 2398, 2423 ¶ 48 (1999)).
501
Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. at 428-29 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
502
United States Telecom Ass’n, 290 F.3d at 429 (holding that the FCC’s Line Sharing Order was
tainted by the same error as the provisions discussed in the earlier portions of the opinion, which focused
on the “necessary” and “impair” standards). For a more complete description of the “necessary” and
“impair” standards, see supra notes 315, 500-501 and accompanying text.
503
Collocation Remand Order, 16 F.C.C.R. at 15452-60 ¶¶ 32-44.
504
Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Order on
Reconsideration and Second Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 8-147 and Fifth
Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking in CC Docket No. 96-98, 15 F.C.C.R. 17806, 17839 ¶ 69 (2000)
(“Collocation Reconsideration Order”).
505
See Verizon Cal., Inc. v. FCC, No. 01-1371 (D.C. Cir. filed Aug. 23, 2001).
506
See Cannon, supra note 463, at 681.
507
See supra note 467.
508
47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(2), (3).
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making any change in the form or content of the information as sent and
received,509 it does not cover pure ESPs, who use computer processing to
modify user-supplied information without providing transmission services to
end users.510 In addition, the two regimes have a different geographic
scope.511
The FCC launched a series of ongoing proposals reconsidering various
features of the current regulatory regime. For example, in one proceeding,
the FCC reevaluated whether the high-frequency portion of the loop should
continue to be a network element subject to unbundled access.512 Another
proceeding considered comments on the rules governing the unbundling513
and physical collocation rules of DSLAMs at remote terminals.514 Finally,
the FCC opened a sweeping inquiry attempting to rationalize these two
regulatory regimes. In particular, this proceeding explored whether
technological changes or the enactment of the 1996 Act justify or require the
modification or elimination of part or all of the CEI and ONA regime created
by Computer III.515
For our purposes, the key fact is that, in contrast the federal ONA
regime, the local competition provisions of the 1996 Act and certain state
ONA regimes gives requesting carriers the right to physically collocate
DSLAMs and switching and routing equipment on the incumbent LECs
property, whether in central offices or remote terminals.516 Like all
unbundled network elements governed by the 1996 Act, the rates that
incumbent LECs may charge for conditioned loops and physical collocation
are governed by TELRIC.
509
See id. § 153(43), (44), (46). The FCC determined telecommunications carriers remain within the
scope of the interconnection and unbundled access provisions of the 1996 Act even if they also offer
information services through the same arrangement. Local Competition Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 15988-90
¶¶ 992-995.
510
Computer III Further Remand Notice, 13 F.C.C.R. at 6061 ¶ 32, 6090 ¶ 92.
511
The separate subsidiary requirements for BOC provision of information services under the 1996
Act are limited to interLATA information services, 47 U.S.C. § 271(a)(2)(C), except for electronic
publishing services, which must be provided through a separate subsidiary regardless if offered on an
interLATA or an intraLATA basis, 47 U.S.C. § 274(a). The separate subsidiary requirements enacted by
Computer II and the nonstructural safeguards enacted by Computer III do not distinguish between
interLATA and intraLATA information services. As a result, interLATA information services are subject
to both section 271 of the 1996 Act and ONA/CEI. IntraLATA services (aside from electronic
publishing) are subject only to CEI and ONA. Non-Accounting Safeguards Order, 11 F.C.C.R. at 2196971 ¶¶ 132-134.
512
Review of Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 16 F.C.C.R. 22781, 22805-06 ¶ 53 (2001) (“Triennial UNE Review Notice”).
513
Id. at 22809 ¶ 61 (opening up to reconsideration the rule requiring unbundled access to DSLAMs
in remote terminals where collocation is impossible and alternative copper loops are unavailable);
Collocation Reconsideration Order, 15 F.C.C.R. at 17851-54 ¶¶ 103-112 (opening general inquiry into
unbundled access at remote terminals).
514
See Deployment of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, Order on
Reconsideration and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 15 F.C.C.R. 17044 (2000).
515
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3040-43 ¶¶ 43-53 (2002).
516
See supra notes 286-287, 295, 307-308, 481 and accompanying text.

112

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

b. Cable Modem Systems — Cable modems represent the other
principal technology for providing broadband services to residential
customers.517 Cable modem systems provide data communications through
the network of coaxial cables originally designed to provide a uniform
stream of video programming in one direction running from the network to
all subscribers. Before a cable network can be used to provide cable modem
service, it must be transformed from the typical tree-and-branch
infrastructure associated with transmitting television programming into a
ring or star-type infrastructure. This is usually accomplished through a
hybrid fiber-coaxial (HFC) architecture that is quite similar to the DLC
architecture discussed above.518 In an HFC architecture, fiber optic cables
are used to connect the cable headend to a satellite facility known as a
neighborhood node. The final connection between the neighborhood node
and the subscribers is made through copper-based coaxial cables. Cable
modem service also requires special equipment at the headend known as a
Cable Modem Termination System to manage the flow of data between cable
subscribers and various types of broadband services, such as e-mail, IP
telephony, content cached locally, and content residing on the World Wide
Web.
FIGURE 5
TYPICAL CONFIGURATION OF CABLE MODEM SYSTEM
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The principal access-related policy question with respect to cable modem
systems has been the extent to which the government should ensure that
cable modem customers have some degree of choice among ISPs, an issue to
which litigants and commentators have variously referred as either “open
access” or “forced access,” depending on the particular biases of the party

517
518

The ensuing regulatory history draws on the discussion in Yoo, supra note 9, at 175-76, 250-51.
See supra note 461 and accompanying text.
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using the term.519 In an apparent attempt to sidestep the political overtones
associated with either designation, the FCC opted to refer to the issue as
“multiple ISP access.”520
Questions about multiple ISP access first arose during the FCC’s review
of AT&T’s proposed acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne. In those
proceedings, a number of parties argued that allowing AT&T to bring both
physical transmission and ISP services under the same corporate umbrella
would allow AT&T to use its control over cable to harm competition in the
market for ISPs. As a result, these parties asked the FCC to force AT&T to
allow independent ISPs to interconnect with AT&T’s cable modem service
network on nondiscriminatory terms.521 Consistent with its longstanding
policy of nonregulation of computer-based services,522 the FCC refused to
impose multiple ISP access as a merger condition in either case.523
Since cable operators are subject to municipal as well as federal
regulation, advocates of multiple ISP access pressed their arguments before
municipal regulators. Some of these municipal authorities were more
accommodating than was the FCC, either mandating open access by
municipal ordinance524 or requiring it as a condition for the transfer of a
license needed to complete AT&T’s acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne.525
This municipal-based strategy was soon cut short by a series of judicial
decisions holding that municipal franchising authorities lacked the
jurisdiction to compel multiple ISP access.526

519
See Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations
from MediaOne Group, Inc., Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order,
15 F.C.C.R. 9816, 9866 ¶ 114 (2000) (“AT&T-MediaOne Merger”).
520
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4839 ¶ 72 (2002).
521
See AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at 9866 ¶¶ 114-115; Applications for Consent to
Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations from Tele-Communications, Inc.,
Transferor, to AT&T Corp., Transferee, Memorandum Opinion and Order, 14 F.C.C.R. 3160, 3197-98
¶ 75 (1999) (“AT&T-TCI Merger”).
522
See, e.g., Amendment of Section 64.702 of Comm’n’s Rules and Regulations (Second Computer
Inquiry), Order, 77 F.C.C.2d 384, 432-33 ¶¶ 124-127 (1980) (“Computer II Final Decision”), aff’d sub
nom. Computer & Communications Indus. Ass’n v. FCC, 693 F.2d 198 (D.C. Cir. 1982), cert. denied, 461
U.S. 938 (1983); Regulatory & Policy Problems Presented by the Interdependence of Computer &
Communication Servs. & Facilities, Final Decision and Order, 28 F.C.C.2d 267, 270 ¶ 11 (1970), aff’d
sub nom. GTE Serv. Corp. v. FCC, 474 F.2d 724 (2d Cir. 1973).
523
AT&T-TCI Merger, 14 F.C.C.R. at 3205-08 ¶¶ 92-96; AT&T-MediaOne Merger, 15 F.C.C.R. at
9872-73 ¶ 127.
524
See Comcast Cablevision of Broward County, Inc. v. Broward County, 124 F. Supp. 2d 685, 68687 (S.D. Fla. 2000).
525
See MediaOne Group, Inc. v. County of Henrico, 257 F.3d 356, 360 (4th Cir. 2001); AT&T Corp.
v. City of Portland, 216 F.3d 871, 875 (9th Cir. 2000). See generally LATHEN, supra note 459, at 14-15.
526
The Ninth Circuit’s decision followed from its conclusion that cable modem service constituted a
“telecommunications service. AT&T, 216 F.3d at 878-79. The Fourth Circuit was more circumspect
about the proper regulatory classification of cable modem service, holding instead that requiring open
access violated the statutory provision contained in 47 U.S.C. § 541(b)(3)(D) prohibiting franchising
authorities from requiring cable operators to provide telecommunications facilities. MediaOne, 257 F.3d
at 363-64.

114

Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press

It was not until the merger between America Online and Time Warner
that multiple ISP access advocates were able to garner sustainable victories.
The order of the Federal Trade Commission (FTC) approving the merger
required that AOL Time Warner allow cable modem subscribers the option
of choosing from among at least three unaffiliated ISPs in addition to its
proprietary ISP, America Online and Roadrunner.527 The order also required
AOL Time Warner to provide all of these unaffiliated ISPs with “Access,”
which the order defined as the right to interconnect at the same connection
points that AOL Time Warner provided to its own affiliated ISPs.528 In
addition, the order required that AOL Time Warner not discriminate against
the content provided by unaffiliated ISPs and that all ISP service agreements
include a “most favored nation clause” that allowed unaffiliated ISPs to avail
themselves of the most attractive terms obtained by AOL from other
unaffiliated cable systems.529
In contradiction to its rejection of similar arguments in AT&T’s
acquisitions of TCI and MediaOne, the FCC abruptly reversed course and
endorsed the FTC’s requirement that Time Warner and America Online
negotiate open access with at least three unaffiliated ISPs as a condition to
their merger.530 Although the FCC claimed that its decision did not portend
how it would eventually resolve multiple ISP access as a matter of general
regulatory policy,531 the breadth of the reasoning contained in its decision
approving the merger suggested that it might approve even more sweeping
action in the future.532 Multiple ISP access has also emerged as an issue in
the Comcast’s proposed acquisition of AT&T’s cable holdings.533 In fact,
AT&T and Comcast have voluntarily undertaken to implement multiple ISP
access in an apparent attempt to boost chances of regulatory approval for
their transaction.534
527
The FTC order allowed AOL Time Warner to begin providing cable service in twenty
specifically identified geographic areas so long as cable modem subscribers had the option of subscribing
to Earthlink, so long as AOL Time Warner provided at least two additional unaffiliated ISP options within
ninety days. America Online, Inc., No. C-3989, slip op. at 6-7 (F.T.C. Dec. 18, 2000) (Decision and
Order), at http://www.ftc.gov/os/2000/12/aoldando.pdf. In all other geographic areas, the order did not
condition the initial offering of services on the availability of Earthlink as an option. Instead, it simply
required AOL Time Warner to provide at least three unaffiliated ISPs within ninety days of making its
own, proprietary ISP services available. Id. at 8. The FTC also authorized the appointment of a trustee to
monitor compliance with its order. Id. at 12-17.
528
Id. at 11; see also id. at 2 (defining “Access”).
529
Id. at 9, 11.
530
Applications for Consent to Transfer of Control of Licenses & Section 214 Authorizations by
Time Warner, Inc. and America Online, Inc., Transferors, to AOL Time Warner Inc., Transferee,
Memorandum Opinion and Order, 16 F.C.C.R. 6547, 6568-69 ¶ 57 (2001) (“AOL-Time Warner Merger”).
531
Id. at 6569 ¶ 58.
532
See id. at 36-57 ¶¶ 81-127.
533
See Yochai J. Dreazen, AT&T, Comcast Likely to Get Regulators’ Nod, WALL ST. J., Dec. 21,
2001, at A3; Yochai J. Dreazen, AT&T, Comcast Assert Benefits of Cable Union Outweigh Risks, WALL
ST. J., Apr. 24, 2002, at D4.
534
Julia Angwin, AT&T to Offer EarthLink Inc. on Cable Lines, WALL ST. J., Mar. 13, 2002, at B7;
Julia Angwin, Comcast, United Online Set Deal for Internet, WALL ST. J., Feb. 27, 2002, at B4.
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Since then, however, the FCC’s initial reticence to impose multiple ISP
access seems to have reasserted itself. The FCC concluded that cable
modem service is an interstate “information service.”535 This decision has
twofold significance. First, in rejecting the Ninth Circuit’s conclusion that
cable modem services constituted “telecommunications services,” the FCC
removed cable modem service from the interconnection, unbundled access,
and physical collocation requirements contained in the 1996 Act.536 Second,
the FCC’s decision placed cable modems in a regulatory category
traditionally associated with nonregulation. Classifying cable modem
service as an information service was thus generally regarded as a signal that
the FCC was unlikely to mandate multiple ISP access.537 That said, the FCC
explicitly acknowledged that multiple ISP access remained an open issue and
specifically requested comments on the relative merits of imposing multiple
ISP access538 and specifically requested comments on the free speech and
takings implications of compelling such access.539
2. Economic Arguments in Favor of Market Value
If access to broadband inputs is to be mandated, economic theory
indicates that access rates should be market price. As we have repeatedly
emphasized, doing so would promote allocative efficiency by giving
purchasers and providers alike the appropriate signals for calibrating
consumption and production levels. In addition, basing access rates on
market prices would enhance dynamic efficiency by providing the incentives
need to attract the investments needed to finance the deployment of the
various broadband technologies. As the FCC has repeatedly recognized,
issues surrounding investment and innovation are of the utmost importance
when the market involved is nascent one.540
Although market prices might have previously been difficult to
determine, the emergence of new technologies capable of providing highspeed broadband services are making this task increasingly easy. As noted
earlier, communications companies are providing preparing to provide
broadband services through a wide variety of wireless technologies,
535
Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities, Declaratory
Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4820-39 ¶ 34-69 (2002) (“Cable Modem
NPRM”).
536
Interestingly, classifying cable modem service as an information service to some extent reopened
the possibility that it might be subject to municipal regulation, as demonstrated by the fact that the FCC
actively sought comments on this specific point. Id. at 4849 ¶ 100.
537
Yochai J. Dreazen, FCC Ruling Frees Cable-TV Firms from Sharing Wires, WALL ST. J., Mar.
15, 2002, at B2.
538
Cable Modem NPRM, 17 F.C.C.R. at 4840-41 ¶ 74, 4843-47 ¶¶ 83-93.
539
Id. at 4843 ¶¶ 80-81.
540
See, e.g., Inquiry Concerning High-Speed Access to Internet over Cable & Other Facilities,
Declaratory Ruling and Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 4798, 4802 ¶ 5 (2002); Deployment
of Wireline Servs. Offering Advanced Telecomms. Capability, First Report and Order and Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 14 F.C.C.R. 4761, 4763 ¶ 2 (1999) (“Collocation Order”).
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including PCS, MDS, ancillary and supplemental service provided via digital
television, and 3G mobile wireless devices.541 These services are similar in
geographic scope to those provided by cable modem and local telephone
systems. Although these services are still in their nascent stages, when fully
operational they should provide a ready basis for determining the value of
the transmission of services.
In addition, DBS companies have begun to provide broadband service
via satellite that is beginning to compete directly with cable modem systems
and ADSL.542 These too can provide a market-based benchmark for the
value of the network services. Again, the fact that DBS is necessarily
national in scope and differences in the quality of the broadband services
provided can complicate any direct comparison between DBS and other
wireline broadband services that are more regional in scope. That said, the
existence of these substitutes can provide useful guidance as to the value of
the services being provided under a regime of compelled access.
Should these alternative technologies be insufficiently developed to
allow direct determination of market prices, economic theory indicates that
regulatory authorities should base rates on ECPR, which sets rates as the sum
of the forward-looking incremental cost and the opportunity cost associated
with providing access. The opportunity cost of providing network access is
determined by subtracting direct incremental costs from the retail price in the
final goods market. The primary reason that the FCC has been reluctant for
allowing this issue in the context of DSL has been because the retail prices
supposedly reflected monopoly returns. Although this position is at least
arguable in the case of local telephony,543 it is unsupportable in the case of
broadband. The FCC and the courts have recognized that vibrant
competition exists, and the impending arrival of additional competitors
should only cause it to intensify.544
Indeed, the presence of this competition raises serious questions whether
compelling access to high-speed broadband facilities represents sensible
economic policy. Access requirements only make sense if there is a true
bottleneck facility that in effect gives a company a natural monopoly. When
competition exists, compelling access at best accomplishes nothing, since
parties who negotiate agreements on other terms will simply negotiate
around access rates that are set too high.545 Access rates that are set too low,
however, can harm allocative efficiency by creating the shortages and

541

See supra notes 413, 415-417, 499-500 and accompanying text.
See supra note 414 and accompanying text.
543
See supra notes 325, 368-369 and accompanying text.
544
See supra notes 412-417, 499-500 and accompanying text.
545
This presumes that access rates will follow the model established by the 1996 Act and allow
parties to negotiate their own arrangements rather than requiring carriers to provide services on a tariffed
basis.
542
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distortions inevitably associated with prices that are not calibrated to balance
supply and demand.
Even worse, compelling access can harm dynamic efficiency, by
eliminating the need for firms to invest in substitute facilities. By rescuing
those who need alternative means of transmission from having to invest in
alternative capacity, access requirements can forestall the emergence of
competition by depriving other facilities-based competitors of their natural
strategic partners. Access requirements can thus have the perverse effect of
cementing the existing technologies into place. Indeed, that is the clear
import of the FCC’s recent notice of proposed rulemaking underscoring the
importance of taking a more functional approach from the consumers’
perspective546 and recognizing the emergence of multiple options in
providing broadband service, including cable, telephony, wireless, and
satellite.547 Indeed, it was the emergence of this competition that led the
FCC to seek comment on whether access requirements should be
foregone.548
There is thus good reason to question whether the FCC should compel
access to broadband networks. If such access requirements are to be
imposed, however, economic theory indicates that rates for such access
should be based on market prices. Any attempt to base access prices solely
on direct cost, as is currently done under TELRIC, fails to acknowledge that
market value of network access is determined by the value of the services
sold through the network, not the cost of the network itself. Not only is this
appropriate in light of the fact that networks are capital assets that are not
consumes; it also reflects the demand-side considerations that underlie
neoclassical economics. The presence of substitute facilities should permit
market value to be determined through a comparison to actual market
transactions or through the opportunity cost component mandated by ECPR.
The presence of direct competition makes it unlikely that prices set in this
manner will allow network owners to recover supracompetitive returns.
3. Constitutional Arguments in Favor of Market Value
The Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence provides another reason for
requiring that any access requirement imposed by the FCC be priced at
market value. The issues are the clearest with respect to DSL. Although the
D.C. Circuit vacated the regulations providing that the high frequency
portion of the loop constituted a network element that was subject to
unbundled access under the 1996 Act, it left intact the regulations giving
requesting telecommunications carriers the right to physically collocate
546
Appropriate Framework for Broadband Access to Internet over Wireline Facilities, Notice of
Proposed Rulemaking, 17 F.C.C.R. 3019, 3023 ¶ 7 (2002).
547
Id. at 3037-38 ¶¶ 36-37.
548
Id. at 3040-42 ¶¶ 44-48.
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DSLAMs and other routing equipment on the incumbent LEC’s property.549
It seems clear as a matter of first principles that such a requirement
constitutes the type of permanent physical occupation held to constitute a per
se taking in Loretto.
Lower court precedent supports this conclusion as well. A similar issue
arose in GTE Northwest, Inc. v. Public Utility Commission.550 At issue in
that case was the regulatory provision enacted by the Oregon Public Utility
Commission (PUC) similar to the ONA regime created by the FCC in
Computer III. The key difference was that Oregon’s regime required local
telephone companies to permit ESPs to physically collocate on their
property.551 After reviewing the relevant takings analysis contained in
Loretto, Florida Power, and Yee v. City of Escondido, the court concluded
that the physical collocation requirement was property characterized as the
type of permanent physical invasion held to be a per se taking in Loretto. In
so holding, the court rejected the argument that the fact that the PUC had
already placed restrictions on the telephone company’s ability to use its
property deprived it of any historically rooted expectation of compensation.
As the court reasoned, “the facts that an industry is heavily regulated, and
that a property owner acquired the property knowing that it is heavily
regulated, do not diminish a physical invasion to something less than a
taking.”552 The court also rejected the argument that physical collocation
represented nothing more than a restriction on the use of the telephone
company’s property that was more properly analyzed as a regulatory
taking.553 According to the court, the PUC lacked the statutory authority to
exercise the power of eminent domain. As a result, the Oregon Supreme
Court invalidated the PUC’s collocation regulations as beyond the PUC’s
statutory authority.554
The analysis with respect to cable modem systems is slightly more
ambiguous. Unless it mandates multiple ISP access as a general matter, the
FCC need not address precisely how and where the interconnection needed
for multiple ISP access should occur or how such access should be priced.555
None of the municipal ordinances requiring multiple ISP access set forth the
549

See supra notes 498-502 and accompanying text.
900 P.2d 495 (Or. 1995). The litigants in GTE Northwest framed their challenge in terms of the
Takings Clauses embodied in both the federal and the Oregon Constitutions. The court assumed without
deciding that the analysis would be the same under either provision. Id. at 501 n.6.
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See supra note 482 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 504.
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Id. at 505-06.
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Id. at 499-501. Note that sections 251 and 252 enacted by the Telecommunications Act of 1996
explicitly give state public utility commissions the right to enforce physical collocation provisions. 47
U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(6), 252. See generally Philip J. Weiser, Towards a Constitutional Architecture for
Cooperative Federalism, 79 N.C. L. REV. 663, 676-77 (2001). Although this in effect overturned the
Oregon Supreme Court’s holding with respect to the PUC’s authority to enforce physical collocation, it
did not in any way undercut the court’s conclusion that the physical collocation provisions of the Oregon
regulatory scheme constituted a per se taking under Loretto.
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parameters for interconnection or pricing guidelines, no consensus has
emerged among industry participants as to where the interconnection needed
for multiple ISP access should occur.556 Accordingly, the only operative
multiple ISP access requirements are those imposed as part of the regulatory
approval of the AOL-Time Warner merger, which gives certain unaffiliated
ISPs the right to interconnect at the same points as AOL Time Warner’s
proprietary ISPs.557 As a result, contrary to the suggestion of some
scholars,558 multiple ISP access to cable modem systems will likely require
the type of permanent physical invasion held to constitute a per se taking.
Consequently, cable modem system operators who are made subject to
multiple ISP access requirements would be entitled to fair market value as
compensation. As noted in the discussion regarding access to DSL networks,
the proliferation of technological alternatives is in the process of greatly
simplifying such a determination.559
CONCLUSION
There can be little question that compelling access to networks has
tremendous intuitive appeal as a potential regulatory response to the growing
influence of network technologies. Compelling access would seem to
increase the number of options presented to consumers and would appear to
offer the prospect of lowering the prices at which network services are
available. It goes without saying, however, that there is no free lunch: every
regulatory effort that seeks to promote the availability of any particular good
necessarily carries costs. Specifically, direct government intervention in
establishing access rates all too often fosters allocative inefficiency by
556
Id. at 38-39. Most of these ordinances simply required that cable modem systems provide
nondiscriminatory access by allowing unaffiliated ISPs to obtain carriage on the same terms as affiliated
ISPs. Although the ordinances in question failed to address the point, such schemes generally require
elaborate accounting and nonaccounting rules to ensure that the terms of the access agreements with
affiliated ISPs does not include any cross subsidies. See id. at 38, 44 (citing Implementation of NonAccounting Safeguards of Sections 271 and 272 of Communications Act of 1934, as Amended, First
Report and Order and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 11 F.C.C.R. 21905 (1996); and
Implementation of Telecomms. Act of 1996: Accounting Safeguards Under Telecomms. Act of 1996,
Report and Order, 11 F.C.C.R. 17539 (1996)). Thus contrary to the suggestion of some advocates of
multiple ISP access, see, e.g., Jim Chen, The Authority to Regulate Broadband Internet Access over
Cable, 16 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 677, 716 (2001), it is likely that any such scheme would require a
significant degree of public utility regulation..
557
See supra notes 527-529 and accompanying text. It should be noted that the multiple ISP access
scheme mandated by the FTC originally anticipated that the unaffiliated ISPs would place their own
routing and backbone access facilities within the cable headend in a manner that closely resembled
physical collocation. As actually implemented, however, multiple ISP access bears a greater resemblance
to virtual collocation, with all of the traffic exiting the headend via AOL’s backbone and interconnecting
with the unaffiliated ISPs network at some location outside the headend. As we have argued earlier, this
shift does not take the access regime outside the realm of physical takings, since multiple ISP access
would still require every cable modem system operator either to permit unaffiliated ISPs to establish a
physical connection to its network. See supra notes 370-375 and accompanying text.
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See, e.g., Chen, supra note 556, at 716.
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See supra note 544 and accompanying text.
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interfering with the mechanism through which consumers of network access
calibrate their overall level of purchases. Interference with market pricing
simultaneously causes secondary distortions in the markets for substitute
inputs by making the regulated input seem artificially attractive. This effect
further causes firms to adjust their production functions farther and farther
away from the most efficient mix of inputs.
What is even less obvious but no less important is the manner in which
government regulation of access pricing can impede dynamic efficiency.
Market prices play a critical role in encouraging firms who need access to
telecommunications networks to make the financial commitments needed to
deploy alternative network technologies. Compelling access at belowmarket rates only serves to dampen the price signal that normally would
stimulate investment in additional network capacity. In addition, by rescuing
those firms from having to make such investments, compelled access starves
firms seeking to deploy substitute technologies of the financial resources
needed to support the buildout of their networks. The arguments that
networks are unique economic phenomena to which ordinary economic
analysis does not apply simply do not withstand analysis.
Given the economic support for basing access rates on market pricing, it
should come as little surprise that the Supreme Court’s takings jurisprudence
supports the same conclusion. The only reason that policy makers and the
courts have sanctioned the use of cost-based rather than market-based rates is
that until recently the lack of competition among different network facilities
rendered market-based pricing of network access impossible.
The
emergence of technological alternatives capable of serving as substitutes and
the overarching shift in regulatory policy from output regulation to input
regulation has in effect caused the justifications for failing to base access
rates on market prices to fall away. Indeed, our discussion of the current
status of local telephone networks, utility pole networks, and wireline
broadband networks identifies the way in technology is now providing the
external benchmarks needed to support market-based access pricing that
were previously unavailable.
Numerous technical obstacles to implementing such a solution no doubt
remain. Many of the technologies to which we refer are only now in the
process of being deployed, and if previous policy making in other
technologies is any guide, numerous technical and accounting-related
difficulties doubtless remain, the final resolution of which exceeds the scope
of this Article. The economic and constitutional validity of market-based
pricing of access to networks should be sufficient to overcome these
administrative costs.
Market-based rates correctly identify both the
economic costs and the just compensation for takings in the “age of access.”
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